Owner Scorecard


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CALY, Callaway Golf Company

Leisure Products consumer brand

We sell our Golf Equipment and Apparel, Gear and Other products in the United States and internationally, with our principal international regions being Europe and Asia.

Corporate costs and expenses include corporate general and administrative expenses not utilized by management in determining segment profitability.

Apparel, Gear and Other product sales for our TravisMathew business are primarily concentrated in the United States.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CALY · Callaway Golf Company
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.1B
−0.8% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $2.7B
Gross margin 43% 5-yr avg 43%
Operating margin 7.7% 5-yr avg 7.1%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 9%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Golf Equipment (67%) and Apparel, Gear and Other (33%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 43% and operating margin about 6.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −6.6% to 10% — on a steadier 43% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Golf Equipment is 67% of revenue, with Apparel, Gear and Other the other meaningful segment at 33%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Golf Equipment67%$1.4B
  • Apparel, Gear and Other33%$685M
By geographyUnited States66%Asia18%Europe10%Rest of World6%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$871M$1.0B$1.2B$1.7B$1.6B$3.1B$4.0B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1BRevenueRevenue
44%46%47%45%41%43%43%42%43%Gross marginGross mgn
8%9%8%34%34%27%24%31%32%33%32%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%3%3%3%3%2%2%3%3%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$44M$79M$128M$133M($106M)$205M$257M$194M$153M$128M$163MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.1%7.5%10.3%7.8%−6.6%6.5%6.4%9.1%7.4%6.2%7.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$190M$41M$105M$79M($127M)$322M$158M$95M($1.4B)($409M)($318M)Net incomeNet inc.
39%20%17%8%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$78M$118M$92M$87M$228M$278M($35M)$365M$382M$334M$250MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$17M$18M$20M$35M$40M$156M$193M$46M$45M$46M$46MDepreciationDeprec.
($138M)$47M($46M)($41M)$305M($238M)($433M)$191M$1.8B$673M$499MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$16M$26M$37M$55M$39M$322M$532M$50M$49M$32M$31MCapexCapex
1.9%2.5%3.0%3.2%2.5%10.3%13.3%2.3%2.3%1.5%1.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$62M$100M$72M$52M$189M$123M($228M)$315M$333M$302M$219MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.1%9.5%5.8%3.0%11.9%3.9%−5.7%14.8%16.0%14.7%10.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$62M$91M$55M$32M$189M($44M)($567M)$315M$333M$302M$219MFree cash flowFCF
7.1%8.7%4.5%1.9%11.9%−1.4%−14.2%14.8%16.0%14.7%10.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$183M$0$463M$0$0$0$30M$23M$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$4M$4M$4M$4M$2M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$5M$17M$22M$28M$22M$38M$36M$56M$31M$4MBuybacksBuybacks
9%8%16%10%-9%4%5%3%ROICROIC
32%6%14%10%-19%9%4%2%-60%-20%-15%Return on equityROE
31%6%14%10%−19%9%4%−15%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$126M$86M$107M$107M$366M$352M$180M$394M$445M$903M$500MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$128M$95M$71M$140M$138M$105M$167M$201M$137M$123M$394MReceivablesReceiv.
$189M$262M$338M$457M$353M$534M$959M$794M$628M$625M$596MInventoryInvent.
$55M$63M$42M$68M$66M$139M$159M$131M$62M$110M$108MAccounts payablePayables
$263M$294M$367M$529M$425M$500M$967M$864M$704M$639M$883MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$460M$466M$525M$789M$913M$1.2B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$5.9B$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$187M$314M$303M$523M$391M$866M$1.2B$948M$826M$4.4B$714MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×1.5×1.7×1.5×2.3×1.3×1.3×1.7×1.9×1.4×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$26M$56M$56M$204M$57M$2.0B$2.0B$619M$619M$620M$620MGoodwillGoodwill
$801M$991M$1.1B$2.0B$2.0B$7.7B$8.6B$9.1B$7.6B$7.3B$3.2BTotal assetsAssets
$0$12M$10M$451M$665M$1.0B$1.2B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$427MTotal debtDebt
($126M)($74M)($97M)$344M$299M$673M$996M$1.1B$984M$513M($72M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
18.7×18.1×23.2×3.4×-2.2×1.8×1.8×0.9×2.4×2.1×3.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$599M$650M$725M$767M$676M$3.7B$3.8B$3.9B$2.4B$2.1B$2.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%1.2%1.1%0.8%0.7%1.2%1.2%1.6%1.3%1.2%1.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$148M$1.4B$1.4BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
95.8M96.6M97.2M96.3M94.2M177M201M201M199M186M203MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.09$10.86$12.79$17.67$16.87$17.71$19.85$10.61$10.42$11.09$10.45Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.98$0.42$1.08$0.82$-1.35$1.82$0.78$0.47$-7.26$-2.20$-1.57EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.64$1.04$0.74$0.54$2.01$0.69$-1.13$1.56$1.67$1.63$1.08Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.64$0.95$0.57$0.33$2.01$-0.25$-2.82$1.56$1.67$1.63$1.08Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04$0.04$0.04$0.04$0.02$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.17$0.27$0.38$0.57$0.42$1.82$2.64$0.25$0.24$0.17$0.15Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.25$6.73$7.46$7.97$7.17$20.82$18.75$19.28$12.08$11.14$10.48Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.88 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.2%/yr−8.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+10.9%/yr−4.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+0.2%/yr−16.3%/yr
Book value / share+6.6%/yr+9.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-0.8%
    “Net sales and operating segment results (in millions, except percentages) Net sales for the year ended December 31, 2025 decreased $17.6 million, or 0.8% as compared to the year ended December 31, 2024 due to a decrease in the Apparel, Gear and Other operating segment, impacted by soft macroeconomic conditions primarily in the U.S. and Asia, while Golf Equipment sales were approximately flat.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Apparel, Gear and Other-1.4%
    “Apparel, Gear and Other Net sales During the year ended December 31, 2025, net sales in our Apparel, Gear and Other segment decreased $10.0 million (1.4%) compared to the same period in 2024, primarily due to a decline in sales of apparel and gear resulting from soft market conditions globally, partially offset by the continued expansion of TravisMathew product lines and the opening of new retail stores.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Asia-4.2%
    “Asia During the year ended December 31, 2025, net sales in Asia decreased $16.0 million (4.2%) compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The decrease was primarily due to soft demand in the apparel market in Korea and Japan. 45 Rest of World During the year ended December 31, 2025, net sales in Rest of World decreased $5.5 million (4.1%) compared to the year ended December 31, 2024.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Europe+11.9%
    “Europe During the year ended December 31, 2025, net sales in Europe increased $21.7 million (11.9%) compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by increases in golf club and golf ball sales.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
186Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
3%low FY2020
Gross margin
42%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$302Mowner earningsvs.($409M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $409M loss into $302M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($409M)($1.4B)$95M$158M$322M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$46M+$45M+$46M+$193M+$156M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$24M+$28M+$33M+$47M+$39M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$673M+$1.8B+$191M−$433M−$238M
Cash from operations$334M$382M$365M($35M)$278M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$32M−$49M−$50M−$193M−$156M
Owner earnings$302M$333M$315M($228M)$123M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$340M−$167M
Free cash flow$302M$333M$315M($567M)($44M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%16%15%-6%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $278M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $128M ÷ interest expense $61M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $513M · 4.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $903M − debt $1.4B
    What this means

    Netting $903M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $513M owed, about 4.0× a year's operating profit (11.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 22 + DIO 191 − DPO 34 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -9%–16%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -6%–16%; latest $302M = operating cash $334M − maintenance capex $32M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $278M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($409M) · cash from operations $334M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $4M ÷ Owner Earnings $302M
    What this means

    Of $302M Owner Earnings, $4M (1%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $4M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($24M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.69×
    Harvesting
    Capex $32M ÷ depreciation $46M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.36×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.4B vs $1.6B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −625%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.27/share (latest year $-2.28), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.51/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 8% early, 8% lately, median 7%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −6.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If we fail to obtain protection for our intellectual property rights developed using AI Technologies, or later have our intellectual property rights invalidated or otherwise diminished, our competitors may be able to take advantage of our research and development efforts to develop competing products which could advers…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$500M
  • Receivables$394M
  • Inventory$596M
  • Other current assets$136M
Current liabilities$714M
  • Debt due within a year$274M
  • Accounts payable$108M
  • Other current liabilities$332M
Current ratio2.28×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.44×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$912Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$274M due · $500M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 2.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$631M$204M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$23Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$776M
'27$15M
'28$13M
'29$13M
'30$616M
later$2M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$776Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$790Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$776Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.4Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$500M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$302M
Together, against $776M due next year1.0×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $802M against the $776M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.0 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.2B · 60%
  • Dividends$17M · 1%
  • Buybacks$260M · 13%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$492M · 26%
  • Returned to owners$277M

    21% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $17M as dividends and $260M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $427M and cash and short-term investments rose $374M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $260M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count111.5%

    The diluted count rose from 96M to 203M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$842M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity30%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$700Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

$1.5B written down across 2 years (2020, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III$27.1M$39.5M$123M
2022Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III$11.0M−$127k($228M)
2023Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III$11.1M−$3.0M$315M
2024Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III$9.4M−$2.1M$333M
2025Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III$14.0M$26.4M$302M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 19% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Callaway Golf Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?111.5%

    Diluted shares grew 111.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $260M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $427M

    Debt rose from $0 to $427M while owner earnings went from about $78M to $317M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?36% → 47% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $317M to $990M while revenue grew 143%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (36% of revenue then, 47% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Leisure Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MATMattel$5.3B47%9.9%11%7%
HASHasbro Inc.$4.7B67%10.5%12%12%
GOLFAcushnet Holdings Corp.$2.6B51%11.4%12%7%
PTONPeloton Interactive Inc.$2.5B43%-15.3%-10%-5%
CALYCallaway Golf Company$2.1B44%6.9%7%8%
YETIYETI Holdings$1.9B54%11.4%30%12%
FNKOFunko Inc.$908M36%4.7%6%5%
JOUTJohnson Outdoors Inc.$592M42%9.1%16%6%
Group median45%9.5%11%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Callaway Golf Company has delivered.

Callaway Golf Company’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Callaway Golf Company earns about $171M on its 8.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $219M on 180M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $72M. The if-converted diluted count is 203M, 13% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Callaway Golf Company (CALY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CALY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CALX its page in the Manual CAPL →

Industry order: ← BC the Leisure Products chapter DOO →