← All companies ← AS Manual ASM → ← 9107 Marine Shipping BIP →

ASC, Ardmore Shipping Corporation

Marine Shipping capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F

ASC · Ardmore Shipping Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$324M

−20.1% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $324M 5-yr avg $350M

Operating margin −1.8% 5-yr avg 21.2%

ROIC −1% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 5.6% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −11% and 35% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 3 of 6 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$164M	$196M	$210M	$230M	$220M	$192M	$446M	$396M	$406M	$310M	$324M	RevenueRevenue
$24M	$9M	($10M)	$4M	$12M	($20M)	$154M	$129M	$140M	$47M	($6M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
14.6%	4.3%	−4.6%	1.7%	5.6%	−10.6%	34.6%	32.5%	34.5%	15.3%	−1.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$4M	($12M)	($43M)	($23M)	($6M)	($37M)	$138M	$117M	$133M	$41M	$58M	Net incomeNet inc.
2%	—	—	—	—	—	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$43M	$18M	$9M	$20M	$46M	($3M)	$124M	$160M	$160M	$82M	$85M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$30M	$34M	$35M	$32M	$32M	$32M	$29M	$28M	$30M	$34M	$36M	DepreciationDeprec.
$9M	($3M)	$17M	$11M	$20M	$2M	($44M)	$15M	($3M)	$7M	($9M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$531K	$12K	$52K	$3M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	CapexCapex
0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$42M	$18M	$9M	$18M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Owner earningsOwner earn.
25.6%	9.4%	4.5%	7.8%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$42M	$18M	$9M	$18M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Free cash flowFCF
25.6%	9.4%	4.5%	7.8%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$9M	$0	$0	$0	$2M	—	—	$47M	$45M	$12M	$13M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$3M	$11M	$0	$0	$287K	—	—	—	$18M	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	-1%	—	—	-4%	26%	22%	22%	6%	-1%	ROICROIC
1%	-3%	-12%	-7%	-2%	-13%	29%	22%	22%	6%	9%	Return on equityROE
−1%	−3%	−12%	−7%	−2%	—	—	13%	14%	5%	7%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$56M	$39M	$57M	$52M	$58M	$54M	—	—	—	—	$54M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$23M	$27M	$27M	$30M	$18M	$20M	$80M	$56M	$61M	$48M	$53M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$7M	$10M	$13M	$10M	$10M	$11M	$16M	$13M	$11M	$9M	$13M	InventoryInvent.
$30M	$37M	$40M	$40M	$28M	$31M	$96M	$69M	$72M	$56M	$66M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$94M	$84M	$109M	$98M	$103M	$94M	$158M	$127M	$127M	$112M	$146M	Current assetsCur. assets
$59M	$58M	$76M	$60M	$63M	$59M	$53M	$34M	$30M	$26M	$30M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×	1.4×	1.4×	1.6×	1.6×	1.6×	3.0×	3.7×	4.2×	4.3×	4.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$884M	$846M	$845M	$772M	$752M	$725M	$724M	$691M	$705M	$789M	$790M	Total assetsAssets
$453M	$404M	$228M	$207M	$211M	$145M	$129M	$46M	$39M	$127M	$103M	Total debtDebt
$397M	$365M	$171M	$156M	$152M	$91M	$129M	$46M	$39M	$127M	$49M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.4×	0.4×	-0.4×	0.1×	0.7×	-1.3×	9.9×	11.3×	20.7×	7.7×	-0.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$404M	$381M	$347M	$326M	$320M	$292M	$469M	$537M	$608M	$634M	$655M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
30.1M	33.4M	32.8M	33.1M	33.2M	33.9M	38.4M	41.8M	42.0M	40.8M	40.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$5.45	$5.86	$6.40	$6.95	$6.62	$5.68	$11.62	$9.47	$9.65	$7.60	$7.96	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.12	$-0.37	$-1.31	$-0.69	$-0.18	$-1.09	$3.61	$2.79	$3.16	$1.00	$1.43	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.40	$0.55	$0.29	$0.54	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.40	$0.55	$0.29	$0.54	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.31	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.05	—	—	$1.13	$1.07	$0.30	$0.31	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.02	$0.00	$0.00	$0.08	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$13.41	$11.39	$10.55	$9.85	$9.64	$8.62	$12.24	$12.85	$14.45	$15.54	$16.08	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.8%/yr	+2.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−27.2%/yr (3-yr)	−27.2%/yr (3-yr)
EPS	+26.1%/yr	—
Dividends / share	−0.4%/yr	+43.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	+64.6%/yr (3-yr)	+64.6%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share	+1.7%/yr	+10.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

41Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

6%low FY2021

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

8.7×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$18Mowner earningsvs.($23M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2016–FY2019cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2019 the business turned a $23M loss into $18M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2019	FY2018	FY2017	FY2016
Reported net income	($23M)	($43M)	($12M)	$4M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$32M	+$35M	+$34M	+$30M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$11M	+$17M	−$3M	+$9M
Cash from operations	$20M	$9M	$18M	$43M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$3M	−$52K	−$12K	−$531K
Owner earnings	$18M	$9M	$18M	$42M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	8%	4%	9%	26%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.8×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($6M) ÷ interest expense $7M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $49M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $54M − debt $103M

What this means
Netting $54M of cash and short-term investments against $103M of debt leaves $49M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -4%–26%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($6M) ÷ invested capital $704M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.45×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $85M ÷ net income $58M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $324M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.87×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $103M vs $116M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.38/share (latest year $1.43), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 5% → 27% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 27% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −23%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 23% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −10.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$146M

Cash & short-term investments$54M
Receivables$53M
Inventory$13M
Other current assets$26M

Current liabilities$30M

Other current liabilities$30M

Current ratio4.87×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio4.43×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.81×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$116Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$655Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$11MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$104M$585K of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2019

Over the record, the business generated $91M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

Reinvested$3M · 4%
Dividends$9M · 10%
Buybacks$14M · 16%
Retained (debt / cash)$64M · 71%

Returned to owners$24M
27% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $9M as dividends and $14M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $350M and cash and short-term investments fell $1M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $14M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count35.1%
The diluted count rose from 30M to 41M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ardmore Shipping Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.1% vs 17.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 17.5% early in the record and 6.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?35.1%
Diluted shares grew 35.1% over 2016–2019, even as the company spent $14M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
KEXKirby	$3.4B	—	7.7%	4%	10%
MATXMatson	$3.3B	96%	11.4%	11%	12%
TDWTidewater Inc.	$1.4B	—	-12.5%	-6%	3%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock	$843M	—	12.3%	3%	33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.	$632M	—	7.7%	10%	10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.	$482M	—	35.2%	7%	38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited	$342M	—	-1.1%	-0%	31%
ASCArdmore Shipping Corporation	$324M	—	10.1%	14%	9%
Group median	—	—	8.9%	5%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Ardmore Shipping Corporation reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ardmore Shipping Corporation has delivered.

Ardmore Shipping Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($28M) Net of stock comp

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’19−23%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings — on 41M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $49M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ASC against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ardmore Shipping Corporation (ASC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AS its page in the Manual ASM →

Industry order: ← 9107 the Marine Shipping chapter BIP →