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EVCM, EverCommerce

Software asset-light Distress / turnaroundSerial acquirer

EverCommerce is a leading provider of integrated, vertically-tailored SaaS solutions for service-based small- and medium-sized businesses.

EverCommerce is simplifying and empowering the lives of business owners whose services support us every day.

We provide tailored, integrated Software-as-a-Service ("SaaS") solutions that support the highly diverse workflows and customer interactions that professionals in home services, health services, and wellness services need to automate manual processes, generate new business, and create more loyal customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

EVCM · EverCommerce

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$589M

+4.8% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $594M 5-yr avg $559M

Operating margin 9.7% 5-yr avg 0.7%

ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 0%

Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg 15%

Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 77% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 10% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −4.9%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$242M	$338M	$490M	$621M	$535M	$562M	$589M	$594M	RevenueRevenue
40%	26%	23%	21%	23%	23%	22%	22%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%	9%	10%	12%	13%	14%	13%	14%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($54M)	($22M)	($27M)	($31M)	($3M)	$26M	$59M	$58M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−22.4%	−6.5%	−5.5%	−4.9%	−0.5%	4.7%	10.1%	9.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($94M)	($60M)	($82M)	($60M)	($46M)	($41M)	$18M	$32M	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
($613K)	$58M	$37M	$65M	$105M	$113M	$111M	$105M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$53M	$77M	$101M	$111M	$104M	$89M	$68M	$66M	DepreciationDeprec.
$10M	$30M	($4M)	($13M)	$20M	$39M	($3M)	($20M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$8M	$5M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$1M	$2M	$3M	CapexCapex
3.2%	1.3%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($8M)	$53M	$34M	$62M	$102M	$112M	$109M	$103M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−3.4%	15.7%	7.0%	10.0%	19.0%	19.9%	18.5%	17.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($8M)	$53M	$34M	$62M	$102M	$112M	$109M	$103M	Free cash flowFCF
−3.4%	15.7%	7.0%	10.0%	19.0%	19.9%	18.5%	17.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$310M	$403M	$365M	$0	$15M	$0	$36M	$36M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$24M	$0	$0	$43M	$67M	$58M	$85M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	-8%	-1%	-2%	-0%	—	5%	5%	ROICROIC
—	—	-8%	-7%	-6%	-5%	2%	5%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−8%	−7%	−6%	−5%	2%	5%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$57M	$96M	$94M	$93M	$93M	$136M	$130M	$129M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$25M	$41M	$48M	$45M	$31M	$37M	$38M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$11M	$10M	$8M	$9M	$7M	$5M	$12M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$14M	$30M	$40M	$37M	$24M	$32M	$26M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$144M	$172M	$181M	$180M	$218M	$213M	$216M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$87M	$103M	$105M	$117M	$111M	$101M	$104M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.7×	1.7×	1.7×	1.5×	2.0×	2.1×	2.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$427M	$668M	$921M	$914M	$876M	$863M	$894M	$893M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	Total assetsAssets
—	$698M	$546M	$536M	$532M	$528M	$523M	$522M	Total debtDebt
—	$602M	$452M	$444M	$440M	$392M	$394M	$393M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	-1.1×	-0.1×	0.6×	1.7×	1.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($275M)	($389M)	$986M	$907M	$826M	$751M	$717M	$714M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
12.4%	3.2%	4.5%	4.3%	4.8%	4.7%	4.8%	4.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
27.1M	41.7M	118M	195M	189M	185M	184M	180M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$8.93	$8.09	$4.16	$3.19	$2.83	$3.04	$3.20	$3.29	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.46	$-1.44	$-0.70	$-0.31	$-0.24	$-0.22	$0.10	$0.18	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.31	$1.27	$0.29	$0.32	$0.54	$0.60	$0.59	$0.57	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.31	$1.27	$0.29	$0.32	$0.54	$0.60	$0.59	$0.57	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.28	$0.11	$0.03	$0.01	$0.02	$0.01	$0.01	$0.01	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-10.14	$-9.33	$8.37	$4.66	$4.37	$4.06	$3.90	$3.96	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.54 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.83 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.65 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−15.7%/yr	−16.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	−14.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	−40.9%/yr	−35.5%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+4.8%
“Sales and Marketing Year Ended December 31, 2025 vs. 2024 2024 vs. 2023 2025 2024 2023 $ Change % Change $ Change % Change (dollars in thousands) Sales and marketing $ 119,503 $ 114,098 $ 113,692 $ 5,405 4.7 % $ 406 0.4 % II-13 2025 compared to 2024 Sales and marketing expenses increased by $5.4 million, or 4.7%, for the year ended December 31, 2025 as compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was driven primarily by an additional $7.0 million in personnel and compensation expense, a $1.1 million increase in consulting…”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

184Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

5%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.6×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$109Mowner earningsvs.$18Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $18M of profit into $109M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$18M

Owner earnings$109M · 19% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$18M	($41M)	($46M)	($60M)	($82M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$68M	+$89M	+$104M	+$111M	+$101M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$28M	+$26M	+$26M	+$27M	+$22M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$3M	+$39M	+$20M	−$13M	−$4M
Cash from operations	$111M	$113M	$105M	$65M	$37M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$2M	−$1M	−$3M	−$3M	−$3M
Owner earnings	$109M	$112M	$102M	$62M	$34M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	20%	19%	10%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $28M), owner earnings is nearer $81M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“We identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2023 that has not been remediated as of December 31, 2025, as described in Part II, Item 9A.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.7×

Thin

Operating income $59M ÷ interest expense $35M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $394M · 6.6× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $130M − debt $523M

What this means
Netting $130M of cash and short-term investments against $523M of debt leaves $394M owed, about 6.6× a year's operating profit (8.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -1%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -8%–5%; 5% latest = NOPAT $51M ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median -10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 16%

High through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range -3%–20%; latest $109M = operating cash $111M − maintenance capex $2M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves $81M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 6.33×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $111M ÷ net income $18M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 78%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $85M ÷ Owner Earnings $109M

What this means
Of $109M Owner Earnings, $85M (78%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $85M buybacks. Net of $28M stock comp, the real buyback was about $57M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.03×

Harvesting

Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $68M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $589M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.11×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $523M vs $112M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.13/share (latest year $0.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −11% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −11% early to 5% lately, median −5% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +30%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 30% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · −22.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, to the extent any AI Technologies are used as a hosted service, the service may be subject to disruption, outage, or loss of information.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$216M

Cash & short-term investments$129M
Receivables$38M
Other current assets$48M

Current liabilities$104M

Debt due within a year$6M
Accounts payable$12M
Other current liabilities$86M

Current ratio2.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.08×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$112Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$6M due · $129M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 2.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($332M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($439M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$536M$13M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$22Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $488M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$25M · 5%
Buybacks$277M · 57%
Retained (debt / cash)$187M · 38%

Returned to owners$277M
60% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $277M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$9.83
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 26M shares were bought for $253M, about $9.83 each.
Net change in share count565.7%
The diluted count rose from 27M to 180M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.1B77% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$1.1Bover 7 years buying other businesses, against $25M of capital spent building

$6M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership10.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$28M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 48% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why EverCommerce is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?565.7%
Diluted shares grew 565.7% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $277M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
QLYSQualys	$669M	78%	24.5%	25%	40%
MQMarqeta Inc.	$625M	45%	-28.0%	-57%	10%
FSLYFastly Inc.	$624M	54%	-30.9%	-13%	-21%
VRNSVaronis	$624M	85%	-23.5%	-22%	5%
NCNOnCino	$595M	59%	-20.4%	-6%	2%
EVCMEverCommerce	$589M	—	-4.9%	-1%	16%
BBBlackBerry Limited	$549M	72%	0.1%	0%	3%
FROGJFrog	$532M	79%	-21.4%	-10%	14%
Group median	—	—	-20.9%	-8%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what EverCommerce has delivered.

EverCommerce’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, EverCommerce earns about $92M on its 15.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($92M) Net of stock comp (−$27M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($103M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+23%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+30%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $103M on 177M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $393M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3M) runs well above depreciation ($66M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $103M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh EVCM against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "EverCommerce (EVCM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EVCM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EVC its page in the Manual EVER →

Industry order: ← ESTC the Software chapter EVER →