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RMBS, Rambus

Semiconductors asset-light Cyclical

Rambus is at the forefront of enabling the next era of AI-driven computing, addressing the critical challenges of signal and power integrity at increasingly extreme data rates in the data center, edge and client markets.

Rambus is a global semiconductor company providing industry-leading chips and silicon IP for data-intensive computing systems, focusing on data center and artificial intelligence ("AI") infrastructure.

We are a leader in high-performance memory subsystems, offering a balanced and diverse portfolio of products, IP and patents that maximize performance and security in computationally intensive systems.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

RMBS · Rambus

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$708M

+27.1% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $721M 5-yr avg $502M

Gross margin 79% 5-yr avg 78%

Operating margin 35.9% 5-yr avg 25.5%

ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 13%

Owner-earnings margin 49% 5-yr avg 47%

Free cash flow margin 46% 5-yr avg 45%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Product Revenue (49%), Royalty (39%) and Contract and other Revenue (11%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 80% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −44% and 37% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Stock-based pay runs about 8.1% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 44% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Product Revenue at 49%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Product Revenue49%$348M
Royalty39%$279M
Contract and other Revenue11%$80M

By geographySouth Korea47%Singapore23%United States18%Other Countries13%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$337M	$393M	$231M	$228M	$246M	$328M	$455M	$461M	$557M	$708M	$721M	RevenueRevenue
94%	94%	92%	88%	75%	79%	76%	78%	80%	80%	79%	Gross marginGross mgn
28%	28%	42%	44%	35%	28%	23%	23%	19%	16%	16%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
39%	38%	68%	69%	57%	41%	35%	34%	29%	27%	27%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$34M	$54M	($87M)	($100M)	($44M)	$24M	$77M	$154M	$183M	$260M	$259M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
10.0%	13.8%	−37.6%	−44.0%	−17.9%	7.4%	16.9%	33.3%	32.9%	36.8%	35.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$7M	($23M)	($158M)	($86M)	($40M)	$18M	($14M)	$334M	$180M	$230M	$230M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	—	21%	—	—	10%	18%	19%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$96M	$117M	$86M	$129M	$185M	$209M	$230M	$196M	$231M	$360M	$366M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$13M	$13M	$11M	$15M	$22M	$21M	$9M	$10M	$10M	$12M	$12M	DepreciationDeprec.
$55M	$100M	$212M	$173M	$178M	$142M	$200M	($193M)	($4M)	$63M	$69M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$9M	$9M	$11M	$6M	$30M	$14M	$17M	$23M	$31M	$27M	$31M	CapexCapex
2.5%	2.4%	4.7%	2.8%	12.1%	4.2%	3.8%	5.0%	5.5%	3.8%	4.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$87M	$108M	$75M	$122M	$163M	$195M	$221M	$186M	$221M	$348M	$354M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
25.9%	27.5%	32.6%	53.6%	66.3%	59.5%	48.6%	40.3%	39.6%	49.2%	49.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$87M	$108M	$75M	$122M	$156M	$195M	$213M	$173M	$200M	$333M	$335M	Free cash flowFCF
25.9%	27.5%	32.6%	53.6%	63.2%	59.5%	46.8%	37.4%	35.9%	47.1%	46.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$203M	$0	$0	$67M	$0	$97M	$16M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$50M	$50M	$0	$50M	$100M	$100M	$101M	$113M	$7M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
3%	6%	-7%	-8%	-4%	3%	—	16%	16%	18%	17%	ROICROIC
1%	-4%	-16%	-9%	-4%	2%	-2%	32%	16%	17%	17%	Return on equityROE
1%	−4%	−16%	−9%	−4%	2%	−2%	32%	16%	17%	17%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$172M	$329M	$278M	$338M	$389M	$108M	$125M	$95M	$100M	$183M	$501M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$21M	$25M	$51M	$39M	$28M	$44M	$55M	$83M	$123M	$137M	$109M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$6M	$5M	$7M	$10M	$14M	$8M	$21M	$36M	$45M	$44M	$58M	InventoryInvent.
$10M	$10M	$7M	$9M	$9M	$11M	$25M	$18M	$19M	$36M	$35M	Accounts payablePayables
$17M	$21M	$50M	$39M	$33M	$41M	$51M	$101M	$149M	$146M	$132M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$217M	$372M	$528M	$656M	$700M	$684M	$527M	$631M	$690M	$989M	$1000M	Current assetsCur. assets
$51M	$133M	$69M	$88M	$86M	$267M	$127M	$89M	$82M	$121M	$102M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.2×	2.8×	7.6×	7.4×	8.1×	2.6×	4.2×	7.1×	8.4×	8.2×	9.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$205M	$210M	$207M	$183M	$183M	$279M	$292M	$287M	$287M	$287M	$287M	GoodwillGoodwill
$783M	$891M	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Total assetsAssets
$126M	$135M	$142M	$147M	$156M	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	Total debtDebt
($46M)	($194M)	($136M)	($191M)	($233M)	($108M)	—	—	—	—	($501M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.6×	4.0×	-5.3×	-10.2×	-4.3×	2.3×	41.1×	103.1×	129.2×	189.5×	203.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$553M	$572M	$1.0B	$975M	$913M	$862M	$779M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
6.2%	7.0%	9.4%	11.6%	10.5%	8.4%	7.8%	9.8%	8.1%	7.7%	7.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
113M	110M	108M	111M	113M	115M	109M	111M	109M	109M	110M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.98	$3.57	$2.13	$2.05	$2.17	$2.86	$4.15	$4.16	$5.10	$6.48	$6.57	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.06	$-0.21	$-1.46	$-0.77	$-0.36	$0.16	$-0.13	$3.01	$1.65	$2.11	$2.10	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.77	$0.98	$0.70	$1.10	$1.44	$1.70	$2.02	$1.67	$2.02	$3.19	$3.22	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.77	$0.98	$0.70	$1.10	$1.38	$1.70	$1.94	$1.56	$1.83	$3.05	$3.06	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.08	$0.09	$0.10	$0.06	$0.26	$0.12	$0.16	$0.21	$0.28	$0.25	$0.28	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.89	$5.19	$9.33	$8.79	$8.06	$7.51	$7.12	$9.36	$10.28	$12.49	$12.70	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.0%/yr	+24.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+17.1%/yr	+17.2%/yr
EPS	+48.4%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+14.0%/yr	−1.3%/yr
Book value / share	+11.0%/yr	+9.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Contract and other Revenue-3.8%
“Contract and other revenue decreased approximately $3.2 million for the year ended December 31, 2025 as compared to 2024, due to lower revenue associated with our Silicon IP offerings.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

109Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

18%low FY2019

Gross margin

80%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$348Mowner earningsvs.$230Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $348M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $12M it takes just to hold its position. It put $15M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $333M.

Reported net income$230M

Owner earnings$348M · 49% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$230M	$180M	$334M	($14M)	$18M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$12M	+$10M	+$10M	+$9M	+$21M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$54M	+$45M	+$45M	+$36M	+$27M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$63M	−$4M	−$193M	+$200M	+$142M
Cash from operations	$360M	$231M	$196M	$230M	$209M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$12M	−$10M	−$10M	−$9M	−$14M
Owner earnings	$348M	$221M	$186M	$221M	$195M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$15M	−$21M	−$13M	−$8M	—
Free cash flow	$333M	$200M	$173M	$213M	$195M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	49%	40%	40%	49%	60%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $12M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $15M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $54M), owner earnings is nearer $294M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 189.5×

Comfortable

Operating income $260M ÷ interest expense $1M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$443M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $183M + ST investments $260M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $443M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 92d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 71 + DIO 111 − DPO 91 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -8%–18%; 18% latest = NOPAT $213M ÷ invested capital $1.2B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 40%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 26%–66%; latest $348M = operating cash $360M − maintenance capex $12M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 49% of revenue this year, a 40% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $54M of SBC) leaves $294M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.56×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $360M ÷ net income $230M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 2%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $7M ÷ Owner Earnings $348M

What this means
Of $348M Owner Earnings, $7M (2%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $7M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($54M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.25×

Expanding

Capex $27M ÷ depreciation $12M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $708M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 8.20×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $868M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.29/share (latest year $2.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −5% → 34% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −5% early to 34% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Owner earnings growth +13%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · −44.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.4%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Many of these companies are larger and may have better access to financial, technical and other resources than we possess and may be able to develop and advance competitive products more effectively, including through the use of AI.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1000M

Cash & short-term investments$501M
Receivables$109M
Inventory$58M
Other current assets$331M

Current liabilities$102M

Accounts payable$35M
Other current liabilities$67M

Current ratio9.82×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio9.25×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio4.92×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$898Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters7.2× → 9.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$860MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$23M$23M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$24Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$177M · 10%
Buybacks$572M · 31%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 59%

Returned to owners$572M
33% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $572M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $572M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−3.0%
The diluted count fell from 113M to 110M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$297M19% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity21%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$382Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $177M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Luc Seraphin	$5.8M	$13.6M	$195M
2022	Luc Seraphin	$7.1M	$19.4M	$221M
2023	Luc Seraphin	$8.4M	$30.4M	$186M
2024	Luc Seraphin	$7.2M	−$5.1M	$221M
2025	Luc Seraphin	$9.5M	$35.7M	$348M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio45:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$54M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 21% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Rambus is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?8% → 23% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $27M to $168M while revenue grew 114%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (8% of revenue then, 23% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$476M · 66% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our top five customers for each reporting period represented approximately 66% of our consolidated revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025 and 62% of our consolidated revenue for both the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ICHRIchor Holdings	$948M	15%	5.2%	11%	4%
ALGMAllegro MicroSystems	$890M	55%	8.1%	13%	14%
ALABAstera Labs Inc.	$853M	75%	-27.4%	14%	11%
SLABSilicon Laboratories	$785M	59%	3.2%	2%	17%
TET1 Energy Inc.	$755M	7%	-31.1%	-14%	2%
RMBSRambus	$708M	80%	11.9%	3%	44%
AOSLAlpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited	$696M	26%	2.6%	3%	2%
KLICKulicke and Soffa Industries Inc.	$654M	47%	9.4%	8%	14%
Group median	—	51%	4.2%	6%	12%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Rambus has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Rambus earns about $314M on its 44.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 49.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($314M) Net of stock comp (−$54M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($354M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+8%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $335M on 108M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net cash $501M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($31M) runs well above depreciation ($12M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $354M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh RMBS against another business →

The owners of RMBS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Rambus (RMBS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RMBS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RM its page in the Manual RMD →

Industry order: ← QUIK the Semiconductors chapter SEDG →