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AOSL, Alpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited

Semiconductors asset-light Cyclical

We differentiate ourselves by integrating our expertise in technology, design and advanced manufacturing and packaging to optimize product performance and cost.

Our portfolio of products targets high-volume applications, including personal computers, graphic cards, game consoles, home appliances, power tools, smart phones, battery packs, consumer and industrial motor controls and power supplies for computers, servers and telecommunications equipment.

Our sales and technical support teams are localized in several growing markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

AOSL · Alpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$696M

+5.9% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $685M 5-yr avg $696M

Gross margin 22% 5-yr avg 29%

Operating margin −6.4% 5-yr avg 4.3%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg 7%

Owner-earnings margin −9% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin −9% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Power discrete (66%), Power IC (34%) and License and development services (2%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 26% and operating margin about 2.0% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −4.1% to 13% — on a steadier 26% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 23% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Power discrete is 66% of revenue, with Power IC the other meaningful line at 34%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Power discrete66%$450M
Power IC34%$230M
License and development services2%$14M
Packaging and testing services0%$3M

By geographyHong Kong SAR China90%China9%Other countries2%United States1%South Korea0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2012–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2012’12	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$342M	$383M	$422M	$451M	$465M	$657M	$778M	$691M	$657M	$696M	$685M	RevenueRevenue
24%	24%	27%	26%	22%	31%	35%	29%	26%	23%	22%	Gross marginGross mgn
10%	13%	16%	17%	14%	12%	12%	13%	13%	14%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%	8%	9%	10%	11%	10%	9%	13%	14%	14%	15%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$17M	$13M	$8M	($7M)	($14M)	$64M	$102M	$23M	($4M)	($28M)	($44M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.9%	3.4%	2.0%	−1.6%	−3.0%	9.8%	13.1%	3.3%	−0.6%	−4.1%	−6.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$13M	$14M	$14M	$2M	($7M)	$58M	$453M	$12M	($11M)	($97M)	($106M)	Net incomeNet inc.
22%	21%	5%	40%	—	6%	8%	32%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$33M	$43M	$3M	$31M	$62M	$129M	$219M	$20M	$26M	$30M	($9M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$25M	$27M	$29M	$32M	$45M	$53M	$43M	$43M	$54M	$62M	$58M	DepreciationDeprec.
($10M)	($5M)	($52M)	($16M)	$13M	$3M	($308M)	($73M)	($39M)	$35M	$11M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$36M	—	—	—	$62M	$73M	$138M	$110M	$37M	$37M	$51M	CapexCapex
10.6%	—	—	—	13.4%	11.1%	17.7%	16.0%	5.6%	5.3%	7.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$8M	—	—	—	$17M	$76M	$176M	($23M)	($11M)	($8M)	($60M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
2.4%	—	—	—	3.7%	11.6%	22.6%	−3.3%	−1.7%	−1.1%	−8.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($3M)	—	—	—	($83K)	$56M	$81M	($90M)	($11M)	($8M)	($60M)	Free cash flowFCF
−1.0%	—	—	—	−0.0%	8.5%	10.4%	−13.0%	−1.7%	−1.1%	−8.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M	$0	$15M	$2M	$0	$0	$0	$13M	$0	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
6%	7%	4%	-2%	-4%	19%	15%	2%	-0%	-3%	-5%	ROICROIC
5%	5%	5%	1%	-2%	16%	53%	1%	-1%	-12%	-13%	Return on equityROE
5%	5%	5%	1%	−2%	16%	53%	1%	−1%	−12%	−13%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$82M	$116M	$132M	$122M	$159M	$202M	$314M	$195M	$175M	$153M	$190M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$39M	$28M	$34M	$24M	$13M	$36M	$66M	$22M	$13M	$35M	$38M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$66M	$76M	$90M	$112M	$136M	$154M	$158M	$183M	$196M	$190M	$199M	InventoryInvent.
$36M	$63M	$93M	$94M	$86M	$81M	$87M	—	—	—	$55M	Accounts payablePayables
$69M	$42M	$31M	$42M	$63M	$109M	$136M	$206M	$208M	$224M	$183M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$194M	$225M	$285M	$295M	$318M	$407M	$550M	$424M	$398M	$396M	$453M	Current assetsCur. assets
$64M	$95M	$155M	$178M	$192M	$233M	$268M	$173M	$154M	$155M	$136M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×	2.4×	1.8×	1.7×	1.7×	1.7×	2.1×	2.5×	2.6×	2.6×	3.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$269K	$300K	$269K	$269K	$269K	$269K	$269K	$269K	$269K	$269K	$269K	GoodwillGoodwill
$366M	$398M	$667M	$739M	$793M	$919M	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$976M	Total assetsAssets
$20M	$866K	$57M	$86M	$130M	$137M	$68M	$50M	$38M	$27M	$43M	Total debtDebt
($62M)	($115M)	($75M)	($36M)	($29M)	($65M)	($246M)	($145M)	($137M)	($126M)	($147M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
48.9×	144.4×	10.3×	-1.0×	—	—	—	4.6×	-0.9×	-10.8×	-37.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$279M	$271M	$279M	$291M	$294M	$373M	$854M	$884M	$892M	$822M	$800M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.6%	1.7%	2.7%	2.9%	2.2%	2.3%	4.0%	5.4%	3.3%	4.2%	4.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
25.6M	24.8M	24.8M	24.7M	24.8M	27.3M	28.2M	29.5M	28.2M	29.4M	29.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$13.37	$15.44	$16.97	$18.26	$18.72	$24.09	$27.57	$23.41	$23.28	$23.67	$22.92	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.50	$0.56	$0.57	$0.08	$-0.27	$2.13	$16.07	$0.42	$-0.39	$-3.30	$-3.56	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.32	—	—	—	$0.69	$2.79	$6.24	$-0.77	$-0.40	$-0.26	$-2.02	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.13	—	—	—	$-0.00	$2.06	$2.87	$-3.05	$-0.40	$-0.26	$-2.02	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.42	—	—	—	$2.51	$2.67	$4.89	$3.74	$1.31	$1.26	$1.71	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.91	$10.91	$11.21	$11.78	$11.82	$13.68	$30.28	$29.93	$31.58	$27.97	$26.77	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	13-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+4.5%/yr	+4.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	−0.9%/yr	−12.8%/yr
Book value / share	+7.5%/yr	+18.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2012–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

29Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

−3%low FY2020

Gross margin

23%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($8M)owner earningsvs.($97M)net incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2012FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $97M loss into ($8M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($97M)	($11M)	$12M	$453M	$58M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$62M	+$54M	+$43M	+$43M	+$53M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$30M	+$22M	+$37M	+$31M	+$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$35M	−$39M	−$73M	−$308M	+$3M
Cash from operations	$30M	$26M	$20M	$219M	$129M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$37M	−$37M	−$43M	−$43M	−$53M
Owner earnings	($8M)	($11M)	($23M)	$176M	$76M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	−$67M	−$95M	−$20M
Free cash flow	($8M)	($11M)	($90M)	$81M	$56M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-1%	-2%	-3%	23%	12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer ($37M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -10.8×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($28M) ÷ interest expense $3M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$80M

Net cash

Cash $153M − debt $73M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $80M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 88d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 18 + DIO 129 − DPO 60 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 2%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -4%–19%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($22M) ÷ invested capital $742M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range -3%–23%; latest ($8M) = operating cash $30M − maintenance capex $37M

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves ($37M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $30M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($97M) · cash from operations $30M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.60×

Harvesting

Capex $37M ÷ depreciation $62M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $696M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.56×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $73M vs $242M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −333%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.07/share (latest year $-3.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $27.48/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2012–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 3% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −0% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2025 · −4.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.1%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“While we have made progress in our diversification and expansion into additional applications, we continue to support and grow our computing business by expanding bill-of-material content, gaining market share, acquiring new customers, and expanding into new application areas suc…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$453M

Cash & short-term investments$190M
Receivables$38M
Inventory$199M
Other current assets$25M

Current liabilities$136M

Debt due within a year$3M
Accounts payable$55M
Other current liabilities$79M

Current ratio3.32×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.86×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.39×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$316Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $190M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway3.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 3.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$799Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$277MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$28M$23M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$5Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2012–2025

Over the record, the business generated $519M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$494M · 95%
Buybacks$15M · 3%
Retained (debt / cash)$10M · 2%

Returned to owners$15M
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $15M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $23M and cash and short-term investments rose $108M.
Average price paid for buybacks$20.30
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $15M, about $20.30 each.
Net change in share count16.7%
The diluted count rose from 26M to 30M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained−12%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($407M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $48M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	$3.8M	$4.3M	($23M)
2023	$3.2M	$2.4M	($23M)
2024	$3.0M	$2.6M	($11M)
2025	$4.2M	$1.8M	($8M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Alpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2012–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−2.0% vs 5.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.9% early in the record and −2.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?16.7%
Diluted shares grew 16.7% over 2012–2025, even as the company spent $15M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$20M → $43M
Debt rose from $20M to $43M while owner earnings went from about $34M to ($14M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ALGMAllegro MicroSystems	$890M	55%	8.1%	13%	14%
ALABAstera Labs Inc.	$853M	75%	-27.4%	14%	11%
SLABSilicon Laboratories	$785M	59%	3.2%	2%	17%
TET1 Energy Inc.	$755M	7%	-31.1%	-14%	2%
RMBSRambus	$708M	80%	11.9%	3%	44%
AOSLAlpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited	$696M	26%	2.6%	3%	2%
KLICKulicke and Soffa Industries Inc.	$654M	47%	9.4%	8%	14%
LSCCLattice Semiconductor	$523M	60%	9.1%	9%	22%
Group median	—	57%	5.7%	6%	14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Alpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited has delivered.

Alpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Alpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited earns about $17M on its 2.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −1.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($17M) Net of stock comp (−$28M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($46M))

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($60M) on 30M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $147M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($51M) runs well above depreciation ($58M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($46M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh AOSL against another business →

The owners of AOSL: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Alpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited (AOSL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AOSL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AOS its page in the Manual APAM →

Industry order: ← AMKR the Semiconductors chapter ARM →