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JBL, Jabil Inc.

Electronic Components & Instruments asset-light

Jabil is one of the leading providers of engineering, manufacturing, and supply chain solutions.

We deliver comprehensive design, production, and product management services to companies across a diverse range of industries and end markets.

Our capabilities span the entire product lifecycle—from innovation, design, and planning to fabrication, assembly, and delivery—enabling seamless management of resources and materials across global supply chains.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

JBL · Jabil Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$29.8B

+3.2% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $33.6B 5-yr avg $31.2B

Gross margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%

Operating margin 4.3% 5-yr avg 4.6%

ROIC 32% 5-yr avg 36%

Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 8.1% and operating margin about 2.8% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 1.8% to 7.0% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

75% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

Other30%$8.8B
United States25%$7.4B
Mexico19%$5.7B
China14%$4.2B
Malaysia12%$3.6B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMay 2026
											Income statement
$18.4B	$19.1B	$22.1B	$25.3B	$27.3B	$29.3B	$33.5B	$34.7B	$28.9B	$29.8B	$33.6B	RevenueRevenue
8%	8%	8%	8%	7%	8%	8%	8%	9%	9%	9%	Gross marginGross mgn
5%	5%	5%	4%	4%	4%	3%	3%	4%	4%	4%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$523M	$410M	$542M	$701M	$500M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$2.0B	$1.2B	$1.4B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
2.8%	2.2%	2.5%	2.8%	1.8%	3.6%	4.2%	4.4%	7.0%	4.0%	4.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$254M	$129M	$86M	$287M	$54M	$696M	$996M	$818M	$1.4B	$657M	$862M	Net incomeNet inc.
34%	50%	—	36%	—	26%	19%	35%	21%	26%	26%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$916M	($1.5B)	($1.1B)	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.9B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$697M	$760M	$774M	$772M	$795M	$876M	$925M	$924M	$696M	$674M	$697M	DepreciationDeprec.
($35M)	($2.4B)	($2.0B)	$134M	$408M	($139M)	($270M)	($8M)	($368M)	$309M	$230M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$924M	$716M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$983M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.0B	$784M	$468M	$551M	CapexCapex
5.0%	3.8%	4.7%	4.0%	3.6%	4.0%	4.1%	3.0%	2.7%	1.6%	1.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$219M	($2.2B)	($1.9B)	$421M	$274M	$557M	$726M	$704M	$932M	$1.2B	$1.3B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.2%	−11.4%	−8.5%	1.7%	1.0%	1.9%	2.2%	2.0%	3.2%	3.9%	3.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($8M)	($2.2B)	($2.1B)	$188M	$274M	$274M	$266M	$704M	$932M	$1.2B	$1.3B	Free cash flowFCF
−0.0%	−11.4%	−9.7%	0.7%	1.0%	0.9%	0.8%	2.0%	3.2%	3.9%	3.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$242M	$37M	$110M	$153M	$147M	$50M	$18M	$29M	$90M	$392M	$851M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$62M	$60M	$58M	$52M	$50M	$50M	$48M	$45M	$42M	$36M	$35M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$148M	$307M	$450M	$350M	$215M	$428M	$696M	$487M	$2.5B	$1.0B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
9%	6%	8%	14%	8%	23%	29%	25%	66%	35%	32%	ROICROIC
10%	5%	4%	15%	3%	33%	41%	29%	80%	43%	65%	Return on equityROE
8%	3%	1%	12%	0%	30%	39%	27%	77%	41%	63%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$912M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$1.4B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	—	—	—	—	$3.1B	$4.0B	$3.6B	—	—	$3.6B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2.5B	$2.9B	$3.5B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$4.4B	$6.1B	$5.2B	$4.3B	$4.7B	$5.9B	InventoryInvent.
$3.6B	$4.3B	$4.9B	$5.2B	$5.7B	$6.8B	$8.0B	$5.7B	$6.2B	$7.9B	$11.9B	Accounts payablePayables
($1.1B)	($1.3B)	($1.5B)	($2.1B)	($2.6B)	$714M	$2.1B	$3.2B	($1.9B)	($3.3B)	($2.3B)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$5.8B	$6.6B	$7.5B	$8.3B	$9.1B	$10.9B	$13.9B	$14.7B	$12.8B	$13.7B	$18.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$5.6B	$6.9B	$7.2B	$8.5B	$9.1B	$10.7B	$13.7B	$12.7B	$11.8B	$13.7B	$18.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.2×	1.1×	1.0×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$595M	$608M	$628M	$622M	$697M	$715M	$704M	$621M	$661M	$841M	$1.2B	GoodwillGoodwill
$10.3B	$11.1B	$12.0B	$13.0B	$14.4B	$16.7B	$19.7B	$19.4B	$17.4B	$18.5B	$23.8B	Total assetsAssets
$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$3.4B	Total debtDebt
$1.2B	$888M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.1B	$679M	$952M	$2.0B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.8×	3.0×	3.6×	3.7×	2.9×	8.1×	9.2×	—	—	—	5.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$2.9B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
193M	186M	175M	159M	155M	152M	144M	136M	124M	111M	107M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$95.22	$102.58	$126.23	$159.41	$175.57	$192.54	$231.84	$255.35	$232.37	$268.73	$313.34	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.32	$0.69	$0.49	$1.81	$0.35	$4.58	$6.90	$6.02	$11.17	$5.92	$8.04	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.14	$-11.73	$-10.74	$2.65	$1.76	$3.66	$5.03	$5.18	$7.50	$10.57	$12.18	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.04	$-11.73	$-12.24	$1.19	$1.76	$1.80	$1.84	$5.18	$7.50	$10.57	$12.18	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.32	$0.32	$0.33	$0.33	$0.32	$0.33	$0.33	$0.33	$0.34	$0.32	$0.33	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.80	$3.86	$5.92	$6.34	$6.33	$7.62	$9.59	$7.58	$6.31	$4.22	$5.14	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.65	$12.66	$11.14	$11.90	$11.66	$14.04	$16.97	$21.09	$13.97	$13.64	$12.34	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+12.2%/yr	+8.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+28.1%/yr	+43.0%/yr
EPS	+18.2%/yr	+76.3%/yr
Dividends / share	+0.0%/yr	+0.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	−1.4%/yr	−7.8%/yr
Book value / share	+0.8%/yr	+3.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

111Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

35%low FY2017

Gross margin

9%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.8×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.2Bowner earningsvs.$657Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $657M of profit into $1.2B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$657M

Owner earnings$1.2B · 4% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$657M	$1.4B	$818M	$996M	$696M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$674M	+$696M	+$924M	+$925M	+$876M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$309M	−$368M	−$8M	−$270M	−$139M
Cash from operations	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.4B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$468M	−$784M	−$1.0B	−$925M	−$876M
Owner earnings	$1.2B	$932M	$704M	$726M	$557M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$460M	−$283M
Free cash flow	$1.2B	$932M	$704M	$266M	$274M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	3%	2%	2%	2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 7.8×

Comfortable

Operating income $1.2B ÷ interest expense $151M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $952M · 0.8× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $1.9B − debt $2.9B

What this means
Netting $1.9B of cash and short-term investments against $2.9B of debt leaves $952M owed, about 0.8× a year's operating profit (2.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 1d

Tight

DSO 45 + DIO 63 − DPO 107 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 14%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range 6%–66%; 35% latest = NOPAT $871M ÷ invested capital $2.5B

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 35% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $1.2B = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $468M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $68M of SBC) leaves $1.1B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.50×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.6B ÷ net income $657M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 88%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $1.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.2B

What this means
Of $1.2B Owner Earnings, $1.0B (88%) went back to shareholders, $36M dividends, $1.0B buybacks. Net of $68M stock comp, the real buyback was about $932M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.69×

Harvesting

Capex $468M ÷ depreciation $674M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $29.8B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.00×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.9B vs $6M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +510%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $9.11/share (latest year $6.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 5% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · 1.8% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −6.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If we are unable to offer technologically advanced, cost effective, quick response manufacturing services that are differentiated from our competition (including utilization of machine learning and artificial intelligence) and adapt those services as our customers' requirements change, demand for our services will decl…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$18.2B

Cash & short-term investments$1.4B
Receivables$3.6B
Inventory$5.9B
Other current assets$7.2B

Current liabilities$18.5B

Debt due within a year$499M
Accounts payable$11.9B
Other current liabilities$6.1B

Current ratio0.98×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.66×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.07×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($353M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$499M due · $1.4B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($532M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($4.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$3.9B$514M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.7B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$992Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$499M

'27$497M

'28$499M

'29$297M

'30$498M

later$595M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$499Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$996Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$499Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$2.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, May 31, 2026$1.4B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$1.2B

Together, against $499M due next year5.1×

Cash on hand as of May 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $2.5B against the $499M due in the twelve months after the Aug 31, 2025 schedule: 5.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Aug 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$320M

'27$134M

'28$96M

'29$83M

'30$65M

later$318M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$320Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$846Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.9B

Lease obligations (present value)$846M

Total fixed claims on the business$3.7B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.7B, of which the leases are 23%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Aug 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $9.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$9.5B · 106%
Dividends$503M · 6%
Buybacks$6.6B · 73%

Returned to owners$7.1B
749% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $503M as dividends and $6.6B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$7.6B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $7.6B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.1B to $3.4B.
Average price paid for buybacks$143.65
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 33M shares were bought for $4.7B, about $143.65 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $58.98 (2022) to $357.14 (2025); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $221.24 ($2.5B).
Net change in share count−44.4%
The diluted count fell from 193M to 107M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.32/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 0% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Mark Mondello	$15.6M	$56.0M	$557M
2022	Mr. Mark Mondello	$16.4M	$10.6M	$726M
2023	Mr. Kenneth Wilson	$10.2M	$24.8M	$704M
2023	Mr. Mark Mondello	$16.6M	$67.0M	$704M
2024	Mr. Kenneth Wilson	$11.9M	−$9.4M	$932M
2024	Mr. Michael Dastoor	$5.2M	$4.6M	$932M
2025	Mr. Michael Dastoor	$16.1M	$33.3M	$1.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$68M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Jabil Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.1B → $3.4B
Debt rose from $2.1B to $3.4B while owner earnings went from about ($1.3B) to $936M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?13% → 18% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $2.5B to $5.9B while revenue grew 83%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (13% of revenue then, 18% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$30.2B · 90% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“In fiscal year 2025, our five largest customers accounted for approximately 36% of our net revenue and 87 customers accounted for approximately 90% of our net revenue.”verify →
Does management own its misses?
1 plain admission in this year's filing
“The divestiture did not meet the criteria to be reported as discontinued operations, and we continued to report the operating results for the Mobility Business in our Consolidated Statements of Operations in the DMS segment until December 29, 2023 (the "Closing Date").”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
AVGOBroadcom Inc.	$63.9B	59%	25.4%	13%	42%
AMDAdvanced Micro Devices	$34.6B	45%	7.2%	6%	7%
JBLJabil Inc.	$29.8B	8%	3.2%	18%	2%
AMATApplied Materials Inc.	$28.4B	46%	27.9%	36%	22%
FLEXFlex Ltd.	$27.9B	7%	3.3%	15%	0%
APHAmphenol Corporation	$23.1B	32%	20.4%	18%	14%
CLSCelestica Inc.	$12.4B	10%	5.2%	19%	3%
SANMSanmina Corporation	$8.1B	8%	3.6%	12%	3%
Group median	—	21%	6.2%	16%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Jabil Inc. has delivered.

Jabil Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Jabil Inc. earns about $532M on its 1.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($532M) Net of stock comp (−$68M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($1.4B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+13%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+36%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.3B on 105M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-24; net debt $2.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($551M) runs well above depreciation ($697M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh JBL against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Jabil Inc. (JBL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/JBL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← JBI its page in the Manual JBLU →

Industry order: ← ITRI the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter KE →