Owner Scorecard


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ARDT, Ardent Health Inc.

Ardent is a provider of healthcare services in the United States, operating in eight growing mid-sized urban markets across six states: Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, New Jersey, Idaho, and Kansas.

We deliver care through a system of 30 acute care hospitals, more than 280 sites of care, and over 2,000 providers that are either employed by or affiliated 1 with us, as of December 31, 2025.

We hold a leading position in a majority of our markets 2 and believe we are one of the leading healthcare systems based on market share and given our integrated network of hospitals, ambulatory facilities, and physician practices.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ARDT · Ardent Health Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$6.3B
+6.0% YoY · 7% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $6.4B 4-yr avg $5.7B
Operating margin 4.5% 4-yr avg 4.9%
ROIC 11% 4-yr avg 20%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 4.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. That margin has held in a narrow 2.8%–6.1% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 2 of 4 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2022–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.1B$5.4B$6.0B$6.3B$6.4BRevenueRevenue
1%2%2%2%2%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$311M$152M$363M$286M$287MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.1%2.8%6.1%4.5%4.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$189M$54M$210M$136M$134MNet incomeNet inc.
20%30%23%29%30%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($38M)$222M$315M$471M$435MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$138M$141M$146M$156M$162MDepreciationDeprec.
($365M)$27M($42M)$179M$138MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$0$0$36M$3M$3MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$175M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
43%8%17%12%11%ROICROIC
18%8%19%11%10%Return on equityROE
1%8%19%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$456M$438M$557M$710M$610MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$775M$743M$686M$686MReceivablesReceiv.
$105M$115M$119M$120MInventoryInvent.
$475M$401M$458M$420MAccounts payablePayables
$406M$457M$347M$386MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.6B$1.8B$2.1B$2.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$994M$945M$1.0B$951MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.9×2.0×2.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$845M$845M$852M$879M$879MGoodwillGoodwill
$4.7B$5.0B$5.3B$5.3BTotal assetsAssets
$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BTotal debtDebt
$749M$538M$390M$501MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.0B$671M$1.1B$1.3B$1.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
126M126M133M141M142MShares out (diluted)Shares
$40.67$42.89$44.94$44.71$45.35Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.50$0.43$1.58$0.96$0.95EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.39$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$8.24$5.32$8.52$9.10$9.43Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
3-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.2%/yr+3.2%/yr (3-yr)
EPS−13.8%/yr−13.8%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+3.4%/yr+3.4%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2022–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
141Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
12%low FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2023FY2025
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $390M · 1.4× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $710M − debt $1.1B
    What this means

    Netting $710M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $390M owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (3.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    4-yr median, range 8%–43%; 12% latest = NOPAT $203M ÷ invested capital $1.7B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $471M ÷ net income $136M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.97×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $1.0B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.93/share (latest year $0.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2022–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 4
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 3 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 5% (2-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 5% lately, median 5%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2023 · 2.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +3.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If AI systems we use now or in the future do not function as expected, whether due to software defects, algorithmic limitations, implementation challenges, human error or other factors, we could experience operational disruptions, incur additional costs, or face reputational harm.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$610M
  • Receivables$686M
  • Inventory$120M
  • Other current assets$605M
Current liabilities$951M
  • Debt due within a year$38M
  • Accounts payable$420M
  • Other current liabilities$494M
Current ratio2.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.00×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.64×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$38M due · $610M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 2.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$445Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.3B$1.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.3B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$200M
'27$193M
'28$189M
'29$175M
'30$168M
later$1.9B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$200Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$2.9Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.2Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.1B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.2B
Total fixed claims on the business$2.3B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.3B, of which the leases are 53%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership1.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio107:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
THCTenet Healthcare$21.3B11.7%18%4%
BTSGBrightSpring Health Services Inc.$12.9B1.7%6%1%
DGXQuest Diagnostics$11.0B35%14.6%10%12%
ARDTArdent Health Inc.$6.3B5.3%14%
AGLagilon health inc.$5.9B-5.4%-52%-5%
OPCHOption Care Health Inc.$5.6B22%4.6%9%4%
SEMSelect Medical Holdings$5.5B7.6%7%5%
MDPediatrix Medical Group Inc.$1.9B10.1%8%11%
Group median6.5%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Ardent Health Inc. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered8%/yr’22→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ardent Health Inc. (ARDT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ARDT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ARCT its page in the Manual ARDX →

Industry order: ← AMED the Health Care Providers & Services chapter ASTH →