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CBRL, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc

Restaurants consumer brand Cyclical

Old country-store design offering a full-service restaurant menu that features home-style country food and a wide variety of decorative and functional items such as rocking chairs, holiday and seasonal gifts, toys, apparel, cookware and foods.

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. is principally engaged in the operation and development of the Cracker Barrel Old Country Store concept ("Cracker Barrel").

As of September 12, 2025, we operated 657 Cracker Barrel stores in 43 states and 68 Maple Street Biscuit Company stores in 10 states.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CBRL · Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.5B

+0.4% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.3B 5-yr avg $3.3B

Gross margin 69% 5-yr avg 68%

Operating margin −0.6% 5-yr avg 4.8%

ROIC −2% 5-yr avg 15%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Restaurant (81%) and Retail (19%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 69% and operating margin about 4.7% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 1.3% to 13% — on a steadier 69% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 20%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Restaurant is 81% of revenue, with Retail the other meaningful line at 19%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Restaurant81%$2.8B
Retail19%$652M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMay 2026
											Income statement
$2.9B	$2.9B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.5B	$3.5B	$3.3B	RevenueRevenue
68%	70%	69%	70%	69%	69%	68%	67%	69%	69%	69%	Gross marginGross mgn
5%	5%	5%	5%	6%	5%	5%	5%	6%	6%	6%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$280M	$313M	$294M	$283M	$104M	$367M	$153M	$121M	$45M	$55M	($22M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.6%	10.7%	9.7%	9.2%	4.1%	13.0%	4.7%	3.5%	1.3%	1.6%	−0.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$189M	$202M	$248M	$223M	($32M)	$255M	$132M	$99M	$41M	$46M	$26M	Net incomeNet inc.
29%	32%	11%	16%	—	18%	8%	4%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$271M	$321M	$331M	$363M	$161M	$302M	$205M	$250M	$169M	$219M	$195M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$78M	$86M	$94M	$108M	$118M	$109M	$104M	$104M	$112M	$122M	$124M	DepreciationDeprec.
($9M)	$24M	($18M)	$24M	$69M	($70M)	($38M)	$38M	$6M	$39M	$38M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$114M	$111M	$152M	$138M	$297M	$71M	$98M	$127M	$128M	$159M	$136M	CapexCapex
3.9%	3.8%	5.0%	4.5%	11.8%	2.5%	3.0%	3.7%	3.7%	4.6%	4.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$193M	$234M	$237M	$255M	$43M	$230M	$107M	$123M	$41M	$97M	$59M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.6%	8.0%	7.8%	8.3%	1.7%	8.2%	3.3%	3.6%	1.2%	2.8%	1.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$157M	$210M	$178M	$225M	($136M)	$230M	$107M	$123M	$41M	$60M	$59M	Free cash flowFCF
5.4%	7.2%	5.9%	7.3%	−5.4%	8.2%	3.3%	3.6%	1.2%	1.7%	1.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	$0	$0	$33M	$2M	$2M	$0	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$256M	$197M	$207M	$193M	$95M	$32M	$115M	$116M	$116M	$23M	$23M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$15M	$0	$15M	$0	$55M	$35M	$132M	$17M	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
26%	27%	30%	25%	9%	36%	16%	13%	5%	6%	-2%	ROICROIC
36%	37%	43%	37%	-8%	38%	26%	20%	9%	10%	6%	Return on equityROE
−13%	1%	7%	5%	−30%	34%	3%	−4%	−17%	5%	1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$151M	$161M	$115M	$37M	$437M	$145M	$45M	$25M	$12M	$40M	$26M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$19M	$18M	$19M	$23M	$20M	$27M	$32M	$30M	$39M	$35M	$35M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$152M	$156M	$156M	$155M	$139M	$138M	$213M	$189M	$181M	$181M	$180M	InventoryInvent.
$132M	$118M	$122M	$132M	$104M	$135M	$170M	$165M	$162M	$170M	$131M	Accounts payablePayables
$39M	$56M	$53M	$45M	$56M	$31M	$76M	$54M	$58M	$46M	$84M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$356M	$359M	$307M	$242M	$643M	$354M	$317M	$282M	$278M	$313M	$291M	Current assetsCur. assets
$369M	$376M	$365M	$392M	$451M	$465M	$502M	$489M	$454M	$626M	$580M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	1.0×	0.8×	0.6×	1.4×	0.8×	0.6×	0.6×	0.6×	0.5×	0.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	$0	$5M	$5M	$5M	$5M	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$2.5B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.1B	Total assetsAssets
$400M	$400M	$400M	$400M	$949M	$327M	$423M	$415M	$477M	$485M	$487M	Total debtDebt
$249M	$239M	$285M	$363M	$512M	$183M	$378M	$390M	$465M	$445M	$461M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
20.0×	21.9×	19.4×	17.2×	—	—	—	—	—	—	-1.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$526M	$545M	$582M	$605M	$418M	$664M	$511M	$484M	$440M	$462M	$465M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
24.1M	24.1M	24.1M	24.1M	23.9M	23.8M	23.2M	22.3M	22.3M	22.5M	22.5M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$120.97	$121.33	$125.87	$127.49	$105.71	$118.71	$140.57	$154.63	$155.50	$155.08	$148.24	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$7.86	$8.37	$10.29	$9.27	$-1.36	$10.71	$5.67	$4.45	$1.83	$2.06	$1.16	EPS (diluted)EPS
$8.02	$9.72	$9.84	$10.59	$1.79	$9.70	$4.60	$5.55	$1.82	$4.30	$2.63	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$6.54	$8.71	$7.41	$9.32	$-5.71	$9.70	$4.60	$5.55	$1.82	$2.66	$2.63	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$10.61	$8.16	$8.60	$8.03	$3.96	$1.33	$4.94	$5.21	$5.20	$1.03	$1.03	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.74	$4.59	$6.32	$5.74	$12.46	$3.00	$4.23	$5.70	$5.75	$7.08	$6.02	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$21.87	$22.58	$24.16	$25.10	$17.53	$27.92	$22.00	$21.73	$19.72	$20.55	$20.68	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.8%/yr	+8.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−6.7%/yr	+19.1%/yr
EPS	−13.8%/yr	—
Dividends / share	−22.8%/yr	−23.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+4.6%/yr	−10.7%/yr
Book value / share	−0.7%/yr	+3.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

22Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

6%low FY2024

Gross margin

69%low FY2023

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.6×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$97Mowner earningsvs.$46Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $97M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $122M it takes just to hold its position. It put $37M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $60M.

Reported net income$46M

Owner earnings$97M · 3% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$46M	$41M	$99M	$132M	$255M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$122M	+$112M	+$104M	+$104M	+$109M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$12M	+$10M	+$9M	+$8M	+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$39M	+$6M	+$38M	−$38M	−$70M
Cash from operations	$219M	$169M	$250M	$205M	$302M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$122M	−$128M	−$127M	−$98M	−$71M
Owner earnings	$97M	$41M	$123M	$107M	$230M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$37M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$60M	$41M	$123M	$107M	$230M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	1%	4%	3%	8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $122M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $37M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $85M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.3×

Adequate

Operating income $55M ÷ interest expense $16M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $445M · 8.1× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $40M − debt $485M

What this means
Netting $40M of cash and short-term investments against $485M of debt leaves $445M owed, about 8.1× a year's operating profit (8.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 7d

Tight

DSO 4 + DIO 61 − DPO 57 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 16%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range 5%–36%; 6% latest = NOPAT $55M ÷ invested capital $907M

Industry peers: median 24%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 1%–8%; latest $97M = operating cash $219M − maintenance capex $122M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $37M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $60M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $85M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 4.72×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $219M ÷ net income $46M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 42%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $41M ÷ Owner Earnings $97M

What this means
Of $97M Owner Earnings, $41M (42%) went back to shareholders, $23M dividends, $17M buybacks. Net of $12M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.30×

Expanding

Capex $159M ÷ depreciation $122M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.50×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $485M vs ($312M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −71%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.78/share (latest year $2.07), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.66/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to 2% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −12%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 12% a year over the record.
Worst year 2024 · 1.3% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −0.8%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 1, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$291M

Cash & short-term investments$26M
Receivables$35M
Inventory$180M
Other current assets$50M

Current liabilities$580M

Debt due within a year$150M
Accounts payable$131M
Other current liabilities$299M

Current ratio0.50×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.19×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($290M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$150M due · $26M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the May 1, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$441Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$659M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.2B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$95Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$86M

'27$74M

'28$70M

'29$66M

'30$60M

later$688M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$86Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$695Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$485M

Lease obligations (present value)$695M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 59%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Aug 1, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.4B · 54%
Dividends$1.3B · 52%
Buybacks$268M · 10%

Returned to owners$1.6B
104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $268M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$422M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $422M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $400M to $487M, and cash and short-term investments drew down $125M.
Average price paid for buybacks$120.29
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $268M, about $120.29 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $101.57 (2023) to $150.51 (2021); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $105.39 ($132M).
Net change in share count−6.5%
The diluted count fell from 24M to 23M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.03/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 23% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Sandra B. Cochran	$7.6M	$9.8M	$230M
2022	Sandra B. Cochran	$7.0M	$3.0M	$107M
2023	Sandra B. Cochran	$8.3M	$6.1M	$123M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2023 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$12M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 21% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.5% vs 7.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.5% early in the record and 2.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Inventory, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
YUMYum! Brands Inc.	$8.2B	73%	32.2%	75%	20%
TXRHTexas Roadhouse	$5.9B	—	8.0%	26%	9%
EATBrinker Intl	$5.4B	74%	6.6%	24%	5%
BLMNBloomin' Brands Inc.	$4.0B	69%	3.5%	13%	3%
CAKECheesecake Factory Incorporated (The)	$3.8B	77%	3.7%	13%	5%
CBRLCracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc	$3.5B	69%	6.9%	20%	5%
PLAYDave & Buster's Entertainment Inc.	$2.1B	83%	13.0%	15%	13%
PZZAPapa John's International Inc.	$2.1B	—	6.0%	37%	4%
Group median	—	74%	6.8%	22%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc earns about $178M on its 5.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($178M) Net of stock comp (−$7M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−20%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−13%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $59M on 22M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-01; net debt $461M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CBRL against another business →

The owners of CBRL: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc (CBRL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CBRL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CBRE its page in the Manual CBSH →

Industry order: ← CAVA the Restaurants chapter CHA →