Owner Scorecard


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ASTH, Astrana Health Inc.

Health Care Providers & Services asset-light Cyclical

Astrana Health, Inc. is a leading physician-centric, technology-powered, risk-bearing healthcare management company.

Leveraging its proprietary population health management and healthcare delivery platform, Astrana operates an integrated, value-based healthcare model, that aims to empower the providers in its network to deliver the highest quality of care to its patients in a cost-effective manner.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ASTH · Astrana Health Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.2B
+56.4% YoY · 36% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $1.7B
Operating margin 2.5% 5-yr avg 7.0%
ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 9.1% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 2.5% to 27% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$44M$356M$520M$561M$687M$774M$1.1B$1.4B$2.0B$3.2B$3.5BRevenueRevenue
23%31%17%22%23%83%Gross marginGross mgn
48%7%8%7%7%8%7%8%8%7%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$12M$35M$88M$32M$81M$98M$104M$85M$89M$79M$86MOperating incomeOp. inc.
26.5%9.9%17.0%5.8%11.7%12.7%9.1%6.1%4.4%2.5%2.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$11M$26M$11M$14M$38M$69M$45M$61M$43M$22M$30MNet incomeNet inc.
43%13%37%60%31%48%35%42%41%38%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$22M$52M$25M$14M$46M$70M$82M$68M$52M$115M$166MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$18M$19M$19M$18M$18M$18M$18M$18M$28M$46M$54MDepreciationDeprec.
($8M)$4M($6M)($20M)($13M)($23M)$3M($32M)($53M)$8M$41MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$3M$2M$1M$1M$1M$19M$23M$29M$8M$10M$11MCapexCapex
7.5%0.6%0.2%0.2%0.2%2.5%2.0%2.1%0.4%0.3%0.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$19M$50M$24M$13M$45M$51M$65M$50M$44M$104M$155MOwner earningsOwner earn.
42.2%14.0%4.7%2.3%6.5%6.6%5.6%3.6%2.2%3.3%4.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$19M$50M$24M$13M$45M$51M$59M$40M$44M$104M$155MFree cash flowFCF
42.2%14.0%4.7%2.3%6.5%6.6%5.2%2.9%2.2%3.3%4.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0$49M$11M$3M$16M$7M$146M$549M$549MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$27M$10M$18M$62M$51M$31M$14M$62M$4M$8M$3MDividends paidDiv. paid
$518K$3M$5M$8M$537K$6M$9M$10M$900K$26MBuybacksBuybacks
20%51%6%11%23%12%9%6%3%4%ROICROIC
13%16%6%7%11%20%8%10%6%3%4%Return on equityROE
−17%10%−4%−25%−4%11%6%−0%5%2%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$56M$101M$108M$220M$261M$287M$294M$296M$291M$429M$480MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$22M$8M$8M$11M$7M$11M$50M$276M$374M$467MReceivablesReceiv.
$1M$4M$4M$7M$36M$44M$50M$60M$106M$196M$221MAccounts payablePayables
$21M$4M$3M$4M($29M)($33M)$69K$170M$179M$246MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$81M$144M$173M$329M$339M$472M$428M$462M$638M$863M$1.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$51M$110M$72M$105M$115M$123M$149M$219M$366M$615M$745MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.3×2.4×3.1×2.9×3.9×2.9×2.1×1.7×1.4×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$103M$86M$186M$239M$232M$246M$269M$279M$419M$865M$875MGoodwillGoodwill
$350M$491M$513M$729M$817M$843M$966M$933M$1.4B$2.2B$2.4BTotal assetsAssets
$0$0$242M$241M$184M$204M$278M$435M$1.0B$1.0BTotal debtDebt
($56M)($108M)$22M($20M)($103M)($90M)($18M)$144M$609M$548MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
189.8×441.0×157.6×6.8×8.5×18.2×13.2×5.3×2.7×1.6×1.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$87M$160M$181M$192M$331M$347M$543M$614M$713M$779M$800MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%0.3%0.3%0.5%0.9%1.4%1.6%1.7%1.2%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$317K$2M$4M$4MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
28.0M28.7M37.9M36.4M37.4M45.4M45.6M46.9M48.0M49.4M49.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.57$12.43$13.71$15.40$18.35$17.05$25.09$29.54$42.41$64.45$71.89Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.41$0.90$0.29$0.39$1.01$1.52$0.99$1.29$0.90$0.46$0.62EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.67$1.74$0.64$0.35$1.20$1.13$1.42$1.08$0.92$2.12$3.16Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.67$1.74$0.64$0.35$1.20$1.13$1.30$0.85$0.92$2.12$3.16Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.95$0.36$0.47$1.70$1.37$0.68$0.31$1.32$0.08$0.16$0.05Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.12$0.07$0.03$0.03$0.03$0.42$0.50$0.61$0.17$0.20$0.22Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.12$5.58$4.76$5.26$8.83$7.64$11.90$13.08$14.86$15.78$16.31Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+51.0%/yr+28.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+13.7%/yr+12.0%/yr
EPS+1.2%/yr−14.7%/yr
Dividends / share−18.0%/yr−34.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+6.3%/yr+45.8%/yr
Book value / share+19.7%/yr+12.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+56.4%
    “Revenue Our total revenue in 2025 was $3,181.8 million, as compared to $2,034.5 million in 2024, an increase of $1,147.2 million or 56%. The increase in total revenue was partially attributable to the acquisition of Prospect, which contributed approximately $616.3 million of revenue from the acquisition date.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Net income-47.9%
    “Net income attributable to Astrana Health, Inc. was $22.5 million in 2025, as compared to net income of $43.1 million in 2024, a decrease of $20.7 million, driven by a decrease in our operating income and an increase in our interest expense, partially offset by a decrease in our provision for income taxes and a decrease in net income attributable to noncontrolling interests.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
49Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
3%low FY2025
Gross margin
23%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.8×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$104Mowner earningsvs.$22Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $22M of profit into $104M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$22M
Owner earnings$104M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$22M$43M$61M$45M$69M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$46M+$28M+$18M+$18M+$18M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$39M+$35M+$22M+$16M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$8M−$53M−$32M+$3M−$23M
Cash from operations$115M$52M$68M$82M$70M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$10M−$8M−$18M−$18M−$19M
Owner earnings$104M$44M$50M$65M$51M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$11M−$5M
Free cash flow$104M$44M$40M$59M$51M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%2%4%6%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $39M), owner earnings is nearer $66M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting related to our accounting for business combinations and the risks posed by changes in the business caused by growth and increased complexity, as further described in Part III.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $79M ÷ interest expense $50M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $607M · 7.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $429M + ST investments $2M − debt $1.0B
    What this means

    Netting $432M of cash and short-term investments against $1.0B of debt leaves $607M owed, about 7.7× a year's operating profit (13.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 43 + DIO 0 − DPO 120 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 3%–51%; 3% latest = NOPAT $46M ÷ invested capital $1.4B
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–42%; latest $104M = operating cash $115M − maintenance capex $10M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $39M of SBC) leaves $66M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $115M ÷ net income $22M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $33M ÷ Owner Earnings $104M
    What this means

    Of $104M Owner Earnings, $33M (32%) went back to shareholders, $8M dividends, $26M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($39M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.22×
    Harvesting
    Capex $10M ÷ depreciation $46M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.40×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.0B vs $248M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +163%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.76/share (latest year $0.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.99/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 18% early to 4% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 2.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +6.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“AI and machine learning technologies are complex and rapidly evolving, and we face significant competition from other companies in our industry as well as an evolving regulatory landscape.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$480M
  • Receivables$467M
  • Other current assets$57M
Current liabilities$745M
  • Debt due within a year$48M
  • Accounts payable$221M
  • Other current liabilities$476M
Current ratio1.35×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.35×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.64×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$259Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$48M due · $480M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+55.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($332M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($777M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$38M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $547M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$98M · 18%
  • Dividends$287M · 53%
  • Buybacks$69M · 13%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$93M · 17%
  • Returned to owners$356M

    76% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $287M as dividends and $69M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.0B and cash and short-term investments rose $424M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$8.27

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $37M, about $8.27 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $2.95 (2023) to $46.13 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $26.47 ($26M).

  • Net change in share count75.4%

    The diluted count rose from 28M to 49M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.16/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 18% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.1B51% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$781Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $98M of capital spent building

$10M written down across 4 years (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership20.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$39M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 49% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Astrana Health Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.0% vs 20.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 20.3% early in the record and 3.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?75.4%

    Diluted shares grew 75.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $69M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $1.0B

    Debt rose from $0 to $1.0B while owner earnings went from about $31M to $66M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 15 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BAHBooz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation$11.2B54%9.0%21%6%
ITGartner Inc.$6.5B67%14.1%40%18%
TTEKTetra Tech$5.4B83%7.7%14%7%
PAYXPaychex Inc.$5.4B70%39.7%41%32%
INCYIncyte$5.1B95%15.0%24%22%
ASTHAstrana Health Inc.$3.2B23%9.5%11%5%
HURNHuron Consulting$1.7B37%7.6%6%11%
BWMNBowman Consulting Group Ltd.$490M51%0.8%2%4%
Group median61%9.2%17%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Astrana Health Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Astrana Health Inc. earns about $164M on its 5.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $155M on 56M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $548M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Astrana Health Inc. (ASTH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASTH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ASTE its page in the Manual ASTS →

Industry order: ← ARDT the Health Care Providers & Services chapter AUNA →