Owner Scorecard


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SLAB, Silicon Laboratories

Semiconductors asset-light Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Silicon Laboratories Inc. is a leader in secure, intelligent wireless technology for a more connected world.

We make it easy for developers to solve complex wireless challenges throughout the product lifecycle and get to market quickly with innovative solutions that transform industries, grow economies, and improve lives.

Our leading platform, purpose-built for the Internet of Things ("IoT"), helps customers quickly create secure, intelligent, wireless connected devices.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
SLAB · Silicon Laboratories
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$785M
+34.3% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $821M 5-yr avg $737M
Gross margin 59% 5-yr avg 58%
Operating margin −6.8% 5-yr avg −9.9%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −5%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Industrial & Commercial (57%) and Home & Life (43%).
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 12% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −3.1%) on a 59% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 6.2% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Industrial & Commercial at 57%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • Industrial & Commercial57%$445M
  • Home & Life43%$340M
By geographyRest of world42%China33%Taiwan17%United States9%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2011–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2011’112016’162017’172018’182019’192021’212022’222023’232024’242026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$493M$698M$769M$868M$474M$511M$1.0B$782M$584M$785M$821MRevenueRevenue
61%62%59%60%59%58%63%59%53%58%59%Gross marginGross mgn
23%22%21%23%34%33%19%19%25%22%23%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
28%29%27%27%43%46%32%43%57%45%43%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$50M$66M$85M$85M($89M)($107M)$119M($24M)($165M)($71M)($56M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
10.1%9.5%11.1%9.8%−18.7%−21.0%11.6%−3.1%−28.3%−9.0%−6.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$35M$61M$47M$84M$19M$13M$91M($35M)($191M)($65M)($50M)Net incomeNet inc.
32%5%39%27%30%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$118M$129M$190M$174M$167M$136M$141M($30M)($14M)$96M$53MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$14M$13M$15M$16M$15M$16M$23M$26M$26M$25M$25MDepreciationDeprec.
$33M$15M$83M$24M$88M$57M($33M)($70M)$90M$56M($3M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$9M$11M$12M$24M$15M$18M$27M$22M$12M$30M$35MCapexCapex
1.8%1.6%1.6%2.8%3.2%3.5%2.6%2.8%2.0%3.8%4.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$109M$118M$177M$149M$151M$118M$115M($53M)($26M)$66M$18MOwner earningsOwner earn.
22.1%16.9%23.1%17.2%31.9%23.0%11.2%−6.7%−4.4%8.4%2.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$109M$118M$177M$149M$151M$118M$115M($53M)($26M)$66M$18MFree cash flowFCF
22.1%16.9%23.1%17.2%31.9%23.0%11.2%−6.7%−4.4%8.4%2.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$27M$7M$15M$240M$3M$317M$317MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$110M$41M$39M$27M$16M$883M$217M$16K$0BuybacksBuybacks
7%8%5%7%-5%-6%6%-2%-16%-8%-4%ROICROIC
6%7%5%8%2%1%7%-3%-18%-6%-5%Return on equityROE
6%7%5%8%2%1%7%−3%−18%−6%−5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$307M$268M$764M$614M$726M$725M$1.2B$439M$382M$444M$439MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$55M$74M$71M$73M$76M$95M$71M$29M$54M$65M$77MReceivablesReceiv.
$35M$60M$73M$75M$73M$48M$100M$194M$106M$96M$103MInventoryInvent.
$26M$40M$39M$41M$39M$55M$90M$57M$42M$51M$56MAccounts payablePayables
$64M$94M$106M$107M$110M$88M$82M$166M$118M$109M$124MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$453M$491M$948M$827M$944M$976M$1.5B$738M$602M$674M$676MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$83M$140M$162M$145M$138M$284M$186M$164M$98M$144M$132MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
5.5×3.5×5.8×5.7×6.9×3.4×7.9×4.5×6.2×4.7×5.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$115M$276M$288M$397M$237M$376M$376M$376M$376M$376M$376MGoodwillGoodwill
$706M$1.1B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$2.0B$2.2B$1.4B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3BTotal assetsAssets
$83M$342M$355M$368M$429M$530M$530MTotal debtDebt
($186M)($422M)($259M)($358M)($296M)($662M)$91MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1353.4×23.4×4.3×-4.4×-3.1×3.8×-4.3×-126.3×-72.3×-60.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$599M$827M$953M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
7.3%5.7%5.8%5.8%9.4%9.7%5.9%6.2%10.5%10.2%10.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
44.8M42.4M43.3M44.0M44.3M44.4M36.0M31.8M32.2M32.7M33.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$11.00$16.46$17.74$19.71$10.70$11.51$28.41$24.60$18.15$23.98$24.89Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.79$1.45$1.09$1.90$0.43$0.28$2.54$-1.09$-5.93$-1.98$-1.53EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.44$2.78$4.09$3.38$3.41$2.65$3.18$-1.65$-0.80$2.01$0.53Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.44$2.78$4.09$3.38$3.41$2.65$3.18$-1.65$-0.80$2.01$0.53Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.19$0.26$0.28$0.56$0.35$0.41$0.74$0.70$0.36$0.91$1.06Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$13.36$19.51$21.99$24.23$25.18$27.04$38.98$38.00$33.55$33.45$33.33Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
15-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.3%/yr+15.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.3%/yr−5.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+10.9%/yr+17.5%/yr
Book value / share+6.3%/yr+4.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2011–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
33Mpeak FY2011
ROIC
−8%low FY2024
Gross margin
58%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-5.8×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$66Mowner earningsvs.($65M)net incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2011FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $65M loss into $66M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($65M)($191M)($35M)$91M$13M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$25M+$26M+$26M+$23M+$16M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$80M+$62M+$48M+$61M+$49M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$56M+$90M−$70M−$33M+$57M
Cash from operations$96M($14M)($30M)$141M$136M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$30M−$12M−$22M−$27M−$18M
Owner earnings$66M($26M)($53M)$115M$118M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%-4%-7%11%23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $80M), owner earnings is nearer ($15M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($71M) ÷ interest expense $975K
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $364M + ST investments $79M − debt $530M
    What this means

    Netting $444M of cash and short-term investments against $530M of debt leaves $86M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 30 + DIO 106 − DPO 56 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -16%–8%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($56M) ÷ invested capital $1.3B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -7%–32%; latest $66M = operating cash $96M − maintenance capex $30M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $80M of SBC) leaves ($15M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($65M) · cash from operations $96M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $66M
    What this means

    Of $66M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.21×
    Expanding
    Capex $30M ÷ depreciation $25M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $785M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.69×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $530M vs $530M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −302%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.94/share (latest year $-1.97), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $33.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2011–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → −13% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −13% lately, median −3% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −33%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −28.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“For example, new products and disruptive technologies are being developed, and companies with which we compete have implemented AI strategies for products and service offerings.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$676M
  • Cash & short-term investments$439M
  • Receivables$77M
  • Inventory$103M
  • Other current assets$57M
Current liabilities$132M
  • Debt due within a year$10M
  • Accounts payable$56M
  • Other current liabilities$66M
Current ratio5.11×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.33×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.31×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$544Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$10M due · $439M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 4, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+20.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.0× → 5.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$701Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$508MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$106M$24M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2011–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$180M · 16%
  • Buybacks$1.3B · 121%
  • Returned to owners$1.3B

    144% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$409M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $409M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $1.3B over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−26.5%

    The diluted count fell from 45M to 33M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$400M31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity34%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$608Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $180M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021G. Tyson Tuttle$17.0M$21.0M$118M
2022R. Matthew Johnson$6.8M$647k$115M
2023$6.9M−$8.8M($53M)
2024$7.2M$5.6M($26M)
2026$11.3M$10.4M$66M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio102:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$80M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Silicon Laboratories is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2011–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.9% vs 20.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 20.7% early in the record and −0.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ICHRIchor Holdings$948M15%5.2%11%4%
ALGMAllegro MicroSystems$890M55%8.1%13%14%
ALABAstera Labs Inc.$853M75%-27.4%14%11%
SLABSilicon Laboratories$785M59%3.2%2%17%
TET1 Energy Inc.$755M7%-31.1%-14%2%
RMBSRambus$708M80%11.9%3%44%
AOSLAlpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited$696M26%2.6%3%2%
KLICKulicke and Soffa Industries Inc.$654M47%9.4%8%14%
Group median51%4.2%6%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Silicon Laboratories has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Silicon Laboratories earns about $134M on its 17.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’26−30%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’11→’26−11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $18M on 33M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $91M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($35M) runs well above depreciation ($25M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $23M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Silicon Laboratories (SLAB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SLAB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SKYW its page in the Manual SLB →

Industry order: ← SKYT the Semiconductors chapter SMTC →