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ASAN, Asana

Software asset-light Unprofitable

Asana is the system of action for work, built for the Agentic Enterprise.

We provide a comprehensive solution where humans and AI agents can collaborate effectively so that individuals work smarter, teams move faster, and organizations deliver results.

Over 180,000 paying customers across 200 countries and territories us e Asana to connect their work to company goals and orchestrate mission-critical workflows like product launches, employee onboarding, resource planning, tracking company-wide strategic initiatives and more.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

ASAN · Asana

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$791M

+9.2% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $809M 5-yr avg $619M

Gross margin 89% 5-yr avg 90%

Operating margin −20.9% 5-yr avg −49.6%

Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg −9%

Free cash flow margin 15% 5-yr avg −11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −70% through the cycle on a 89% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −28 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −177%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

41% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2026

United States59%$468M
International41%$322M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMApr 2026
									Income statement
$77M	$143M	$227M	$378M	$547M	$653M	$724M	$791M	$809M	RevenueRevenue
82%	86%	87%	90%	90%	90%	89%	89%	89%	Gross marginGross mgn
26%	33%	34%	31%	30%	22%	21%	24%	24%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
55%	63%	53%	54%	54%	50%	47%	38%	36%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($52M)	($120M)	($176M)	($265M)	($408M)	($270M)	($267M)	($197M)	($169M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−67.8%	−83.9%	−77.3%	−70.1%	−74.5%	−41.4%	−36.8%	−25.0%	−20.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($51M)	($119M)	($212M)	($288M)	($408M)	($257M)	($256M)	($189M)	($163M)	Net incomeNet inc.
									Cash flow & returns
($30M)	($40M)	($93M)	($84M)	($160M)	($18M)	$15M	$90M	$124M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$4M	$2M	$4M	$9M	$13M	$14M	$18M	$22M	$23M	DepreciationDeprec.
$8M	$28M	$81M	$92M	$46M	$22M	$42M	$43M	$61M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$7M	$57M	$42M	$5M	$8M	$6M	$4M	$6M	CapexCapex
3.7%	4.8%	25.3%	11.0%	1.0%	1.2%	0.8%	0.5%	0.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($33M)	($42M)	($96M)	($92M)	($165M)	($26M)	$9M	$87M	$118M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−43.0%	−29.7%	−42.5%	−24.4%	−30.2%	−3.9%	1.3%	10.9%	14.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($33M)	($47M)	($150M)	($125M)	($165M)	($26M)	$9M	$87M	$118M	Free cash flowFCF
−43.0%	−33.0%	−66.2%	−33.1%	−30.2%	−3.9%	1.3%	10.9%	14.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$14K	$77K	$33K	$40K	$9K	$0	$78M	$132M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	-177%	—	—	-160%	-257%	—	—	ROICROIC
—	—	—	-141%	-114%	-79%	-112%	-123%	-119%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	−141%	−114%	−79%	−112%	−123%	−119%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$24M	$306M	$260M	$240M	$527M	$237M	$185M	$200M	$194M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$13M	$32M	$59M	$82M	$88M	$88M	$110M	$73M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$8M	$10M	$12M	$8M	$7M	$10M	$19M	$25M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$5M	$23M	$48M	$75M	$81M	$78M	$91M	$48M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$381M	$446M	$411M	$660M	$660M	$601M	$593M	$550M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$100M	$163M	$255M	$332M	$367M	$416M	$501M	$480M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	3.8×	2.7×	1.6×	2.0×	1.8×	1.4×	1.2×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$422M	$731M	$707M	$955M	$962M	$891M	$844M	$806M	Total assetsAssets
—	$203M	$351M	$35M	$47M	$44M	$39M	$41M	$38M	Total debtDebt
—	($103M)	$91M	($206M)	($480M)	($193M)	($145M)	($159M)	($155M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	-1533.7×	-4.9×	-14.4×	-203.9×	-68.3×	-72.4×	-62.7×	-56.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($181M)	($145M)	($13M)	$204M	$357M	$326M	$228M	$154M	$137M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
11.1%	33.9%	15.1%	27.6%	34.5%	31.0%	29.2%	27.2%	25.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
									Per share
65.2M	70.3M	106M	176M	200M	220M	229M	237M	238M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.18	$2.03	$2.13	$2.15	$2.74	$2.96	$3.15	$3.34	$3.40	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.78	$-1.69	$-1.99	$-1.63	$-2.04	$-1.17	$-1.11	$-0.80	$-0.69	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.51	$-0.60	$-0.91	$-0.52	$-0.83	$-0.12	$0.04	$0.37	$0.49	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.51	$-0.67	$-1.41	$-0.71	$-0.83	$-0.12	$0.04	$0.37	$0.49	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04	$0.10	$0.54	$0.24	$0.03	$0.04	$0.02	$0.02	$0.03	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-2.78	$-2.07	$-0.12	$1.16	$1.78	$1.48	$0.99	$0.65	$0.58	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.51 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.66 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+16.1%/yr	+9.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	−13.4%/yr	−50.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

237Mpeak FY2026

ROIC

−257%low FY2025

Gross margin

89%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$87Mowner earningsvs.($189M)net incomelow FY2023

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $189M loss into $87M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	($189M)	($256M)	($257M)	($408M)	($288M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$22M	+$18M	+$14M	+$13M	+$9M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$215M	+$211M	+$202M	+$189M	+$105M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$43M	+$42M	+$22M	+$46M	+$92M
Cash from operations	$90M	$15M	($18M)	($160M)	($84M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$4M	−$6M	−$8M	−$5M	−$9M
Owner earnings	$87M	$9M	($26M)	($165M)	($92M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	—	−$33M
Free cash flow	$87M	$9M	($26M)	($165M)	($125M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	11%	1%	-4%	-30%	-24%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $215M), owner earnings is nearer ($128M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -62.7×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($197M) ÷ interest expense $3M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$159M

Net cash

Cash $200M − debt $41M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $159M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -28d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 51 + DIO 0 − DPO 79 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not meaningful here

Invested capital ($5M) = debt $41M + equity $154M − cash

Industry peers: median -16%

What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Positive this year, negative across the cycle

latest $87M = operating cash $90M − maintenance capex $4M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (8-yr median -30%)

Industry peers: median 0%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a -30% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $215M of SBC) leaves ($128M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $90M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($189M) · cash from operations $90M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 153%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $132M ÷ Owner Earnings $87M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $87M of Owner Earnings, $132M (153%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $132M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($215M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.17×

Harvesting

Capex $4M ÷ depreciation $22M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $791M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.18×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $41M vs $92M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 8 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.98/share (latest year $-0.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.65/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −76% → −34% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −76% early to −34% lately, median −70% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −83.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Developments in AI technology may also change how work is performed or how software tools are used, which could reduce demand for certain work management capabilities or require us to adapt our platform and business model.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$550M

Cash & short-term investments$194M
Receivables$73M
Other current assets$283M

Current liabilities$480M

Debt due within a year$38M
Accounts payable$25M
Other current liabilities$416M

Current ratio1.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.15×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.40×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$71Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$38M due · $194M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 30, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$137Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($118M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$248M$210M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$323Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	$1	$1	($92M)
2023	$1	$1	($165M)
2024	$1	$1	($26M)
2025	$1	$1	$9M
2026	$39.5M	$26.7M	$87M
2026	$1	$1	$87M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio189:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$215M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 27% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CXMSprinklr Inc.	$857M	70%	-6.6%	-3%	5%
FRSHFreshworks Inc.	$839M	81%	-22.5%	-23%	11%
QTWOQ2 Holdings Inc.	$795M	48%	-14.8%	-10%	0%
ASANAsana	$791M	89%	-68.9%	-177%	-27%
COURCoursera Inc.	$758M	53%	-22.9%	—	0%
BANDBandwidth Inc.	$754M	44%	-2.3%	-2%	5%
BRZEBraze	$738M	67%	-30.7%	-30%	-5%
APPNAppian Corporation	$727M	71%	-18.7%	-50%	-6%
Group median	—	69%	-20.6%	-23%	0%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Asana has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($23M) Net of stock comp (−$203M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($120M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2025+825%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $118M on 238M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $155M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6M) runs well above depreciation ($23M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $120M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ASAN against another business →

The owners of ASAN: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Asana (ASAN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASAN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ARX its page in the Manual ASB →

Industry order: ← ARQQ the Software chapter AUR →