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INTA, Intapp

Software asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a leading global provider of AI-powered solutions for the world's premier accounting, consulting, investment banking, legal, private capital and real assets firms.

The world's top firms — across accounting, consulting, investment banking, legal, private capital, and real assets — trust Intapp's industry-specific platform and solutions to modernize and drive new growth.

We generate revenues primarily from software subscriptions, typically with one-year or multi-year contract terms.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

INTA · Intapp

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$504M

+17.1% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $560M 5-yr avg $354M

Gross margin 75% 5-yr avg 68%

Operating margin −7.2% 5-yr avg −16.0%

ROIC −18% 5-yr avg −22%

Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 24% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is SaaS (66%), License (24%) and Professional Services (10%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −11% through the cycle on a 65% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 14% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −23%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

SaaS is 66% of revenue, with License the other meaningful line at 24%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

SaaS66%$332M
License24%$120M
Professional Services10%$52M

By geographyUnited States67%Rest Of The World17%United Kingdom16%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
							Income statement
$187M	$215M	$272M	$351M	$431M	$504M	$560M	RevenueRevenue
62%	65%	64%	68%	71%	74%	75%	Gross marginGross mgn
15%	20%	32%	23%	20%	20%	19%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
23%	24%	27%	27%	26%	27%	29%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($17M)	($23M)	($99M)	($69M)	($32M)	($27M)	($40M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−9.0%	−10.7%	−36.6%	−19.7%	−7.5%	−5.4%	−7.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($46M)	($47M)	($100M)	($69M)	($32M)	($18M)	($36M)	Net incomeNet inc.
							Cash flow & returns
($1M)	($10M)	$14M	$27M	$67M	$124M	$139M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$13M	$13M	$17M	$15M	$17M	$18M	$19M	DepreciationDeprec.
$28M	$6M	$20M	$14M	$23M	$36M	$48M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$2M	$554K	$2M	$2M	$2M	$3M	CapexCapex
1.4%	1.2%	0.2%	0.6%	0.6%	0.3%	0.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($4M)	($12M)	$14M	$25M	$65M	$122M	$136M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−2.2%	−5.7%	5.0%	7.2%	15.0%	24.2%	24.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($4M)	($12M)	$14M	$25M	$65M	$122M	$136M	Free cash flowFCF
−2.2%	−5.7%	5.0%	7.2%	15.0%	24.2%	24.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$21M	$3M	$7M	$11M	$52M	$51M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	-23%	-38%	-26%	-13%	-10%	-18%	ROICROIC
—	—	-39%	-20%	-8%	-4%	-11%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−39%	−20%	−8%	−4%	−11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
							Balance sheet
$42M	$38M	$51M	$130M	$208M	$313M	$147M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$49M	$67M	$93M	$95M	$90M	$80M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$2M	$4M	$6M	$13M	$16M	$18M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$46M	$63M	$87M	$82M	$73M	$63M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$114M	$147M	$255M	$343M	$456M	$276M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$172M	$224M	$259M	$301M	$350M	$361M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.7×	0.7×	1.0×	1.1×	1.3×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$228M	$262M	$269M	$279M	$286M	$326M	$326M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$460M	$494M	$629M	$733M	$894M	$709M	Total assetsAssets
-0.6×	-0.9×	-363.0×	-444.0×	—	—	-257.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($171M)	($158M)	$256M	$341M	$403M	$520M	$320M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.7%	8.4%	28.5%	19.3%	13.9%	17.5%	19.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
							Per share
24.1M	27.9M	61.3M	64.3M	71.5M	78.7M	80.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$7.75	$7.68	$4.44	$5.46	$6.02	$6.40	$6.95	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.90	$-1.67	$-1.63	$-1.08	$-0.45	$-0.23	$-0.45	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.17	$-0.44	$0.22	$0.39	$0.91	$1.55	$1.69	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.17	$-0.44	$0.22	$0.39	$0.91	$1.55	$1.69	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.11	$0.09	$0.01	$0.03	$0.03	$0.02	$0.03	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-7.08	$-5.64	$4.18	$5.31	$5.64	$6.60	$3.97	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.19 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	5-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−3.7%/yr	−3.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	−27.9%/yr	−27.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Professional Services-3.2%
“Professional services revenues decreased by $1.7 million, or 3%, for fiscal year 2025 compared to fiscal year 2024 due to changes in mix of resource delivery to our third-party implementation partners.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

79Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−10%low FY2022

Gross margin

74%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$122Mowner earningsvs.($18M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2022FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $18M loss into $122M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($18M)	($32M)	($69M)	($100M)	($47M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$18M	+$17M	+$15M	+$17M	+$13M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$88M	+$60M	+$68M	+$78M	+$18M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$36M	+$23M	+$14M	+$20M	+$6M
Cash from operations	$124M	$67M	$27M	$14M	($10M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$2M	−$2M	−$2M	−$554K	−$2M
Owner earnings	$122M	$65M	$25M	$14M	($12M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	24%	15%	7%	5%	-6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $88M), owner earnings is nearer $34M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -175.4×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($27M) ÷ interest expense $156K

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$38M

Net cash

Cash $313M − debt $276M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $38M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 19d

Tight

DSO 65 + DIO 0 − DPO 46 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -23%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -38%–-10%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($22M) ÷ invested capital $482M

Industry peers: median -15%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Solid through the cycle

6-yr median margin, range -6%–24%; latest $122M = operating cash $124M − maintenance capex $2M

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $88M of SBC) leaves $34M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $124M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($18M) · cash from operations $124M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.09×

Harvesting

Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $18M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $504M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.30×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $276M vs $106M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.52/share (latest year $-0.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.74/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 6

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −19% → −11% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −19% early to −11% lately, median −11% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2022 · −36.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.

“We are a leading global provider of AI-powered solutions for the world's premier accounting, consulting, investment banking, legal, private capital and real assets firms.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$276M

Cash & short-term investments$147M
Receivables$80M
Other current assets$49M

Current liabilities$361M

Accounts payable$18M
Other current liabilities$343M

Current ratio0.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.76×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.41×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($85M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($38M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($113M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$21M$21M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$282Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2020–2025

Over the record, the business generated $221M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$12M · 5%
Retained (debt / cash)$209M · 95%

Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $105M.
Net change in share count234.4%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 81M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$367M41% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity63%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$93Mover 6 years buying other businesses, against $12M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Mr. Hall	$892k	−$13.8M	$14M
2023	Mr. Hall	$3.1M	$29.6M	$25M
2024	Mr. Hall	$8.1M	$3.8M	$65M
2025	Mr. Hall	$14.9M	$30.2M	$122M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership11.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$88M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 17% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BBBlackBerry Limited	$549M	72%	0.1%	0%	3%
FROGJFrog	$532M	79%	-21.4%	-10%	14%
NABLN-able Inc.	$511M	83%	12.7%	3%	15%
INTAIntapp	$504M	67%	-9.8%	-23%	6%
PDPagerDuty	$493M	84%	-33.4%	-24%	3%
SPTSprout Social Inc	$458M	76%	-20.6%	-52%	2%
XPERXperi Inc. Common Stock	$448M	—	-29.1%	-19%	-7%
ALKTAlkami Technology Inc.	$444M	54%	-28.2%	-15%	-19%
Group median	—	76%	-21.0%	-17%	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Intapp has delivered.

Intapp’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Intapp earns about $31M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($31M) Net of stock comp (−$109M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($137M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+236%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+107%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $136M on 77M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net cash $147M. The if-converted diluted count is 81M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3M) runs well above depreciation ($19M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $137M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh INTA against another business →

The owners of INTA: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Intapp (INTA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/INTA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← INSW its page in the Manual INTC →

Industry order: ← IIIV the Software chapter INTU →