Share count
598Mpeak FY2023
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BB, BlackBerry Limited
The Company's QNX division develops safe, reliable software for embedded systems across technology-driven industries, including automotive, medical devices, robotics, and industrial automation.
Based in Waterloo, Ontario, the Company has two core divisions, QNX and Secure Communications, each addressing large and growing market opportunities.
The world's leading automotive OEMs and Tier 1 suppliers rely on QNX technology, which enables more than 275 million vehicles.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
$549M
+2.7% YoY · −9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $580M 5-yr avg $617M
Revenue $153M +25.6% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 10.0% yr-ago 1.6%
Net income $9M yr-ago $2M
Net margin 5.6% yr-ago 1.6%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is QNX (46%), Secure Communications (45%) and Licensing (4%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 72% and operating margin about 0.1% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −124% to 30% — on a steadier 72% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 5.0% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 1 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest QNX at 46%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
- QNX46%$268M
- Secure Communications45%$259M
- Licensing4%$22M
By geographyNorth America42%EMEA33%Other Regions19%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $932M | $904M | $1.0B | $893M | $718M | $526M | $759M | $535M | $549M | $580M | RevenueRevenue |
| 72% | 77% | 73% | 72% | 65% | 70% | 65% | 74% | 76% | 77% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 51% | 45% | 47% | 39% | 41% | 65% | 25% | 30% | 23% | 24% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 26% | 24% | 25% | 24% | 31% | 25% | 17% | 20% | 21% | 21% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $283M | $60M | ($149M) | ($1.1B) | ($2M) | ($207M) | $11M | $800K | $48M | $62M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 30.4% | 6.6% | −14.3% | −124.0% | −0.3% | −39.3% | 1.4% | 0.1% | 8.8% | 10.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $405M | $93M | ($152M) | ($1.1B) | $12M | ($734M) | ($130M) | ($79M) | $53M | $60M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 0% | — | — | — | 37% | — | — | — | 10% | 15% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $704M | $100M | $26M | $82M | ($28M) | ($262M) | ($4M) | $17M | $50M | $73M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $177M | $149M | $212M | $198M | $176M | $105M | $59M | $45M | $18M | $16M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $73M | ($209M) | ($97M) | $944M | ($252M) | $334M | $35M | $25M | ($44M) | ($27M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $15M | $17M | $12M | $8M | $8M | $7M | $7M | $3M | $4M | $6M | CapexCapex |
| 1.6% | 1.9% | 1.2% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.4% | 0.9% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 1.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $689M | $83M | $14M | $74M | ($36M) | ($270M) | ($11M) | $13M | $47M | $67M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 73.9% | 9.2% | 1.3% | 8.3% | −5.0% | −51.2% | −1.4% | 2.5% | 8.5% | 11.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $689M | $83M | $14M | $74M | ($36M) | ($270M) | ($11M) | $13M | $47M | $67M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 73.9% | 9.2% | 1.3% | 8.3% | −5.0% | −51.2% | −1.4% | 2.5% | 8.5% | 11.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $1.4B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $1.4B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $18M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $61M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 17% | 3% | -5% | -68% | -0% | -29% | 1% | 0% | 7% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| 16% | 4% | -6% | -73% | 1% | -86% | -17% | -11% | 7% | 8% | Return on equityROE |
| 16% | 4% | −6% | −73% | 1% | −86% | −17% | −11% | 7% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $816M | $916M | $909M | $739M | $712M | $427M | $237M | $338M | $360M | $351M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $233M | $215M | $182M | $138M | $120M | $199M | $174M | $156M | $161M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $48M | $31M | $20M | $22M | $24M | $17M | $31M | $6M | $16M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $185M | $184M | $162M | $116M | $96M | $182M | $143M | $151M | $144M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $743M | $508M | $592M | $568M | $560M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $510M | $1.1B | $429M | $397M | $729M | $357M | $344M | $268M | $255M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.4× | 1.1× | 2.3× | 2.6× | 1.0× | 1.4× | 1.7× | 2.1× | 2.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $569M | $1.5B | $1.4B | $849M | $844M | $489M | $475M | $472M | $479M | $478M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $4.0B | $3.9B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $194M | $195M | $197M | $197M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | — | ($427M) | ($43M) | ($143M) | ($163M) | ($154M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $857M | $775M | $720M | $746M | $751M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 5.3% | 7.4% | 6.1% | 4.9% | 5.0% | 6.4% | 4.4% | 4.8% | 4.2% | 4.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | $22M | $594M | — | $245M | $35M | — | — | — | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 546M | 616M | 614M | 561M | 631M | 639M | 592M | 591M | 598M | 593M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.71 | $1.47 | $1.69 | $1.59 | $1.14 | $0.82 | $1.28 | $0.90 | $0.92 | $0.98 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.74 | $0.15 | $-0.25 | $-1.97 | $0.02 | $-1.15 | $-0.22 | $-0.13 | $0.09 | $0.10 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.26 | $0.13 | $0.02 | $0.13 | $-0.06 | $-0.42 | $-0.02 | $0.02 | $0.08 | $0.11 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.26 | $0.13 | $0.02 | $0.13 | $-0.06 | $-0.42 | $-0.02 | $0.02 | $0.08 | $0.11 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $4.59 | $4.28 | $4.12 | $2.68 | $2.46 | $1.34 | $1.31 | $1.22 | $1.25 | $1.27 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −7.5%/yr | −10.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −29.4%/yr | −10.0%/yr |
| EPS | −23.3%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −16.7%/yr | −14.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | −15.0%/yr | −14.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
7%low FY2021
Gross margin
76%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$47Mowner earningsvs.$53Mnet incomelow FY2023
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2018FY2026
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business reported $53M of profit but $47M of owner earnings: $7M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $53M | ($79M) | ($130M) | ($734M) | $12M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$18M | +$45M | +$59M | +$105M | +$176M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$23M | +$26M | +$33M | +$34M | +$36M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$44M | +$25M | +$35M | +$334M | −$252M |
| Cash from operations | $50M | $17M | ($4M) | ($262M) | ($28M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$4M | −$3M | −$7M | −$7M | −$8M |
| Owner earnings | $47M | $13M | ($11M) | ($270M) | ($36M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 3% | -1% | -51% | -5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer $23M.
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $275M + ST investments $85M − debt $197M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $163M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 104 + DIO 0 − DPO 15 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -68%–17%; 7% latest = NOPAT $44M ÷ invested capital $668MIndustry peers: median -10%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -51%–74%; latest $47M = operating cash $50M − maintenance capex $4MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves $23M.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $50M ÷ net income $53M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $61M ÷ Owner Earnings $47M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $47M of Owner Earnings, $61M (131%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $61M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $23M stock comp, the real buyback was about $38M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.21×HarvestingCapex $4M ÷ depreciation $18M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $549M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.12×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $197M vs $300M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −145%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.09/share (latest year $0.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (3%) sits below the early years (8%), but the latest year (9%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 0% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −27%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 27% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · −124.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +1.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Similarly, the use of AI technologies or increasingly pervasive open source tools by the Company's customers to support development internally could have a negative impact on the Company's business, including the revenues derived from the number of user licenses and the provision of professional services.…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, May 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$560M
- Cash & short-term investments$351M
- Receivables$161M
- Other current assets$49M
Current liabilities$255M
- Accounts payable$16M
- Other current liabilities$239M
Current ratio2.20×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.20×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.38×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$305Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+25.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$233Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$70MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$231M$34M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$134Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2018–2026
Over the record, the business generated $685M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$81M · 12%
- Buybacks$79M · 11%
- Retained (debt / cash)$525M · 77%
- Returned to owners$79M
13% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $79M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments fell $465M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$4.47
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 18M shares were bought for $79M, about $4.47 each.
- Net change in share count8.7%
The diluted count rose from 546M to 593M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$519M42% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity64%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.4Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $81M of capital spent building
$896M written down across 4 years (2020, 2021, 2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 64% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$23M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 48% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why BlackBerry Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2026.
All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.2% vs 28.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 28.2% early in the record and 3.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.7%
Diluted shares grew 8.7% over 2018–2026, even as the company spent $79M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 9 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 9 years, $991M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MQMarqeta Inc. | $625M | 45% | -28.0% | -57% | 10% |
| NCNOnCino | $595M | 59% | -20.4% | -6% | 2% |
| EVCMEverCommerce | $589M | — | -4.9% | -1% | 16% |
| BBBlackBerry Limited | $549M | 72% | 0.1% | 0% | 3% |
| FROGJFrog | $532M | 79% | -21.4% | -10% | 14% |
| NABLN-able Inc. | $511M | 83% | 12.7% | 3% | 15% |
| INTAIntapp | $504M | 67% | -9.8% | -23% | 6% |
| PDPagerDuty | $493M | 84% | -33.4% | -24% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 72% | -15.1% | -8% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BlackBerry Limited has delivered.
BlackBerry Limited’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, BlackBerry Limited earns about $14M on its 2.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
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The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’26−27%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’26−27%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $67M on 586M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-22; net cash $154M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6M) runs well above depreciation ($16M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $69M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "BlackBerry Limited (BB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BB, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BAX its page in the Manual BBAI →
Industry order: ← BAND the Software chapter BBAI →