Owner Scorecard


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MATX, Matson

Marine Shipping capital-intensive

Matson, Inc. is a leading provider of ocean transportation and logistics services.

Consists of two segments, Ocean Transportation and Logistics.

MatNav also operates premium, expedited services from China to Long Beach, California, which includes cargo from other Asia origins, provides services to Okinawa, Japan and various islands in the South Pacific, and operates an international export service from Alaska to Asia.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MATX · Matson
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.3B
−2.3% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.3B 5-yr avg $3.6B
Operating margin 14.4% 5-yr avg 20.7%
ROIC 14% 5-yr avg 26%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 17%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Ocean Transportation (82%) and Logistics (18%).
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from 5.9% to 31% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 9.1% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Ocean Transportation is 82% of revenue, with Logistics the other meaningful line at 18%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Ocean Transportation82%$2.7B
  • Logistics18%$609M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.9B$2.0B$2.2B$2.2B$2.4B$3.9B$4.3B$3.1B$3.4B$3.3B$3.3BRevenueRevenue
9%10%10%10%9%6%6%9%9%9%9%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$157M$147M$164M$129M$280M$1.2B$1.4B$343M$551M$500M$479MOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.1%7.2%7.4%5.9%11.8%30.3%31.2%11.1%16.1%14.9%14.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$81M$231M$109M$83M$193M$927M$1.1B$297M$476M$445M$429MNet incomeNet inc.
38%26%23%25%21%21%20%21%17%16%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$158M$225M$305M$249M$430M$984M$1.3B$511M$768M$547M$552MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$97M$101M$94M$100M$115M$117M$139M$142M$153M$167M$169MDepreciationDeprec.
($32M)($118M)$90M$54M$103M($80M)$51M$47M$112M($87M)($68M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$179M$307M$209M$248M$310M$393M$353MCapexCapex
9.2%15.0%4.8%8.0%9.1%11.8%10.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$61M$124M$1.1B$368M$615M$380M$384MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.1%6.0%26.1%11.9%18.0%11.4%11.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($22M)($82M)$1.1B$262M$458M$154M$200MFree cash flowFCF
−1.1%−4.0%24.5%8.5%13.4%4.6%6.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$32M$34M$35M$37M$39M$46M$48M$45M$45M$45M$45MDividends paidDiv. paid
$38M$19M$198M$397M$155M$199M$303MBuybacksBuybacks
8%10%8%6%12%47%42%10%16%14%14%ROICROIC
16%34%14%10%20%56%46%12%18%16%16%Return on equityROE
10%29%10%6%16%53%44%11%16%14%14%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$14M$20M$20M$21M$14M$282M$250M$134M$267M$142M$100MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$190M$195M$224M$206M$253M$344M$269M$279M$269M$257M$258MReceivablesReceiv.
$171M$175M$247M$236M$283M$308M$256M$278M$269M$245M$254MAccounts payablePayables
$19M$20M($23M)($30M)($30M)$35M$13M$2M$400K$12M$8MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$274M$266M$318M$290M$306M$705M$760M$602M$610M$472M$436MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$278M$286M$371M$437M$512M$612M$582M$562M$560M$527M$530MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×0.9×0.9×0.7×0.6×1.2×1.3×1.1×1.1×0.9×0.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$324M$328M$328M$328M$328M$328M$328M$328M$328M$328M$328MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.0B$2.3B$2.4B$2.8B$2.9B$3.7B$4.3B$4.3B$4.6B$4.6B$4.6BTotal assetsAssets
$739M$857M$856M$958M$745M$615M$505M$429M$391M$352M$342MTotal debtDebt
$725M$837M$837M$937M$730M$332M$255M$295M$124M$210M$242MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
6.5×6.1×8.8×5.7×10.2×52.5×75.2×28.1×73.5×73.5×71.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$495M$677M$755M$806M$961M$1.7B$2.3B$2.4B$2.7B$2.8B$2.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.8%0.5%0.4%0.8%0.8%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
43.5M43.2M43.0M43.3M43.5M43.2M39.3M35.7M34.2M32.2M30.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$44.63$47.38$51.69$50.88$54.79$90.86$110.51$86.68$100.05$103.87$108.51Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.87$5.35$2.53$1.91$4.44$21.47$27.07$8.32$13.93$13.81$14.02EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.40$2.86$28.82$10.32$17.97$11.81$12.54Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.50$-1.90$27.04$7.34$13.38$4.77$6.52Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.74$0.78$0.82$0.86$0.90$1.06$1.22$1.26$1.31$1.39$1.46Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.12$7.11$5.33$6.96$9.07$12.22$11.52Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.38$15.68$17.57$18.61$22.10$38.60$58.45$67.25$77.54$85.68$89.22Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.8%/yr+13.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+26.8%/yr−25.7%/yr (3-yr)
EPS+24.9%/yr+25.5%/yr
Dividends / share+7.3%/yr+9.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.8%/yr+31.9%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+25.1%/yr+31.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
32Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
14%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.6×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$380Mowner earningsvs.$445Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $380M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $167M it takes just to hold its position. It put $227M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $154M.

Reported net income$445M
Owner earnings$380M · 11% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2017
Reported net income$445M$476M$297M$1.1B$231M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$167M+$153M+$142M+$139M+$101M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$23M+$27M+$24M+$18M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$87M+$112M+$47M+$51M−$118M
Cash from operations$547M$768M$511M$1.3B$225M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$167M−$153M−$142M−$139M−$101M
Owner earnings$380M$615M$368M$1.1B$124M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$227M−$157M−$106M−$70M−$206M
Free cash flow$154M$458M$262M$1.1B($82M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%18%12%26%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $167M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $227M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer $358M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $500M ÷ interest expense $7M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $219M · 0.4× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $142M − debt $361M
    What this means

    Netting $142M of cash and short-term investments against $361M of debt leaves $219M owed, about 0.4× a year's operating profit (0.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 28 + DIO 12 − DPO 682 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 6%–47%; 14% latest = NOPAT $416M ÷ invested capital $3.0B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    6-yr median margin, range 3%–26%; latest $380M = operating cash $547M − maintenance capex $167M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 6 years. It chose to put $227M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $154M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves $358M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $547M ÷ net income $445M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $348M ÷ Owner Earnings $380M
    What this means

    Of $380M Owner Earnings, $348M (92%) went back to shareholders, $45M dividends, $303M buybacks. Net of $23M stock comp, the real buyback was about $281M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.36×
    Expanding
    Capex $393M ÷ depreciation $167M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.89×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $361M vs ($56M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +189%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $13.42/share (latest year $14.70), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $91.17/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 8% early to 14% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 19%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 5.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$436M
  • Cash & short-term investments$100M
  • Receivables$258M
  • Inventory$4M
  • Other current assets$74M
Current liabilities$530M
  • Debt due within a year$40M
  • Accounts payable$254M
  • Other current liabilities$236M
Current ratio0.82×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.82×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($94M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$40M due · $100M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−3.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$697M$355M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $737M (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$140M
'27$106M
'28$56M
'29$33M
'30$23M
later$73M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$140Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$431Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$375Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$361M
Lease obligations (present value)$375M
Total fixed claims on the business$737M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $737M, of which the leases are 51%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.6B · 47%
  • Dividends$249M · 7%
  • Buybacks$1.1B · 32%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$472M · 14%
  • Returned to owners$1.4B

    51% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $249M as dividends and $1.1B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$92.51

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 11M shares were bought for $1.1B, about $92.51 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $73.90 (2023) to $124.44 (2024); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $79.40 ($397M).

  • Net change in share count−29.7%

    The diluted count fell from 44M to 31M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.39/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $15M, so each retained $1 added about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Matthew J. Cox$6.0M$18.4M
2022Matthew J. Cox$6.0M$838k$1.1B
2023Matthew J. Cox$6.2M$18.8M$368M
2024Matthew J. Cox$6.1M$12.6M$615M
2025Matthew J. Cox$6.5M$5.3M$380M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio45:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$23M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Matson is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CCLCarnival Corp.$26.6B38%15.0%9%13%
RCLRoyal Caribbean Cruises$17.9B44%19.4%7%22%
NCLHNorwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd.$9.8B38%15.7%9%11%
KEXKirby$3.4B7.7%4%10%
MATXMatson$3.3B96%11.4%11%12%
TDWTidewater Inc.$1.4B-12.5%-6%3%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock$843M12.3%3%33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.$632M7.7%10%10%
Group median41%11.8%8%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Matson has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Matson earns about $389M on its 11.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022−48%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $200M on 30M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $242M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($353M) runs well above depreciation ($169M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $385M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Matson (MATX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MATX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MATW its page in the Manual MAX →

Industry order: ← LPG the Marine Shipping chapter NAT →