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FROG, JFrog

Software asset-light Unprofitable

JFrog's goal is to provide a system of record for the software supply chain in the Artificial Intelligence era.

We envision a world where innovative, secure, compliant and trusted software is consumed, built and continuously delivered from any user to any destination; a reality we refer to as "Liquid Software."

The complimentary practices of DevOps, DevSecOps, DevGovOps, MLOps and AI development are converging within organizations, exposing new challenges in process, security, governance and compliance for software delivery.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

FROG · JFrog

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$532M

+24.1% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $563M 5-yr avg $359M

Gross margin 77% 5-yr avg 78%

Operating margin −14.5% 5-yr avg −25.1%

ROIC −7% 5-yr avg −10%

Owner-earnings margin 27% 5-yr avg 18%

Free cash flow margin 27% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −22% through the cycle on a 78% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 27% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −10%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

40% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States60%$316M
Rest of world37%$199M
Israel3%$16M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$64M	$105M	$151M	$207M	$280M	$350M	$428M	$532M	$563M	RevenueRevenue
83%	81%	81%	80%	78%	78%	77%	77%	77%	Gross marginGross mgn
30%	17%	23%	27%	20%	18%	16%	15%	15%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
41%	28%	27%	39%	43%	38%	38%	37%	36%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($27M)	($7M)	($14M)	($68M)	($90M)	($76M)	($91M)	($92M)	($82M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−42.3%	−6.6%	−9.4%	−33.1%	−32.1%	−21.6%	−21.3%	−17.3%	−14.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($26M)	($5M)	($9M)	($64M)	($90M)	($61M)	($69M)	($72M)	($62M)	Net incomeNet inc.
									Cash flow & returns
$9M	$10M	$29M	$28M	$21M	$74M	$111M	$146M	$155M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1M	$3M	$4M	$9M	$15M	$15M	$21M	$25M	$23M	DepreciationDeprec.
$13M	$3M	$11M	$26M	$28M	$25M	$28M	$36M	$34M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M	$2M	$4M	$4M	$4M	$2M	$3M	$3M	$4M	CapexCapex
3.3%	1.7%	2.3%	2.0%	1.5%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$7M	$8M	$26M	$24M	$17M	$72M	$108M	$142M	$151M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
11.7%	7.8%	17.2%	11.5%	6.1%	20.6%	25.2%	26.8%	26.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$6M	$8M	$26M	$24M	$17M	$72M	$108M	$142M	$151M	Free cash flowFCF
10.2%	7.8%	17.2%	11.5%	6.1%	20.6%	25.2%	26.8%	26.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$21M	$0	$196M	$179K	$0	$157M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	-3%	-9%	-12%	-10%	-10%	-9%	-7%	ROICROIC
—	—	-2%	-10%	-14%	-9%	-9%	-8%	-7%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−2%	−10%	−14%	−9%	−9%	−8%	−7%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$178M	$166M	$598M	$421M	$443M	$545M	$522M	$704M	$741M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$25M	$37M	$50M	$62M	$76M	$91M	$120M	$114M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$5M	$10M	$11M	$15M	$17M	$11M	$14M	$17M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$20M	$27M	$40M	$47M	$59M	$80M	$106M	$97M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$199M	$653M	$499M	$532M	$646M	$649M	$873M	$905M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$86M	$123M	$175M	$210M	$262M	$318M	$408M	$400M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	2.3×	5.3×	2.8×	2.5×	2.5×	2.0×	2.1×	2.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M	$17M	$17M	$248M	$248M	$248M	$372M	$372M	$372M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$238M	$689M	$853M	$871M	$973M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.4B	Total assetsAssets
($178M)	($166M)	($598M)	($421M)	($443M)	($545M)	($522M)	($704M)	($741M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($39M)	($33M)	$554M	$639M	$625M	$679M	$774M	$887M	$924M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
31.7%	8.9%	15.8%	27.6%	24.5%	27.2%	30.6%	29.5%	28.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
									Per share
26.1M	27.1M	46.5M	94.8M	99.2M	103M	110M	116M	120M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.43	$3.86	$3.24	$2.18	$2.82	$3.39	$3.91	$4.58	$4.69	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.00	$-0.20	$-0.20	$-0.68	$-0.91	$-0.59	$-0.63	$-0.62	$-0.51	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.29	$0.30	$0.56	$0.25	$0.17	$0.70	$0.98	$1.22	$1.26	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.25	$0.30	$0.56	$0.25	$0.17	$0.70	$0.98	$1.22	$1.26	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.08	$0.07	$0.08	$0.04	$0.04	$0.02	$0.03	$0.03	$0.03	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-1.48	$-1.23	$11.91	$6.74	$6.30	$6.57	$7.05	$7.64	$7.69	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.71 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.04 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.4%/yr	+7.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+23.1%/yr	+17.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	−13.1%/yr	−17.0%/yr
Book value / share	—	−8.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

116Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−9%low FY2022

Gross margin

77%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$142Mowner earningsvs.($72M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $72M loss into $142M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($72M)	($69M)	($61M)	($90M)	($64M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$25M	+$21M	+$15M	+$15M	+$9M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$157M	+$131M	+$95M	+$69M	+$57M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$36M	+$28M	+$25M	+$28M	+$26M
Cash from operations	$146M	$111M	$74M	$21M	$28M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$3M	−$3M	−$2M	−$4M	−$4M
Owner earnings	$142M	$108M	$72M	$17M	$24M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	27%	25%	21%	6%	11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $157M), owner earnings is nearer ($14M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$704M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $76M + ST investments $629M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $704M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 40d

Tight

DSO 82 + DIO 0 − DPO 42 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median -6%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 12%

Solid through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range 6%–27%; latest $142M = operating cash $146M − maintenance capex $3M

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 27% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $157M of SBC) leaves ($14M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $146M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($72M) · cash from operations $146M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.14×

Harvesting

Capex $3M ÷ depreciation $25M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $532M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.14×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 8 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.56/share (latest year $-0.59), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −19% → −20% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −19% early, −20% lately, median −22%.
Owner earnings growth +49%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 49% a year over the record.
Worst year 2018 · −42.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Accordingly, it is difficult to predict customer adoption and renewals and demand for our products, the entry of competitive products, the success of existing competitive products, or the future growth rate, expansion, longevity, and the size of the DevOps, DevSecOps, AI/MLOps, and software release management software …”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$905M

Cash & short-term investments$741M
Receivables$114M
Other current assets$50M

Current liabilities$400M

Accounts payable$17M
Other current liabilities$384M

Current ratio2.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.26×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.85×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$505Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+25.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 2.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$517Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$456MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$16M$16M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$341Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $428M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$25M · 6%
Retained (debt / cash)$404M · 94%

Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $563M.
Net change in share count360.3%
The diluted count rose from 26M to 120M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$411M31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity42%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$374Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $25M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Ben Haim	$3.4M	−$10.7M	$24M
2022	Ben Haim	$3.8M	$3.8M	$17M
2023	Ben Haim	$7.2M	$14.8M	$72M
2024	Ben Haim	$10.3M	$9.0M	$108M
2025	Ben Haim	$16.8M	$38.6M	$142M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership11.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$157M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 29% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
NCNOnCino	$595M	59%	-20.4%	-6%	2%
EVCMEverCommerce	$589M	—	-4.9%	-1%	16%
BBBlackBerry Limited	$549M	72%	0.1%	0%	3%
FROGJFrog	$532M	79%	-21.4%	-10%	14%
NABLN-able Inc.	$511M	83%	12.7%	3%	15%
INTAIntapp	$504M	67%	-9.8%	-23%	6%
PDPagerDuty	$493M	84%	-33.4%	-24%	3%
SPTSprout Social Inc	$458M	76%	-20.6%	-52%	2%
Group median	—	76%	-15.1%	-8%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what JFrog has delivered.

JFrog’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, JFrog earns about $77M on its 14.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($77M) Net of stock comp (−$159M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($152M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+57%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+50%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $151M on 121M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $741M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4M) runs well above depreciation ($23M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $152M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh FROG against another business →

The owners of FROG: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "JFrog (FROG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FROG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FRMEP its page in the Manual FRPH →

Industry order: ← FLUT the Software chapter FRSH →