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ARDT, Ardent Health Inc.
Ardent is a provider of healthcare services in the United States, operating in eight growing mid-sized urban markets across six states: Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, New Jersey, Idaho, and Kansas.
We deliver care through a system of 30 acute care hospitals, more than 280 sites of care, and over 2,000 providers that are either employed by or affiliated 1 with us, as of December 31, 2025.
We hold a leading position in a majority of our markets 2 and believe we are one of the leading healthcare systems based on market share and given our integrated network of hospitals, ambulatory facilities, and physician practices.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 4.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. That margin has held in a narrow 2.8%–6.1% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 2 of 4 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $5.1B | $5.4B | $6.0B | $6.3B | $6.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 1% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $311M | $152M | $363M | $286M | $287M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.1% | 2.8% | 6.1% | 4.5% | 4.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $189M | $54M | $210M | $136M | $134M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 20% | 30% | 23% | 29% | 30% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($38M) | $222M | $315M | $471M | $435M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $138M | $141M | $146M | $156M | $162M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($365M) | $27M | ($42M) | $179M | $138M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $0 | $36M | $3M | $3M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $175M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 43% | 8% | 17% | 12% | 11% | ROICROIC |
| 18% | 8% | 19% | 11% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| 1% | 8% | 19% | — | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $456M | $438M | $557M | $710M | $610M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $775M | $743M | $686M | $686M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $105M | $115M | $119M | $120M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $475M | $401M | $458M | $420M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $406M | $457M | $347M | $386M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $994M | $945M | $1.0B | $951M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.6× | 1.9× | 2.0× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $845M | $845M | $852M | $879M | $879M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $4.7B | $5.0B | $5.3B | $5.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $749M | $538M | $390M | $501M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $1.0B | $671M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 126M | 126M | 133M | 141M | 142M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $40.67 | $42.89 | $44.94 | $44.71 | $45.35 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.50 | $0.43 | $1.58 | $0.96 | $0.95 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.39 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $8.24 | $5.32 | $8.52 | $9.10 | $9.43 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.2%/yr | +3.2%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | −13.8%/yr | −13.8%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +3.4%/yr | +3.4%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $390M · 1.4× operating profitModest net debtCash $710M − debt $1.1B
What this means
Netting $710M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $390M owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (3.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle4-yr median, range 8%–43%; 12% latest = NOPAT $203M ÷ invested capital $1.7BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $471M ÷ net income $136M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $6.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.97×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $1.0B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.93/share (latest year $0.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 4
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 5% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 5% lately, median 5%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2023 · 2.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +3.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“If AI systems we use now or in the future do not function as expected, whether due to software defects, algorithmic limitations, implementation challenges, human error or other factors, we could experience operational disruptions, incur additional costs, or face reputational harm.…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$610M
- Receivables$686M
- Inventory$120M
- Other current assets$605M
- Debt due within a year$38M
- Accounts payable$420M
- Other current liabilities$494M
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.3B, of which the leases are 53%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio107:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Health Care Providers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| THCTenet Healthcare | $21.3B | — | 11.7% | 18% | 4% |
| BTSGBrightSpring Health Services Inc. | $12.9B | — | 1.7% | 6% | 1% |
| DGXQuest Diagnostics | $11.0B | 35% | 14.6% | 10% | 12% |
| ARDTArdent Health Inc. | $6.3B | — | 5.3% | 14% | — |
| AGLagilon health inc. | $5.9B | — | -5.4% | -52% | -5% |
| OPCHOption Care Health Inc. | $5.6B | 22% | 4.6% | 9% | 4% |
| SEMSelect Medical Holdings | $5.5B | — | 7.6% | 7% | 5% |
| MDPediatrix Medical Group Inc. | $1.9B | — | 10.1% | 8% | 11% |
| Group median | — | — | 6.5% | 8% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFArdent Health Inc. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered8%/yr’22→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← ARCT its page in the Manual ARDX →
Industry order: ← AMED the Health Care Providers & Services chapter ASTH →