Owner Scorecard


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TDW, Tidewater Inc.

Marine Shipping capital-intensive

We offer a large, diversified fleet of offshore service vessels and related support vessels, with 208 vessels serving customers in over 30 countries as of December 31, 2025.

We have provided marine and transportation services to the global offshore energy industry since our incorporation in 1956.

Our vessels routinely move between geographic regions as our customers complete projects and new projects arise.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TDW · Tidewater Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.4B
+0.5% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $945M
Operating margin 19.8% 5-yr avg 8.1%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 21% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 23% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −18%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 2 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

94% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • Other Countries45%$614M
  • Angola12%$156M
  • United Kingdom11%$149M
  • Saudi Arabia10%$134M
  • Norway9%$117M
  • Australia8%$108M
  • United States6%$75M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$979M$602M$407M$487M$397M$371M$648M$1.0B$1.3B$1.4B$1.3BRevenueRevenue
16%24%27%21%18%18%16%9%8%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($70M)($578M)($107M)($87M)($187M)($95M)$27M$182M$311M$283M$267MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−7.1%−96.1%−26.4%−17.8%−47.0%−25.6%4.1%18.0%23.1%20.9%19.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($160M)($660M)($172M)($142M)($196M)($129M)($22M)$97M$181M$335M$298MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$253M$30M$4M($31M)$4M$15M$40M$104M$282M$379M$318MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$182M$167M$51M$77M$73M$73M$84M$129M$156M$151M$151MDepreciationDeprec.
$218M$519M$111M$14M$122M$65M($29M)($133M)($68M)($121M)($145M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$194M$25M$21M$18M$15M$9M$17M$32M$28M$26M$30MCapexCapex
19.9%4.2%5.3%3.7%3.8%2.4%2.6%3.1%2.0%1.9%2.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$59M$4M($17M)($49M)($11M)$6M$24M$73M$255M$353M$287MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.0%0.7%−4.3%−10.2%−2.7%1.6%3.6%7.2%18.9%26.1%21.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$59M$4M($17M)($49M)($11M)$6M$24M$73M$255M$353M$287MFree cash flowFCF
6.0%0.7%−4.3%−10.2%−2.7%1.6%3.6%7.2%18.9%26.1%21.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$21M$594M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$35M$91M$90MBuybacksBuybacks
-1%-44%-7%-6%-17%-10%8%17%20%15%ROICROIC
-7%-65%-15%-14%-24%-18%-3%9%16%25%22%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$678M$432M$372M$218M$150M$149M$164M$274M$325M$579M$552MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$228M$114M$111M$121MReceivablesReceiv.
$49M$38M$32M$28M$17M$21M$39M$45M$71M$66M$58MAccounts payablePayables
$179M$76M$79M$63MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$845M$683M$537M$389M$343M$378M$591M$699M$914M$900MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.5B$220M$158M$186M$183M$158M$195M$329M$332M$315M$270MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×3.8×4.3×2.9×2.1×2.2×1.9×1.8×2.1×2.9×3.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.0B$3.9B$1.8B$1.6B$1.3B$1.1B$1.3B$2.1B$2.1B$2.4B$2.3BTotal assetsAssets
$4.1B$448M$439M$289M$193M$168M$169M$734M$637M$655M$950MTotal debtDebt
$3.4B$16M$67M$71M$43M$19M$5M$460M$312M$76M$398MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.3×-7.7×-3.5×-3.0×-7.7×-6.1×1.5×3.7×4.3×4.3×4.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.3B$1.0B$1.1B$1.0B$822M$701M$866M$1.0B$1.1B$1.4B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%0.5%3.3%4.0%1.3%1.5%1.1%1.1%1.0%1.1%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
47.0M47.1M26.6M38.2M40.4M41.0M44.1M52.9M53.1M50.4M49.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$20.84$12.78$15.29$12.74$9.84$9.05$14.68$19.08$25.36$26.82$27.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.41$-14.02$-6.45$-3.71$-4.86$-3.14$-0.49$1.84$3.40$6.64$5.98EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.25$0.09$-0.66$-1.29$-0.27$0.15$0.53$1.37$4.80$7.01$5.77Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.25$0.09$-0.66$-1.29$-0.27$0.15$0.53$1.37$4.80$7.01$5.77Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$4.14$0.54$0.80$0.47$0.37$0.22$0.38$0.60$0.52$0.51$0.61Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$48.95$21.66$43.02$26.56$20.37$17.10$19.62$19.63$20.99$27.07$27.45Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.77 into 2018 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.8%/yr+22.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+21.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−20.7%/yr+6.7%/yr
Book value / share−6.4%/yr+5.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
50Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
20%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.2×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$353Mowner earningsvs.$335Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $335M of profit into $353M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$335M
Owner earnings$353M · 26% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$335M$181M$97M($22M)($129M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$151M+$156M+$129M+$84M+$73M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$14M+$14M+$11M+$7M+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$121M−$68M−$133M−$29M+$65M
Cash from operations$379M$282M$104M$40M$15M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$26M−$28M−$32M−$17M−$9M
Owner earnings$353M$255M$73M$24M$6M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue26%19%7%4%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $339M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $283M ÷ interest expense $66M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $371M · 1.3× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $579M − debt $950M
    What this means

    Netting $579M of cash and short-term investments against $950M of debt leaves $371M owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit (3.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -44%–20%; 16% latest = NOPAT $283M ÷ invested capital $1.7B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High, recently turned positive
    latest $353M = operating cash $379M − maintenance capex $26M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $339M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $379M ÷ net income $335M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $125M ÷ Owner Earnings $353M
    What this means

    Of $353M Owner Earnings, $125M (36%) went back to shareholders, $35M dividends, $90M buybacks. Net of $14M stock comp, the real buyback was about $76M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.17×
    Harvesting
    Capex $26M ÷ depreciation $151M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.90×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $950M vs $599M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.11/share (latest year $6.73), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $27.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −43% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −43% early to 21% lately, median −18% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +29%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 29% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · −96.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.8%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We are in the early stages of integrating AI tools into our systems, and we expect our third-party service providers as well as our competitors to also develop or use such tools.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$900M
  • Cash & short-term investments$552M
  • Receivables$121M
  • Other current assets$226M
Current liabilities$270M
  • Debt due within a year$6M
  • Accounts payable$58M
  • Other current liabilities$206M
Current ratio3.33×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.33×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$630Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$6M due · $552M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 3.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$661M$7M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$11Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

  • Reinvested$385M · 36%
  • Dividends$35M · 3%
  • Buybacks$216M · 20%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$445M · 41%
  • Returned to owners$251M

    36% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $35M as dividends and $216M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $3.1B and cash and short-term investments fell $126M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $216M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count6.1%

    The diluted count rose from 47M to 50M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.75/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$284M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity21%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$615Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $385M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Quintin Kneen$3.0M$3.9M$6M
2022Quintin Kneen$5.5M$21.7M$24M
2023Quintin Kneen$5.0M$24.6M$73M
2024Quintin Kneen$5.9M$688k$255M
2025Quintin Kneen$5.7M$4.3M$353M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership5.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio106:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$14M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Tidewater Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?6.1%

    Diluted shares grew 6.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $216M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $791M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$645M · 48% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “For the year ended December 31, 2025, our five largest customers accounted for approximately 29.8%, while our ten largest customers accounted for approximately 47.9% of our total revenues.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NCLHNorwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd.$9.8B38%15.7%9%11%
KEXKirby$3.4B7.7%4%10%
MATXMatson$3.3B96%11.4%11%12%
TDWTidewater Inc.$1.4B-12.5%-6%3%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock$843M12.3%3%33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.$632M7.7%10%10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.$482M35.2%7%38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited$342M-1.1%-0%31%
Group median9.6%5%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tidewater Inc. has delivered.

Tidewater Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Tidewater Inc. earns about $36M on its 2.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+113%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $287M on 50M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $398M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($30M) runs well above depreciation ($151M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $292M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Tidewater Inc. (TDW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TDW, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TDUP its page in the Manual TDY →

Industry order: ← STNG the Marine Shipping chapter TEN →