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SLAB, Silicon Laboratories
Silicon Laboratories Inc. is a leader in secure, intelligent wireless technology for a more connected world.
We make it easy for developers to solve complex wireless challenges throughout the product lifecycle and get to market quickly with innovative solutions that transform industries, grow economies, and improve lives.
Our leading platform, purpose-built for the Internet of Things ("IoT"), helps customers quickly create secure, intelligent, wireless connected devices.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Industrial & Commercial (57%) and Home & Life (43%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 12% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −3.1%) on a 59% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 6.2% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Industrial & Commercial at 57%.
- Industrial & Commercial57%$445M
- Home & Life43%$340M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2011–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2011’11 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $493M | $698M | $769M | $868M | $474M | $511M | $1.0B | $782M | $584M | $785M | $821M | RevenueRevenue |
| 61% | 62% | 59% | 60% | 59% | 58% | 63% | 59% | 53% | 58% | 59% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 23% | 22% | 21% | 23% | 34% | 33% | 19% | 19% | 25% | 22% | 23% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 28% | 29% | 27% | 27% | 43% | 46% | 32% | 43% | 57% | 45% | 43% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $50M | $66M | $85M | $85M | ($89M) | ($107M) | $119M | ($24M) | ($165M) | ($71M) | ($56M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 10.1% | 9.5% | 11.1% | 9.8% | −18.7% | −21.0% | 11.6% | −3.1% | −28.3% | −9.0% | −6.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $35M | $61M | $47M | $84M | $19M | $13M | $91M | ($35M) | ($191M) | ($65M) | ($50M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 32% | 5% | 39% | — | 27% | — | 30% | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $118M | $129M | $190M | $174M | $167M | $136M | $141M | ($30M) | ($14M) | $96M | $53M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $14M | $13M | $15M | $16M | $15M | $16M | $23M | $26M | $26M | $25M | $25M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $33M | $15M | $83M | $24M | $88M | $57M | ($33M) | ($70M) | $90M | $56M | ($3M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $9M | $11M | $12M | $24M | $15M | $18M | $27M | $22M | $12M | $30M | $35M | CapexCapex |
| 1.8% | 1.6% | 1.6% | 2.8% | 3.2% | 3.5% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 2.0% | 3.8% | 4.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $109M | $118M | $177M | $149M | $151M | $118M | $115M | ($53M) | ($26M) | $66M | $18M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 22.1% | 16.9% | 23.1% | 17.2% | 31.9% | 23.0% | 11.2% | −6.7% | −4.4% | 8.4% | 2.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $109M | $118M | $177M | $149M | $151M | $118M | $115M | ($53M) | ($26M) | $66M | $18M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 22.1% | 16.9% | 23.1% | 17.2% | 31.9% | 23.0% | 11.2% | −6.7% | −4.4% | 8.4% | 2.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $27M | $7M | $15M | $240M | $3M | $317M | — | — | — | — | $317M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $110M | $41M | — | $39M | $27M | $16M | $883M | $217M | $16K | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 7% | 8% | 5% | 7% | -5% | -6% | 6% | -2% | -16% | -8% | -4% | ROICROIC |
| 6% | 7% | 5% | 8% | 2% | 1% | 7% | -3% | -18% | -6% | -5% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | 7% | 5% | 8% | 2% | 1% | 7% | −3% | −18% | −6% | −5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $307M | $268M | $764M | $614M | $726M | $725M | $1.2B | $439M | $382M | $444M | $439M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $55M | $74M | $71M | $73M | $76M | $95M | $71M | $29M | $54M | $65M | $77M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $35M | $60M | $73M | $75M | $73M | $48M | $100M | $194M | $106M | $96M | $103M | InventoryInvent. |
| $26M | $40M | $39M | $41M | $39M | $55M | $90M | $57M | $42M | $51M | $56M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $64M | $94M | $106M | $107M | $110M | $88M | $82M | $166M | $118M | $109M | $124M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $453M | $491M | $948M | $827M | $944M | $976M | $1.5B | $738M | $602M | $674M | $676M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $83M | $140M | $162M | $145M | $138M | $284M | $186M | $164M | $98M | $144M | $132M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 5.5× | 3.5× | 5.8× | 5.7× | 6.9× | 3.4× | 7.9× | 4.5× | 6.2× | 4.7× | 5.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $115M | $276M | $288M | $397M | $237M | $376M | $376M | $376M | $376M | $376M | $376M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $706M | $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $83M | $342M | $355M | $368M | $429M | $530M | — | — | — | $530M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($186M) | ($422M) | ($259M) | ($358M) | ($296M) | ($662M) | — | — | — | $91M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1353.4× | 23.4× | — | 4.3× | -4.4× | -3.1× | 3.8× | -4.3× | -126.3× | -72.3× | -60.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $599M | $827M | $953M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 7.3% | 5.7% | 5.8% | 5.8% | 9.4% | 9.7% | 5.9% | 6.2% | 10.5% | 10.2% | 10.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 44.8M | 42.4M | 43.3M | 44.0M | 44.3M | 44.4M | 36.0M | 31.8M | 32.2M | 32.7M | 33.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $11.00 | $16.46 | $17.74 | $19.71 | $10.70 | $11.51 | $28.41 | $24.60 | $18.15 | $23.98 | $24.89 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.79 | $1.45 | $1.09 | $1.90 | $0.43 | $0.28 | $2.54 | $-1.09 | $-5.93 | $-1.98 | $-1.53 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.44 | $2.78 | $4.09 | $3.38 | $3.41 | $2.65 | $3.18 | $-1.65 | $-0.80 | $2.01 | $0.53 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $2.44 | $2.78 | $4.09 | $3.38 | $3.41 | $2.65 | $3.18 | $-1.65 | $-0.80 | $2.01 | $0.53 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.19 | $0.26 | $0.28 | $0.56 | $0.35 | $0.41 | $0.74 | $0.70 | $0.36 | $0.91 | $1.06 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $13.36 | $19.51 | $21.99 | $24.23 | $25.18 | $27.04 | $38.98 | $38.00 | $33.55 | $33.45 | $33.33 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 15-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.3%/yr | +15.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −1.3%/yr | −5.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +10.9%/yr | +17.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.3%/yr | +4.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2011–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $65M loss into $66M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($65M) | ($191M) | ($35M) | $91M | $13M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$25M | +$26M | +$26M | +$23M | +$16M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$80M | +$62M | +$48M | +$61M | +$49M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$56M | +$90M | −$70M | −$33M | +$57M |
| Cash from operations | $96M | ($14M) | ($30M) | $141M | $136M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$30M | −$12M | −$22M | −$27M | −$18M |
| Owner earnings | $66M | ($26M) | ($53M) | $115M | $118M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | -4% | -7% | 11% | 23% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $80M), owner earnings is nearer ($15M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -72.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($71M) ÷ interest expense $975K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $364M + ST investments $79M − debt $530M
What this means
Netting $444M of cash and short-term investments against $530M of debt leaves $86M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 30 + DIO 106 − DPO 56 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -16%–8%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($56M) ÷ invested capital $1.3BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -7%–32%; latest $66M = operating cash $96M − maintenance capex $30MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $80M of SBC) leaves ($15M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($65M) · cash from operations $96M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $66M
What this means
Of $66M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.21×ExpandingCapex $30M ÷ depreciation $25M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $785M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.69×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $530M vs $530M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −302%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.94/share (latest year $-1.97), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $33.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2011–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 10% → −13% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −13% lately, median −3% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −33%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −11%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 11% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −28.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −2.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“For example, new products and disruptive technologies are being developed, and companies with which we compete have implemented AI strategies for products and service offerings.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$439M
- Receivables$77M
- Inventory$103M
- Other current assets$57M
- Debt due within a year$10M
- Accounts payable$56M
- Other current liabilities$66M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2011–2026
Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$180M · 16%
- Buybacks$1.3B · 121%
- Returned to owners$1.3B
144% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.3B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$409M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $409M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1.3B over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
- Net change in share count−26.5%
The diluted count fell from 45M to 33M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | G. Tyson Tuttle | $17.0M | $21.0M | $118M |
| 2022 | R. Matthew Johnson | $6.8M | $647k | $115M |
| 2023 | — | $6.9M | −$8.8M | ($53M) |
| 2024 | — | $7.2M | $5.6M | ($26M) |
| 2026 | — | $11.3M | $10.4M | $66M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.
- Insider ownership1.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio102:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$80M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Silicon Laboratories is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2011–2026.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.9% vs 20.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 20.7% early in the record and −0.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ICHRIchor Holdings | $948M | 15% | 5.2% | 11% | 4% |
| ALGMAllegro MicroSystems | $890M | 55% | 8.1% | 13% | 14% |
| ALABAstera Labs Inc. | $853M | 75% | -27.4% | 14% | 11% |
| SLABSilicon Laboratories | $785M | 59% | 3.2% | 2% | 17% |
| TET1 Energy Inc. | $755M | 7% | -31.1% | -14% | 2% |
| RMBSRambus | $708M | 80% | 11.9% | 3% | 44% |
| AOSLAlpha and Omega Semiconductor Limited | $696M | 26% | 2.6% | 3% | 2% |
| KLICKulicke and Soffa Industries Inc. | $654M | 47% | 9.4% | 8% | 14% |
| Group median | — | 51% | 4.2% | 6% | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Silicon Laboratories has delivered.
Through the cycle, Silicon Laboratories earns about $134M on its 17.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $18M on 33M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $91M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($35M) runs well above depreciation ($25M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $23M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SKYW its page in the Manual SLB →
Industry order: ← SKYT the Semiconductors chapter SMTC →