Owner Scorecard


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AVTX, Avalo Therapeutics Inc.

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundNet current asset value

We are a clinical stage biotechnology company fully dedicated to developing IL-1 -based treatments for immune-mediated inflammatory diseases.

Our lead product candidate, abdakibart (AVTX-009), an anti-IL-1 monoclonal antibody ("mAb") is in a Phase 2 clinical trial for hidradenitis suppurativa ("HS").

The following table summarizes certain key information about our lead product candidate: Abdakibart (AVTX-009): Anti-IL-1 mAb targeting inflammatory diseases.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AVTX · Avalo Therapeutics Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$59K
−86.6% YoY · −61% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $82M
Cash burn · annual $60M
Runway 1.4 yrs

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 50% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −1395%) on a 81% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 101% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −97%, above 15% in 1 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$1M$28M$7M$7M$7M$5M$18M$2M$441K$59K$59KRevenueRevenue
54%72%81%33%Gross marginGross mgn
614%29%150%150%260%457%115%535%n/mn/mn/mSG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
880%16%82%174%481%n/m173%716%n/mn/mn/mR&D / revenueR&D/rev
($16M)$14M($35M)($16M)($73M)($82M)($37M)($27M)($69M)($73M)($79M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
n/m49.9%−503.4%−239.1%n/mn/m−207.4%n/mn/mn/mn/mOperating marginOp. mgn
($16M)$12M($40M)($16M)($64M)($84M)($42M)($32M)($35M)($78M)($85M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($15M)$13M($3M)($19M)($41M)($71M)($27M)($31M)($49M)($51M)($60M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$27K$425K$5M$4M$2M$2M$166K$158K$169K$344K$226KDepreciationDeprec.
$177K($874K)$30M($9M)$14M$4M$7M($3M)($20M)$13M$11MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$35K$23K$564K$262K$63K$113K$95K$158K$0$0CapexCapex
3.0%0.1%8.0%3.9%0.9%2.1%0.5%8.2%0.0%0.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($15M)$13M($4M)($19M)($41M)($71M)($27M)($31M)($49M)($60M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
n/m45.1%−52.5%−287.3%−606.1%n/m−148.7%n/mn/mn/mOwner earnings marginOE mgn
($15M)$13M($4M)($19M)($41M)($71M)($27M)($31M)($49M)($60M)Free cash flowFCF
n/m45.1%−52.5%−287.3%−606.1%n/m−148.7%n/mn/mn/mFree cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$19M$1$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
47%-109%-73%-1020%-4879%-86%-82%ROICROIC
-7957%43%-192%-77%-259%-366%-432%-26%-94%-124%Return on equityROE
n/m43%−192%−77%−259%−366%−432%−26%−94%−124%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5M$2M$11M$4M$19M$55M$13M$7M$135M$98M$82MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$132K$3M$822K$1M$2M$1M$0$38KReceivablesReceiv.
$0$382K$318K$21K$3K$38K$20K$0$0InventoryInvent.
$1M$1M$1M$2M$3M$3M$3M$446K$283K$137K$356KAccounts payablePayables
($878K)$2M($306K)($1M)($394K)($2M)($3M)($446K)($318K)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$6M$11M$22M$18M$26M$62M$16M$8M$139M$105M$89MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$4M$11M$26M$12M$15M$20M$22M$5M$7M$13M$12MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.0×0.8×1.5×1.7×3.1×0.7×1.8×20.0×8.1×7.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$12M$14M$14M$14M$14M$14M$11M$11M$11M$11MGoodwillGoodwill
$6M$43M$70M$36M$44M$80M$33M$21M$151M$116M$100MTotal assetsAssets
$2M$0$15M$0$33M$13M$0$33MTotal debtDebt
($3M)($2M)$5M($19M)($22M)$314K($7M)($49M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$207K$28M$21M$21M$25M$23M($11M)$7M$133M$83M$68MShareholders’ equityEquity
147.0%4.2%34.6%37.5%101.3%151.4%41.8%180.7%n/mn/mn/mStock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
8.8M18.8M34.8M44.4M75.0M9.4M39.2M278M7.5M13.4M20.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.13$1.48$0.20$0.15$0.09$0.57$0.46$0.01$0.06$0.00$0.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.87$0.63$-1.15$-0.36$-0.85$-8.98$-1.06$-0.11$-4.69$-5.84$-4.21EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.65$0.67$-0.11$-0.44$-0.54$-7.55$-0.68$-0.11$-6.54$-2.97Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.65$0.67$-0.11$-0.44$-0.54$-7.55$-0.68$-0.11$-6.54$-2.97Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.02$0.01$0.00$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.02$1.49$0.60$0.47$0.33$2.46$-0.28$0.03$17.75$6.20$3.40Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.12 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.85 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.69 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/7.98 into 2021 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×4.17 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×7.08 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/37.05 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.79 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.5 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−31.4%/yr−45.2%/yr
Book value / share+85.8%/yr+80.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
13Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
−86%low FY2021
Gross margin
33%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($49M)owner earningsvs.($35M)net incomelow FY2021

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business reported a $35M loss but ($49M) of owner earnings: $14M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income($35M)($32M)($42M)($84M)($64M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$169K+$158K+$166K+$2M+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$6M+$3M+$8M+$8M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$20M−$3M+$7M+$4M+$14M
Cash from operations($49M)($31M)($27M)($71M)($41M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$158K−$95K−$113K−$63K
Owner earnings($49M)($31M)($27M)($71M)($41M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-11124%-1603%-149%-1315%-606%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $6M), owner earnings is nearer ($55M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $16M + ST investments $82M − debt $15M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $83M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 0 + DIO 0 − DPO 39 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -4879%–47%; -70% latest = NOPAT ($58M) ÷ invested capital $83M
    Industry peers: median -86%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -70% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -11124%–45%; latest ($51M) = operating cash ($51M) − maintenance capex $0
    Industry peers: median -5624%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -87217% of revenue this year, a -606% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves ($65M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($78M) · cash from operations ($51M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.00×
    Harvesting
    Capex $0 ÷ depreciation $344K
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $59K
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 8.14×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $15M vs $92M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.92/share (latest year $-1.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −616% → −46853% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −616% early to −46853% lately, median −1395% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2025 · −123601.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$89M
  • Cash & short-term investments$82M
  • Receivables$38K
  • Other current assets$7M
Current liabilities$12M
  • Debt due within a year$1M
  • Accounts payable$356K
  • Other current liabilities$10M
Current ratio7.66×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio7.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio7.07×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$77Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1M due · $82M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway1.4 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−100.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 7.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$58Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$57MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$16M$328K of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$11M9% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity13%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$19Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1M of capital spent building

$4M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 21% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023$1.1M$142k($31M)
2023$320k$320k($31M)
2024$7.2M$5.4M($49M)
2025$3.8M$12.3M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$14M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 23086% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Avalo Therapeutics Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2M → $33M

    Debt rose from $2M to $33M while owner earnings went from about ($2M) to ($36M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SLNSilence Therapeutics PLC$559K60%-242.7%-177%-211%
QUCYQuantum Cyber N.V.$537K73%-3005.0%-2045%
MREOMereo BioPharma Group plc$500K-8021.4%-6198%
DMACDiaMedica Therapeutics Inc.$500K-6879.4%-67%-5820%
SVRASavara Inc.$257K-6852.8%-64%-5624%
IXHLIncannex Healthcare Inc.$86K-27661.6%-14559%
AVTXAvalo Therapeutics Inc.$59K63%-1241.0%-97%-606%
ALTAltimmune Inc.$41K-577.1%-105%-189%
Group median63%-4928.9%-97%-3834%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Avalo Therapeutics Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered−22%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−101173%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Avalo Therapeutics Inc. (AVTX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AVTX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AVTR its page in the Manual AVX →

Industry order: ← AVIR the Pharmaceuticals chapter AXSM →