Owner Scorecard


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INSW, International Seaways Inc. Common Stock

Marine Shipping capital-intensive Cyclical

Revenue is International Crude Tankers (52%) and International Product Carriers (48%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
INSW · International Seaways Inc. Common Stock
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$843M
−11.4% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $985M 5-yr avg $801M
Operating margin 58.3% 5-yr avg 31.3%
ROIC 22% 5-yr avg 15%
Owner-earnings margin 46% 5-yr avg 34%
Free cash flow margin 46% 5-yr avg 34%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 9.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −41% and 57% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 33% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest International Crude Tankers at 52%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • International Crude Tankers52%$440M
  • International Product Carriers48%$404M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$398M$290M$270M$366M$422M$273M$865M$1.1B$952M$843M$985MRevenueRevenue
8%8%9%7%7%12%5%4%6%6%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$7M($108M)($55M)$55M$40M($112M)$443M$615M$455M$345M$575MOperating incomeOp. inc.
1.8%−37.2%−20.2%15.1%9.5%−41.1%51.2%57.4%47.8%41.0%58.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
($18M)($106M)($89M)($830K)($6M)($133M)$388M$556M$417M$309M$546MNet incomeNet inc.
0%1%-0%-0%-0%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$129M$17M($12M)$87M$216M($76M)$288M$688M$547M$380M$451MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$80M$79M$72M$76M$74M$87M$110M$129M$149M$164M$164MDepreciationDeprec.
$64M$41M$870K$8M$142M($40M)($217M)($6M)($28M)($101M)($267M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M$174M$149M$574K$507K$979K$710K$1M$1M$1M$1MCapexCapex
0.5%59.8%55.1%0.2%0.1%0.4%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$127M($61M)($85M)$87M$216M($77M)$287M$687M$546M$379M$450MOwner earningsOwner earn.
31.9%−21.2%−31.4%23.7%51.1%−28.3%33.2%64.1%57.4%44.9%45.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$127M($156M)($161M)$87M$216M($77M)$287M$687M$546M$379M$450MFree cash flowFCF
31.9%−53.8%−59.7%23.7%51.1%−28.3%33.2%64.1%57.4%44.9%45.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$7M$41M$70M$308M$284M$145M$145MDividends paidDiv. paid
$30M$17M$20M$14M$25MBuybacksBuybacks
0%-5%-2%3%-4%20%26%19%14%22%ROICROIC
-2%-10%-9%-0%-1%-11%26%32%22%15%25%Return on equityROE
−1%−15%21%14%7%8%18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$92M$60M$58M$90M$199M$98M$324M$187M$158M$167M$377MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$67M$58M$95M$84M$43M$107M$290M$247M$186M$178M$242MReceivablesReceiv.
$1M$3M$3M$4M$4M$2M$531K$1M$2M$611K$5MInventoryInvent.
$3M$330K$1M$5M$3M$2M$2M$7M$6M$2M$2MAccounts payablePayables
$65M$61M$97M$83M$44M$108M$288M$242M$182M$177M$246MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$171M$132M$168M$187M$257M$224M$643M$465M$376M$367M$666MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$45M$47M$75M$114M$109M$235M$257M$196M$131M$99M$91MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.8×2.8×2.2×1.6×2.4×1.0×2.5×2.4×2.9×3.7×7.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.7B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8B$1.6B$2.3B$2.6B$2.5B$2.6B$2.7B$2.9BTotal assetsAssets
$440M$553M$811M$661M$536M$1.1B$1.0B$723M$688M$567M$602MTotal debtDebt
$348M$493M$752M$571M$336M$1.0B$700M$536M$531M$400M$225MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.2×-2.6×-0.9×0.8×1.1×-3.0×7.7×9.4×9.2×8.1×14.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$972M$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$1.9B$2.0B$2.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%1.3%1.2%1.2%1.3%3.9%0.8%0.8%0.9%1.0%0.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
29.2M29.2M29.1M29.2M28.4M38.4M49.8M49.4M49.7M49.6M49.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$13.66$9.95$9.28$12.53$14.86$7.10$17.35$21.68$19.15$17.00$19.82Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.62$-3.64$-3.05$-0.03$-0.19$-3.48$7.78$11.26$8.39$6.24$10.98EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.35$-2.11$-2.91$2.97$7.60$-2.01$5.76$13.90$10.99$7.63$9.05Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.35$-5.35$-5.54$2.97$7.60$-2.01$5.76$13.90$10.99$7.63$9.05Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.24$1.07$1.40$6.23$5.72$2.92$2.91Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.07$5.95$5.11$0.02$0.02$0.03$0.01$0.03$0.03$0.03$0.03Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$40.45$37.23$34.66$34.98$34.26$30.46$29.85$34.73$37.36$40.73$44.14Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.5%/yr+2.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.4%/yr+0.1%/yr
Dividends / share+65.0%/yr (5-yr)+65.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−9.0%/yr+10.2%/yr
Book value / share+0.1%/yr+3.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
50Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
14%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.1×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$379Mowner earningsvs.$309Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $309M of profit into $379M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$309M
Owner earnings$379M · 45% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$309M$417M$556M$388M($133M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$164M+$149M+$129M+$110M+$87M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$9M+$9M+$9M+$7M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$101M−$28M−$6M−$217M−$40M
Cash from operations$380M$547M$688M$288M($76M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1M−$1M−$1M−$710K−$979K
Owner earnings$379M$546M$687M$287M($77M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue45%57%64%33%-28%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $370M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $345M ÷ interest expense $43M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $400M · 1.2× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $117M + ST investments $50M − debt $567M
    What this means

    Netting $167M of cash and short-term investments against $567M of debt leaves $400M owed, about 1.2× a year's operating profit (1.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -5%–26%; 14% latest = NOPAT $345M ÷ invested capital $2.5B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -31%–64%; latest $379M = operating cash $380M − maintenance capex $1M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 45% of revenue this year, a 32% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $370M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $380M ÷ net income $309M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $170M ÷ Owner Earnings $379M
    What this means

    Of $379M Owner Earnings, $170M (45%) went back to shareholders, $145M dividends, $25M buybacks. Net of $9M stock comp, the real buyback was about $16M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.01×
    Harvesting
    Capex $1M ÷ depreciation $164M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $843M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.71×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $567M vs $268M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.64/share (latest year $6.25), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $40.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −19% → 49% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −19% early to 49% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Owner earnings growth +34%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 34% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −41.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +6.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“As of December 31, 2025, we participated in six commercial pools as our principal means of participation in the spot market— Tankers International ("TI"), Maersk Tankers Suezmax Pool ("MAERSK"), Panamax International ("PI"), Clean Products Tankers Alliance ("CPTA"), Norden Tanker…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$666M
  • Cash & short-term investments$377M
  • Receivables$242M
  • Inventory$5M
  • Other current assets$42M
Current liabilities$91M
  • Debt due within a year$28M
  • Accounts payable$2M
  • Other current liabilities$61M
Current ratio7.34×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio7.28×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio4.15×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$576Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$28M due · $377M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+77.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.9× → 7.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($11M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$610M$8M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$332M · 15%
  • Dividends$855M · 38%
  • Buybacks$106M · 5%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$973M · 43%
  • Returned to owners$960M

    46% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $855M as dividends and $106M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$28.72

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 3M shares were bought for $76M, about $28.72 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $15.47 (2021) to $49.84 (2024), and 2024, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($25M).

  • Net change in share count70.5%

    The diluted count rose from 29M to 50M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2.92/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 65% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained152%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($357M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $544M, so each retained $1 added about 1.52 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Ms. Lois Zabrocky$3.1M$2.4M($77M)
2022Ms. Lois Zabrocky$5.4M$10.8M$287M
2023Ms. Lois Zabrocky$4.3M$5.9M$687M
2024Ms. Lois Zabrocky$4.0M$2.7M$546M
2025Ms. Lois Zabrocky$4.5M$6.7M$379M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$9M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why International Seaways Inc. Common Stock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?70.5%

    Diluted shares grew 70.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $106M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?17% → 25% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $68M to $248M while revenue grew 147%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (17% of revenue then, 25% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $304M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NCLHNorwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd.$9.8B38%15.7%9%11%
KEXKirby$3.4B7.7%4%10%
MATXMatson$3.3B96%11.4%11%12%
TDWTidewater Inc.$1.4B-12.5%-6%3%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock$843M12.3%3%33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.$632M7.7%10%10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.$482M35.2%7%38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited$342M-1.1%-0%31%
Group median9.6%5%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what International Seaways Inc. Common Stock has delivered.

International Seaways Inc. Common Stock’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, International Seaways Inc. Common Stock earns about $274M on its 32.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 44.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+45%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $450M on 50M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $225M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "International Seaways Inc. Common Stock (INSW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/INSW, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← INSP its page in the Manual INTA →

Industry order: ← IMPPP the Marine Shipping chapter KEX →