← All companies ← ASPN Manual ASST → ← ARL Real Estate Development & Services BEKE →

ASPS, Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A.

Real Estate Development & Services diversified Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Altisource is an integrated service provider and marketplace for the real estate and mortgage industries.

Combining operational excellence with a suite of innovative services and technologies, Altisource helps solve the demands of the ever-changing markets we serve.

Our Marketplace business includes the Hubzu online real estate auction platform, real estate brokerage and asset management services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ASPS · Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$171M

+6.8% YoY · −14% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $175M 5-yr avg $162M

Gross margin 28% 5-yr avg 24%

Operating margin −0.6% 5-yr avg −2.9%

ROIC −2% 5-yr avg −9%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg −17%

Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg −17%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 26% and operating margin about 2.0% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −22% and 16% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 1 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$997M	$942M	$838M	$649M	$366M	$178M	$153M	$145M	$160M	$171M	$175M	RevenueRevenue
31%	26%	26%	24%	17%	—	14%	20%	31%	29%	28%	Gross marginGross mgn
21%	20%	21%	22%	25%	38%	36%	32%	28%	24%	24%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$65M	$50M	$42M	$18M	($44M)	$29M	($33M)	($17M)	$3M	$417K	($1M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
6.5%	5.3%	5.1%	2.8%	−12.1%	16.2%	−21.7%	−11.6%	2.0%	0.2%	−0.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$29M	$309M	($5M)	($308M)	($67M)	$12M	($53M)	($56M)	($36M)	$2M	$6M	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$127M	$66M	$68M	$47M	($22M)	($60M)	($45M)	($22M)	($5M)	($5M)	$4M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$37M	$36M	$31M	$14M	$12M	$3M	$2M	$2M	$602K	$380K	$308K	DepreciationDeprec.
$55M	($284M)	$33M	$329M	$25M	($78M)	$1M	$28M	$25M	($11M)	($7M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$23M	$11M	$4M	$2M	$3M	$1M	$863K	$0	$3K	$69K	$182K	CapexCapex
2.3%	1.1%	0.5%	0.3%	0.7%	0.8%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$104M	$56M	$64M	$45M	($25M)	($62M)	($46M)	($22M)	($5M)	($5M)	$4M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
10.4%	5.9%	7.7%	6.9%	−6.9%	−34.6%	−29.9%	−15.1%	−3.1%	−3.0%	2.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$104M	$56M	$64M	$45M	($25M)	($62M)	($46M)	($22M)	($5M)	($5M)	$4M	Free cash flowFCF
10.4%	5.9%	7.7%	6.9%	−6.9%	−34.6%	−29.9%	−15.1%	−3.1%	−3.0%	2.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$9M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$38M	$39M	$40M	$20M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
12%	8%	—	5%	-35%	30%	-35%	-23%	—	—	-2%	ROICROIC
47%	91%	-2%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
											Balance sheet
$195M	$154M	$58M	$83M	$58M	$98M	$51M	$33M	$30M	$27M	$75M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$88M	$53M	$36M	$44M	$22M	$18M	$13M	$12M	$15M	$18M	$21M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$9M	$16M	$28M	$22M	$17M	$16M	$15M	$15M	$18M	$13M	$18M	Accounts payablePayables
$79M	$37M	$9M	$21M	$6M	$2M	($2M)	($4M)	($3M)	$4M	$3M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$325M	$272M	$202M	$184M	$100M	$138M	$88M	$56M	$51M	$54M	$59M	Current assetsCur. assets
$149M	$110M	$104M	$88M	$72M	$55M	$40M	$36M	$271M	$47M	$51M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×	2.5×	1.9×	2.1×	1.4×	2.5×	2.2×	1.6×	0.2×	1.2×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$86M	$86M	$81M	$74M	$74M	$56M	$56M	$56M	$56M	$56M	$56M	GoodwillGoodwill
$689M	$865M	$742M	$394M	$266M	$258M	$195M	$155M	$144M	$140M	$142M	Total assetsAssets
$474M	$409M	$331M	$288M	$243M	$244M	$245M	$216M	$231M	$191M	$190M	Total debtDebt
$278M	$255M	$273M	$205M	$184M	$146M	$194M	$183M	$201M	$164M	$114M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.7×	2.2×	1.6×	0.8×	-2.5×	2.0×	-2.0×	-0.5×	0.1×	0.0×	-0.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$61M	$339M	$295M	($23M)	($84M)	($70M)	($120M)	($126M)	($157M)	($110M)	($110M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.5%	1.2%	1.8%	2.1%	1.6%	3.3%	3.5%	3.0%	2.5%	2.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
3.3M	3.1M	2.8M	2.7M	2.6M	2.7M	2.7M	3.7M	3.6M	11.1M	11.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$305.11	$302.44	$294.57	$243.38	$140.61	$66.66	$57.17	$38.83	$44.89	$15.45	$15.76	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$8.78	$99.15	$-1.89	$-115.55	$-25.83	$4.41	$-19.94	$-15.07	$-9.99	$0.15	$0.57	EPS (diluted)EPS
$31.68	$17.84	$22.66	$16.71	$-9.66	$-23.08	$-17.08	$-5.84	$-1.41	$-0.46	$0.38	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$31.68	$17.84	$22.66	$16.71	$-9.66	$-23.08	$-17.08	$-5.84	$-1.41	$-0.46	$0.38	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$7.12	$3.37	$1.38	$0.81	$1.04	$0.52	$0.32	$0.00	$0.00	$0.01	$0.02	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.60	$108.69	$103.82	$-8.56	$-32.22	$-26.20	$-44.67	$-33.63	$-44.12	$-9.96	$-9.94	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2024 are restated ×1/6 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×3.1 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−28.2%/yr	−35.7%/yr
EPS	−36.6%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−54.3%/yr	−64.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

11Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−23%low FY2022

Gross margin

29%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.6×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($5M)owner earningsvs.$2Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2019

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $2M of profit but ($5M) of owner earnings: $7M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2M	($36M)	($56M)	($53M)	$12M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$380K	+$602K	+$2M	+$2M	+$3M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$4M	+$5M	+$5M	+$5M	+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$11M	+$25M	+$28M	+$1M	−$78M
Cash from operations	($5M)	($5M)	($22M)	($45M)	($60M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$69K	−$3K	—	−$863K	−$1M
Owner earnings	($5M)	($5M)	($22M)	($46M)	($62M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-3%	-3%	-15%	-30%	-35%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $4M), owner earnings is nearer ($9M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.0×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $417K ÷ interest expense $12M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $115M · 276.6× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $27M + ST investments $49M − debt $191M

What this means
Netting $76M of cash and short-term investments against $191M of debt leaves $115M owed, about 276.6× a year's operating profit (458.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -2d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 38 + DIO 0 − DPO 40 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range -35%–30%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median -15%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -3%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -35%–10%; latest ($5M) = operating cash ($5M) − maintenance capex $69K

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a -3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves ($9M).
Are earnings backed by cash? -3.14×

Thinly cash-backed

Cash from ops ($5M) ÷ net income $2M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.18×

Harvesting

Capex $69K ÷ depreciation $380K

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $171M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.15×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $191M vs $7M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −127%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.67/share (latest year $0.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-9.77/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 6% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 6% early to −3% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2022 · −21.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −6.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Certain of these technologies incorporate licensed open source and third-party code or may be created or maintained using artificial intelligence, low-code, or similar techniques, each of which carry inherent risks.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$59M

Cash & short-term investments$75M
Receivables$21M

Current liabilities$51M

Debt due within a year$1M
Accounts payable$18M
Other current liabilities$32M

Current ratio1.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.15×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.48×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$8Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$1M due · $75M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.2× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($182M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$191M$951K of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$4Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $148M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$45M · 30%
Buybacks$137M · 92%

Returned to owners$137M
132% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $137M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$34M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $34M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $120M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $137M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count239.9%
The diluted count rose from 3M to 11M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$73M52% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$9Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $45M of capital spent building

$9M written down across 2 years (2018, 2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 91% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	William B. Shepro	$2.4M	$645k	($22M)
2024	William B. Shepro	$1.9M	$604k	($5M)
2025	William B. Shepro	$7.5M	$5.7M	($5M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$4M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 1042% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−7.1% vs 8.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.0% early in the record and −7.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?239.9%
Diluted shares grew 239.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $137M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$74M · 42% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“During the year ended December 31, 2025, Onity was our largest customer, accounting for 42% of our total revenue.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Real Estate Development & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
DFINDonnelley Financial Solutions, Inc.	$767M	—	13.2%	17%	10%
ARLOArlo Technologies Inc.	$529M	25%	-9.4%	-46%	-6%
NVEENV5 Global	$491M	—	11.5%	7%	9%
LQDTLiquidity Services Inc.	$477M	—	6.4%	37%	12%
PHRPhreesia Inc.	$468M	—	-17.3%	-36%	-7%
SEZLSezzle Inc.	$236M	—	-5.4%	-141%	14%
ASPSAltisource Portfolio Solutions S.A.	$171M	26%	2.4%	5%	-3%
CASSCass Information Systems Inc	$108M	—	35.6%	—	29%
Group median	—	—	4.4%	5%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle (($11M)) Net of stock comp (−$4M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($4M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $4M on 11M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $114M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($182K) runs well above depreciation ($308K), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $4M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ASPS against another business →

The owners of ASPS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A. (ASPS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASPS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ASPN its page in the Manual ASST →

Industry order: ← ARL the Real Estate Development & Services chapter BEKE →