Owner Scorecard


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BC, Brunswick

Leisure Products capital-intensive

Brunswick Corporation is a global leader in marine recreation, delivering innovation that transforms experiences on the water and beyond.

Our unique, technology-driven solutions are informed and inspired by deep consumer insights and powered by our belief that "Next Never Rests."

We design, manufacture, and market recreational marine products, including leading marine propulsion products and boats, as well as parts and accessories for the marine and RV markets, and we operate the world's largest boat club.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
BC · Brunswick
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$5.4B
+2.4% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.5B 5-yr avg $5.9B
Gross margin 25% 5-yr avg 27%
Operating margin −0.8% 5-yr avg 8.9%
ROIC −1% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Propulsion (36%) and Boat (28%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 27% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.8% to 14% — on a steadier 27% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 21% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Propulsion at 36%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Propulsion36%$1.9B
  • Boat28%$1.5B
  • Engine Parts and Accessories23%$1.2B
  • Navico Group13%$721M
  • Corporate0%$0
By geographyUnited States73%Europe15%Asia Pacific7%Rest of World6%Canada6%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$4.5B$3.8B$4.1B$4.1B$4.3B$5.8B$6.8B$6.4B$5.2B$5.4B$5.5BRevenueRevenue
27%25%25%27%28%28%29%28%26%25%25%Gross marginGross mgn
13%12%13%12%13%12%11%13%14%16%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$480M$330M$356M$471M$539M$813M$948M$735M$312M($41M)($47M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
10.7%8.7%8.6%11.5%12.4%13.9%13.9%11.5%5.9%−0.8%−0.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$276M$146M$265M($131M)$373M$593M$677M$420M$130M($137M)($137M)Net incomeNet inc.
29%43%18%21%19%20%32%29%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$435M$400M$337M$434M$798M$574M$586M$734M$431M$562M$525MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$104M$87M$124M$139M$153M$178M$231M$273M$289M$293M$297MDepreciationDeprec.
$39M$151M($69M)$409M$245M($227M)($344M)$18M($11M)$368M$323MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$194M$178M$180M$233M$182M$267M$388M$289M$167M$166M$185MCapexCapex
4.3%4.7%4.4%5.7%4.2%4.6%5.7%4.5%3.2%3.1%3.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$331M$313M$213M$296M$616M$396M$355M$444M$264M$396M$340MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.4%8.2%5.2%7.2%14.2%6.8%5.2%6.9%5.0%7.4%6.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$241M$222M$157M$202M$616M$307M$198M$444M$264M$396M$340MFree cash flowFCF
5.4%5.8%3.8%4.9%14.2%5.2%2.9%6.9%5.0%7.4%6.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$276M$16M$910M$64M$0$1.1B$94M$104M$32M$200K$200KAcquisitionsAcquis.
$55M$61M$68M$73M$78M$99M$109M$112M$112M$113M$113MDividends paidDiv. paid
$120M$130M$75M$400M$118M$120M$450M$275M$200M$80MBuybacksBuybacks
23%13%12%22%19%19%12%6%-1%-1%ROICROIC
19%10%17%-10%25%31%33%20%7%-8%-9%Return on equityROE
15%6%12%−16%19%26%28%15%1%−15%−16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$422M$449M$294M$320M$520M$355M$596M$468M$269M$257M$278MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$412M$485M$352M$332M$338M$485M$543M$493M$429M$523M$639MReceivablesReceiv.
$699M$828M$774M$825M$712M$1.2B$1.5B$1.5B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3BInventoryInvent.
$378M$421M$458M$394M$458M$694M$663M$558M$393M$375M$460MAccounts payablePayables
$732M$893M$668M$763M$592M$1000M$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.5B$1.7B$2.1B$2.7B$2.5B$2.1B$2.1B$2.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$965M$1.0B$1.3B$944M$1.1B$1.4B$1.5B$1.8B$1.3B$1.4B$1.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.8×1.5×1.6×1.5×1.5×1.8×1.4×1.7×1.4×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$414M$34M$377M$415M$418M$888M$968M$1.0B$966M$681M$676MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.3B$3.4B$4.3B$3.6B$3.8B$5.4B$6.3B$6.2B$5.7B$5.3B$5.5BTotal assetsAssets
$439M$437M$1.2B$1.1B$951M$1.8B$2.5B$2.4B$2.3B$2.1B$2.3BTotal debtDebt
$17M($11M)$926M$789M$432M$1.5B$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$1.8B$2.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
17.4×12.5×7.7×6.2×8.0×12.3×9.7×6.5×2.5×-0.4×-0.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.3B$1.5B$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$1.9B$1.6B$1.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.6%0.5%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.7%0.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$80M$306M$306MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
92.0M90.1M88.2M85.6M79.7M78.4M75.2M70.5M67.4M65.9M65.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$48.79$42.20$46.72$48.00$54.55$74.57$90.59$90.80$77.70$81.38$84.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.00$1.62$3.01$-1.53$4.68$7.57$9.00$5.96$1.93$-2.08$-2.08EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.60$3.48$2.41$3.45$7.73$5.05$4.72$6.30$3.92$6.01$5.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.62$2.47$1.78$2.36$7.73$3.91$2.63$6.30$3.92$6.01$5.18Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.60$0.67$0.77$0.86$0.98$1.26$1.44$1.59$1.67$1.71$1.72Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.11$1.98$2.04$2.72$2.29$3.41$5.16$4.10$2.48$2.52$2.82Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.65$16.46$17.94$15.20$18.95$24.42$27.16$29.61$28.08$24.67$24.38Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.8%/yr+8.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.9%/yr−4.9%/yr
Dividends / share+12.3%/yr+11.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.0%/yr+1.9%/yr
Book value / share+5.2%/yr+5.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
66Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
−1%low FY2025
Gross margin
25%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.7×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$396Mowner earningsvs.($137M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $137M loss into $396M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($137M)$130M$420M$677M$593M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$293M+$289M+$273M+$231M+$178M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$39M+$23M+$22M+$22M+$30M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$368M−$11M+$18M−$344M−$227M
Cash from operations$562M$431M$734M$586M$574M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$166M−$167M−$289M−$231M−$178M
Owner earnings$396M$264M$444M$355M$396M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$157M−$89M
Free cash flow$396M$264M$444M$198M$307M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%5%7%5%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $39M), owner earnings is nearer $358M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($41M) ÷ interest expense $112M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $257M − debt $2.1B
    What this means

    Netting $257M of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $1.8B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 36 + DIO 108 − DPO 34 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -1%–23%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($32M) ÷ invested capital $3.5B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 5%–14%; latest $396M = operating cash $562M − maintenance capex $166M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $39M of SBC) leaves $358M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($137M) · cash from operations $562M

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $193M ÷ Owner Earnings $396M
    What this means

    Of $396M Owner Earnings, $193M (49%) went back to shareholders, $113M dividends, $80M buybacks. Net of $39M stock comp, the real buyback was about $41M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.57×
    Harvesting
    Capex $166M ÷ depreciation $293M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.44×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs $635M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −40%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.12/share (latest year $-2.11), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $25.02/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to 6% lately, median 11% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −0.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −3.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Competitors may adopt new technologies and technological advancements, such as using artificial intelligence and machine learning to pursue new products, services, and approaches more quickly, successfully and effectively.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$278M
  • Receivables$639M
  • Inventory$1.3B
  • Other current assets$116M
Current liabilities$1.7B
  • Debt due within a year$490M
  • Accounts payable$460M
  • Other current liabilities$711M
Current ratio1.38×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.62×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$624Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$490M due · $278M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Apr 4, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$83Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$2.5B$168M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$295M
'27$4M
'28$3M
'29$402M
'30$800K
later$1.4B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$295Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$300Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$402Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$2.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Apr 4, 2026$278M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$396M
Together, against $295M due next year2.3×

Cash on hand as of Apr 4, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $674M against the $295M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 2.3 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.2B · 42%
  • Dividends$880M · 17%
  • Buybacks$2.0B · 37%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$199M · 4%
  • Returned to owners$2.8B

    79% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $880M as dividends and $2.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.9B and cash and short-term investments fell $145M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$64.89

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 30M shares were bought for $2.0B, about $64.89 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $44.64 (2016) to $96.47 (2021); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $76.13 ($450M).

  • Net change in share count−28.6%

    The diluted count fell from 92M to 66M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.71/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.5B29% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity42%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.2B of capital spent building

$386M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021David M. Foulkes$9.6M$20.4M$396M
2022David M. Foulkes$9.5M$2.9M$355M
2023David M. Foulkes$10.8M$14.0M$444M
2024David M. Foulkes$11.0M$280k$264M
2025David M. Foulkes$13.0M$14.5M$396M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$39M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Brunswick is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$439M → $2.3B

    Debt rose from $439M to $2.3B while owner earnings went from about $286M to $368M — about 1.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?25% → 34% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $1.1B to $1.9B while revenue grew 23%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (25% of revenue then, 34% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $473M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Leisure Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
RRXRegal Rexnord Corporation$5.9B27%9.9%7%9%
TEXTerex$5.4B20%8.6%11%5%
ZBRAZebra Technologies$5.4B47%13.7%13%15%
BCBrunswick$5.4B27%11.1%13%7%
LIILennox Intl$5.2B29%14.0%44%11%
WFRDWeatherford International plc$4.9B56%3.2%5%5%
FLSFlowserve$4.7B30%7.7%7%6%
BWXTBWX Technologies Inc.$3.2B27%15.9%17%11%
Group median28%10.5%12%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Brunswick has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Brunswick earns about $379M on its 7.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $340M on 65M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $2.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($185M) runs well above depreciation ($297M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $360M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Brunswick (BC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BBY its page in the Manual BCAL →

Industry order: ← 7951 the Leisure Products chapter CALY →