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ARCO, Arcos Dorados Holdings Inc.
We are the world's largest independent McDonald's franchisee in terms of systemwide sales and number of restaurants, according to McDonald's, representing 4.4% of McDonald's global sales in 2025.
As of December 31, 2025, we operated or franchised 2,520 McDonald's-branded restaura nts, which represented 5.8% of McDonald's total franchised restaurants worldwide.
We operate in the QSR sub-segment of the fast food segment of the Latin American and Caribbean food service industry.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 98% and operating margin about 6.1% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.4% to 8.2% — on a steadier 98% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest Brazil at 38%.
- Brazil38%$1.8B
- Other countries37%$1.7B
- Argentina15%$698M
- Mexico10%$481M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $3.6B | $4.3B | $4.5B | $4.7B | $4.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | 98% | 98% | 98% | 98% | 98% | 98% | 98% | 98% | 98% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $179M | $273M | $123M | $160M | ($67M) | $140M | $264M | $314M | $325M | $364M | $364M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.1% | 8.2% | 4.0% | 5.4% | −3.4% | 5.2% | 7.3% | 7.2% | 7.3% | 7.8% | 7.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $79M | $129M | $37M | $80M | ($149M) | $46M | $141M | $182M | $149M | $213M | $213M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 43% | 29% | 57% | 33% | — | 41% | 38% | 34% | 42% | 38% | 38% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $164M | $255M | $180M | $223M | $16M | $258M | $345M | $382M | $267M | $296M | $296M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $93M | $99M | $106M | $123M | $127M | $120M | $120M | $149M | $177M | $197M | $197M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($8M) | $26M | $37M | $20M | $38M | $92M | $85M | $50M | ($60M) | ($113M) | ($113M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $92M | $175M | $197M | $265M | $86M | $115M | $217M | $360M | $328M | $281M | $281M | CapexCapex |
| 3.2% | 5.3% | 6.4% | 9.0% | 4.3% | 4.3% | 6.0% | 8.3% | 7.3% | 6.0% | 6.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $72M | $156M | $74M | $100M | ($70M) | $143M | $226M | $233M | $89M | $99M | $99M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.5% | 4.7% | 2.4% | 3.4% | −3.5% | 5.4% | 6.2% | 5.4% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 2.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $72M | $80M | ($17M) | ($42M) | ($70M) | $143M | $128M | $22M | ($61M) | $15M | $15M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 2.5% | 2.4% | −0.6% | −1.4% | −3.5% | 5.4% | 3.5% | 0.5% | −1.4% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $21M | $22M | $10M | $21K | $32M | $40M | $51M | $51M | $51M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $0 | $46M | $14M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 14% | 24% | 7% | 12% | -7% | 12% | 21% | 20% | 17% | 15% | 15% | ROICROIC |
| 23% | 26% | 9% | 19% | -76% | 21% | 44% | 35% | 29% | 28% | 28% | Return on equityROE |
| 23% | 26% | 4% | 14% | −81% | 21% | 34% | 28% | 19% | 21% | 21% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $195M | $328M | $197M | $122M | $166M | $279M | $304M | $247M | $139M | $422M | $422M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $49M | $83M | $46M | $38M | $34M | $38M | $50M | $53M | $52M | $66M | $66M | InventoryInvent. |
| $218M | $303M | $242M | $260M | $210M | $269M | $353M | $375M | $348M | $357M | $357M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($169M) | ($221M) | ($196M) | ($222M) | ($176M) | ($231M) | ($303M) | ($322M) | ($296M) | ($290M) | ($290M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $445M | $653M | $465M | $405M | $416M | $540M | $684M | $605M | $468M | $852M | $852M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $548M | $606M | $493M | $595M | $503M | $618M | $759M | $842M | $766M | $829M | $829M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.8× | 1.1× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.9× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $7M | $7M | $6M | $7M | $6M | $5M | $7M | $12M | $13M | $17M | $17M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $3.9B | $3.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $580M | $634M | $630M | $627M | $777M | $744M | $731M | $715M | $719M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Total debtDebt |
| $385M | $305M | $433M | $505M | $611M | $465M | $426M | $468M | $580M | $715M | $715M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.7× | 4.0× | 2.3× | 3.1× | -2.0× | 2.8× | 6.0× | 9.7× | 6.9× | 26.7× | 26.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $351M | $496M | $392M | $421M | $198M | $220M | $324M | $515M | $508M | $770M | $770M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 211M | 212M | 210M | 208M | 209M | 211M | 211M | 211M | 211M | 211M | 211M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $13.88 | $15.66 | $14.67 | $14.25 | $9.51 | $12.63 | $17.18 | $20.57 | $21.22 | $22.21 | $22.21 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.37 | $0.61 | $0.18 | $0.39 | $-0.72 | $0.22 | $0.67 | $0.87 | $0.71 | $1.01 | $1.01 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.34 | $0.73 | $0.35 | $0.48 | $-0.34 | $0.68 | $1.07 | $1.10 | $0.42 | $0.47 | $0.47 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.34 | $0.38 | $-0.08 | $-0.20 | $-0.34 | $0.68 | $0.61 | $0.10 | $-0.29 | $0.07 | $0.07 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.10 | $0.11 | $0.05 | $0.00 | $0.15 | $0.19 | $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.24 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.44 | $0.82 | $0.94 | $1.28 | $0.41 | $0.55 | $1.03 | $1.71 | $1.56 | $1.34 | $1.34 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.66 | $2.34 | $1.87 | $2.03 | $0.95 | $1.05 | $1.54 | $2.45 | $2.41 | $3.66 | $3.66 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.4%/yr | +18.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.6%/yr | — |
| EPS | +11.6%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | — | +37.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +13.2%/yr | +26.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.2%/yr | +31.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $99M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $197M it takes just to hold its position. It put $84M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $15M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $213M | $149M | $182M | $141M | $46M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$197M | +$177M | +$149M | +$120M | +$120M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$113M | −$60M | +$50M | +$85M | +$92M |
| Cash from operations | $296M | $267M | $382M | $345M | $258M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$197M | −$177M | −$149M | −$120M | −$115M |
| Owner earnings | $99M | $89M | $233M | $226M | $143M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$84M | −$150M | −$211M | −$97M | — |
| Free cash flow | $15M | ($61M) | $22M | $128M | $143M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 2% | 2% | 5% | 6% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $197M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $84M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 26.7×ComfortableOperating income $364M ÷ interest expense $14M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $715M · 2.0× operating profitModest net debtCash $373M + ST investments $49M − debt $1.1B
What this means
Netting $422M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $715M owed, about 2.0× a year's operating profit (3.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -7%–24%; 15% latest = NOPAT $227M ÷ invested capital $1.5BIndustry peers: median 20%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $99M = operating cash $296M − maintenance capex $197M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. It chose to put $84M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $15M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $296M ÷ net income $213M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $51M ÷ Owner Earnings $99M
What this means
Of $99M Owner Earnings, $51M (51%) went back to shareholders, $51M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.43×ExpandingCapex $281M ÷ depreciation $197M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.03×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $23M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +122%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.86/share (latest year $1.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.66/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 6% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 7% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 21%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −3.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$422M
- Inventory$66M
- Other current assets$363M
- Debt due within a year$12M
- Accounts payable$357M
- Other current liabilities$460M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$2.1B · 89%
- Dividends$226M · 9%
- Buybacks$60M · 3%
- Returned to owners$286M
26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $226M as dividends and $60M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $558M and cash and short-term investments rose $228M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $60M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−0.2%
The diluted count barely moved (211M to 211M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.24/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained6%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($621M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $40M, so each retained $1 added about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Arcos Dorados Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$580M → $1.1B
Debt rose from $580M to $1.1B while owner earnings went from about $101M to $140M — about 5.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Restaurants
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QSRRestaurant Brands International Inc. | $9.4B | 66% | 31.0% | 11% | 21% |
| YUMYum! Brands Inc. | $8.2B | 73% | 32.2% | 75% | 20% |
| TXRHTexas Roadhouse | $5.9B | — | 8.0% | 26% | 9% |
| EATBrinker Intl | $5.4B | 74% | 6.6% | 24% | 5% |
| ARCOArcos Dorados Holdings Inc. | $4.7B | 98% | 6.7% | 14% | 3% |
| BLMNBloomin' Brands Inc. | $4.0B | 69% | 3.5% | 13% | 3% |
| CAKECheesecake Factory Incorporated (The) | $3.8B | 77% | 3.7% | 13% | 5% |
| CBRLCracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc | $3.5B | 69% | 6.9% | 20% | 5% |
| Group median | — | 73% | 6.8% | 17% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Arcos Dorados Holdings Inc. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Arcos Dorados Holdings Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Arcos Dorados Holdings Inc. earns about $137M on its 2.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $15M on 211M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2025-12-31; net debt $715M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($281M) runs well above depreciation ($197M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $99M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ARBK its page in the Manual ARIS →
Industry order: the Restaurants chapter ARMK →