Owner Scorecard


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VRTS, Virtus Investment Partners Inc.

We provide investment management and related services to institutions and individuals.

We use a multi-manager, multi-style approach, offering investment strategies from our investment managers, each having its own distinct investment style, autonomous investment process and individual brand, as well as from select unaffiliated managers for certain of our funds.

We offer investment strategies for institutional and individual investors in different investment products and through multiple distribution channels.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
VRTS · Virtus Investment Partners Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$853M
−6.0% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $834M 5-yr avg $894M
Operating margin 17.7% 5-yr avg 22.7%
Net margin 14.0% 5-yr avg 15.9%
Return on equity 13% 5-yr avg 17%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Open-end funds (34%) and Retail separate accounts (25%), with 4 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
Assets under management and the fee rate on them. What decides it: net flows in or out, the market's move on the assets already there (the firm rises and falls with the indices it invests in), the drift toward cheaper passive products, and the operating leverage on a largely fixed cost base. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Operating margin has been modest for a fee business (median 20%). It earns this on little capital, so return on equity has run near 14%, the leverage of a model that needs almost no plant to grow. A high return that does not fade can mark a moat, but whether the assets stay (net flows, not last year's market) is what the flow disclosures and the 10-K settle, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Open-end funds at 34%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Open-end funds34%$287M
  • Retail separate accounts25%$210M
  • Institutional accounts20%$168M
  • Administration and shareholder service fees9%$73M
  • Closed-end funds7%$61M
  • Distribution and service fees6%$50M
  • Other income and fees1%$5M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$323M$426M$552M$563M$604M$979M$886M$845M$907M$853M$834MRevenueRevenue
15.8%13.6%20.5%22.1%23.7%33.2%22.3%17.9%20.1%19.8%17.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
15.0%8.7%13.7%17.0%13.2%21.3%13.3%15.5%13.4%16.2%14.0%Net marginNet mgn
$49M$37M$76M$96M$80M$208M$118M$131M$122M$138M$117MNet incomeNet inc.
30%52%30%27%35%30%33%26%31%27%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$19M($184M)($74M)($44M)($227M)$660M$126M$228M($4M)($74M)($34M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
15%6%12%14%11%25%14%15%14%15%13%Return on equityROE
11%4%10%12%8%21%9%9%7%8%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$824M$2.6B$2.9B$3.2B$3.5B$3.9B$4.0B$3.7B$4.0B$4.3B$4.6BTotal assetsAssets
$83M$132M$202M$222M$340M$586M$589M$341M$400M$478M$277MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$322M$589M$630M$676M$711M$828M$817M$864M$897M$934M$917MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
7.8M7.2M8.5M8.1M8.0M8.0M7.6M7.4M7.2M6.9M6.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$41.24$58.73$64.76$69.12$75.71$122.36$116.91$114.61$125.79$123.09$122.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.20$5.11$8.86$11.74$10.02$26.01$15.50$17.71$16.89$19.97$17.17EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.42$-25.44$-8.71$-5.43$-28.48$82.46$16.63$30.96$-0.53$-10.69$-4.96Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.76$1.74$1.65$2.08$2.86$3.92$6.23$7.06$8.06$9.32$9.60Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$41.12$81.21$73.87$82.92$89.16$103.50$107.76$117.14$124.48$134.80$134.79Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.9%/yr+10.2%/yr
EPS+13.9%/yr+14.8%/yr
Dividends / share+20.3%/yr+26.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+16.1%/yr+50.0%/yr
Book value / share+14.1%/yr+8.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
7Mpeak FY2018
Revenue
$853Mlow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Solid fee margin
    Operating income $169M ÷ revenue $853M
    Industry peers: median 33%
    What this means

    The heart of a asset manager: how much of each fee dollar survives the cost of running the business. Fees ride on assets under management, so the swing factors are net flows in or out and the market's move on the assets already there; the cost base is largely fixed, which lifts margins in a bull market and squeezes them in a bear one. A high margin held for years, through a market it does not control, is the operational mark of a real franchise.

  • Net margin 16.2%
    Wide
    Net income $138M ÷ revenue $853M
    What this means

    What reaches the owner after tax and interest. For a capital-light fee business this should be a wide share of revenue; when it is thin despite a high operating margin, debt taken on for acquisitions is usually the reason, so read it next to the balance sheet.

  • Solid
    Net income $138M ÷ equity $934M
    Industry peers: median 39%
    What this means

    Because the business ties up little capital, a healthy fee stream throws off a high return on the equity behind it. Read it with the buyback record: returning capital lifts this ratio honestly, but heavy debt taken to do so can flatter it.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Sep 30, 2013

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$461M
  • Cash & short-term investments$277M
  • Receivables$104M
  • Other current assets$80M
Current liabilities$109M
  • Accounts payable$11M
  • Other current liabilities$98M
Current ratio4.23×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.23×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.54×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$352Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway8.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−8.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($343M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$439Mno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$725M17% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity43%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$806Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $58M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Aylward$8.6M$17.3M$660M
2022Mr. Aylward$6.5M−$4.2M$126M
2023Mr. Aylward$6.6M$9.0M$228M
2024Mr. Aylward$6.9M$2.6M($4M)
2025Mr. Aylward$6.3M$5.0M($74M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership6.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on fee margins. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueOp. marginNet marginROE
PJTPJT Partners$1.7B16.0%8.0%72%
VCTRVictory Capital Holdings$1.3B38.3%25.6%19%
APAMArtisan Partners$1.2B35.1%21.8%74%
VRTSVirtus Investment Partners Inc.$853M20.3%14.4%14%
RILYBRC Group Holdings Inc.$789M10.7%7.8%10%
HLNEHamilton Lane$759M33.2%23.8%29%
GCMGGCM Grosvenor Inc.$558M18.9%3.3%168%
CNSCohen & Steers$556M38.3%28.4%39%
Group median26.7%18.1%34%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Virtus Investment Partners Inc. has delivered.

Virtus Investment Partners Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($34M) on 7M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $162M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Virtus Investment Partners Inc. (VRTS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VRTS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VRT its page in the Manual VRTX →

Industry order: ← VIRT the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter WD →