Owner Scorecard


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APAM, Artisan Partners

Artisan is a global multi-asset investment platform focused on providing high value-added active investment strategies in growing asset classes to sophisticated clients around the world.

We access other institutional-like investors primarily through consultants, alliances with major defined contribution/401(k) platforms and relationships with financial advisors and broker-dealers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
APAM · Artisan Partners
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+7.6% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.1B
Operating margin 33.3% 5-yr avg 35.2%
Net margin 23.5% 5-yr avg 23.7%
Return on equity 74% 5-yr avg 80%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Assets under management and the fee rate on them. What decides it: net flows in or out, the market's move on the assets already there (the firm rises and falls with the indices it invests in), the drift toward cheaper passive products, and the operating leverage on a largely fixed cost base. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Operating margin has run at the high end of fee-business margins across the record (median 35%, above 25% in 10 of 10 years), the economics of a business that takes a cut without carrying the risk. It earns this on little capital, so return on equity has run near 74%, the leverage of a model that needs almost no plant to grow. A high return that does not fade can mark a moat, but whether the assets stay (net flows, not last year's market) is what the flow disclosures and the 10-K settle, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

20% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States80%$957M
  • International20%$240M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$721M$796M$829M$799M$900M$1.2B$993M$975M$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
32.5%36.0%36.8%35.5%39.8%44.0%34.6%31.1%33.0%33.4%33.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
10.1%6.2%19.1%19.6%23.6%27.4%20.8%22.8%23.4%24.3%23.5%Net marginNet mgn
$73M$50M$158M$157M$213M$337M$207M$222M$260M$290M$287MNet incomeNet inc.
41%23%15%22%24%23%24%26%28%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$267M$224M$330M$289M$317M$396M$306M$251M$371M$172M$195MOwner earningsOwner earn.
55%45%117%118%118%122%79%69%67%66%74%Return on equityROE
−32%−74%−7%−24%5%22%−16%12%10%8%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$936M$837M$805M$934M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.4B$1.6B$1.6B$1.4BTotal assetsAssets
$157M$137M$160M$135M$199M$201M$143M$178M$268M$256M$300MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$132M$110M$135M$133M$180M$276M$262M$324M$389M$439M$389MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
38.1M44.6M48.9M51.1M55.6M59.9M62.5M63.5M64.9M65.6M66.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$18.90$17.82$16.96$15.63$16.17$20.49$15.89$15.36$17.12$18.24$18.49Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.91$1.11$3.24$3.06$3.82$5.62$3.31$3.50$4.00$4.43$4.34EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.01$5.03$6.76$5.66$5.69$6.62$4.90$3.95$5.72$2.62$2.95Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.03$2.93$3.43$3.68$3.65$4.59$3.98$2.89$3.42$3.92$4.16Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.45$2.46$2.76$2.60$3.24$4.61$4.20$5.11$5.99$6.69$5.88Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.4%/yr+2.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−10.4%/yr−14.4%/yr
EPS+9.8%/yr+3.0%/yr
Dividends / share+2.9%/yr+1.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−25.2%/yr−31.3%/yr
Book value / share+7.6%/yr+15.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
66Mpeak FY2025
Revenue
$1.2Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Wide fee margin (≥30%)
    Operating income $400M ÷ revenue $1.2B
    Industry peers: median 25%
    What this means

    The heart of a asset manager: how much of each fee dollar survives the cost of running the business. Fees ride on assets under management, so the swing factors are net flows in or out and the market's move on the assets already there; the cost base is largely fixed, which lifts margins in a bull market and squeezes them in a bear one. A high margin held for years, through a market it does not control, is the operational mark of a real franchise.

  • Net margin 24.3%
    Wide
    Net income $290M ÷ revenue $1.2B
    What this means

    What reaches the owner after tax and interest. For a capital-light fee business this should be a wide share of revenue; when it is thin despite a high operating margin, debt taken on for acquisitions is usually the reason, so read it next to the balance sheet.

  • Very high (≥25%)
    Net income $290M ÷ equity $439M
    Industry peers: median 19%
    What this means

    Because the business ties up little capital, a healthy fee stream throws off a high return on the equity behind it. Read it with the buyback record: returning capital lifts this ratio honestly, but heavy debt taken to do so can flatter it.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Eric Colson$8.1M$7.9M$396M
2022Eric Colson$6.8M$4.3M$306M
2023Eric Colson$6.7M$10.3M$251M
2024Eric Colson$6.8M$7.3M$371M
2025Eric Colson$7.2M$7.5M$172M
2025Jason Gottlieb$5.5M$5.7M$172M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership9.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio21:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$27M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Does management own its misses?
    1 plain admission in this year's filing
    “Value-added is the amount, in basis points, by which the average annual gross composite return of each of our strategies has outperformed or underperformed its respective benchmark.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on fee margins. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueOp. marginNet marginROE
STEPStepStone Group$2.0B25.0%4.0%18%
FHIFederated Hermes$1.8B28.4%20.0%26%
PJTPJT Partners$1.7B16.0%8.0%72%
VCTRVictory Capital Holdings$1.3B38.3%25.6%19%
APAMArtisan Partners$1.2B35.1%21.8%74%
VRTSVirtus Investment Partners Inc.$853M20.3%14.4%14%
RILYBRC Group Holdings Inc.$789M10.7%7.8%10%
HLNEHamilton Lane$759M33.2%23.8%29%
Group median26.7%17.2%23%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Artisan Partners has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Artisan Partners earns about $393M on its 32.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $195M on 81M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net cash $100M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($683K) runs well above depreciation ($9M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $196M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Artisan Partners (APAM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/APAM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AOSL its page in the Manual APD →

Industry order: ← ANTA the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter APO →