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CALY, Callaway Golf Company
We sell our Golf Equipment and Apparel, Gear and Other products in the United States and internationally, with our principal international regions being Europe and Asia.
Corporate costs and expenses include corporate general and administrative expenses not utilized by management in determining segment profitability.
Apparel, Gear and Other product sales for our TravisMathew business are primarily concentrated in the United States.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Golf Equipment (67%) and Apparel, Gear and Other (33%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 43% and operating margin about 6.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −6.6% to 10% — on a steadier 43% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Golf Equipment is 67% of revenue, with Apparel, Gear and Other the other meaningful segment at 33%.
- Golf Equipment67%$1.4B
- Apparel, Gear and Other33%$685M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $871M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $3.1B | $4.0B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 44% | 46% | 47% | 45% | 41% | — | — | 43% | 43% | 42% | 43% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 8% | 9% | 8% | 34% | 34% | 27% | 24% | 31% | 32% | 33% | 32% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 4% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $44M | $79M | $128M | $133M | ($106M) | $205M | $257M | $194M | $153M | $128M | $163M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.1% | 7.5% | 10.3% | 7.8% | −6.6% | 6.5% | 6.4% | 9.1% | 7.4% | 6.2% | 7.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $190M | $41M | $105M | $79M | ($127M) | $322M | $158M | $95M | ($1.4B) | ($409M) | ($318M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 39% | 20% | 17% | — | 8% | — | 24% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $78M | $118M | $92M | $87M | $228M | $278M | ($35M) | $365M | $382M | $334M | $250M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $17M | $18M | $20M | $35M | $40M | $156M | $193M | $46M | $45M | $46M | $46M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($138M) | $47M | ($46M) | ($41M) | $305M | ($238M) | ($433M) | $191M | $1.8B | $673M | $499M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $16M | $26M | $37M | $55M | $39M | $322M | $532M | $50M | $49M | $32M | $31M | CapexCapex |
| 1.9% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 2.5% | 10.3% | 13.3% | 2.3% | 2.3% | 1.5% | 1.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $62M | $100M | $72M | $52M | $189M | $123M | ($228M) | $315M | $333M | $302M | $219M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.1% | 9.5% | 5.8% | 3.0% | 11.9% | 3.9% | −5.7% | 14.8% | 16.0% | 14.7% | 10.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $62M | $91M | $55M | $32M | $189M | ($44M) | ($567M) | $315M | $333M | $302M | $219M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.1% | 8.7% | 4.5% | 1.9% | 11.9% | −1.4% | −14.2% | 14.8% | 16.0% | 14.7% | 10.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $183M | $0 | $463M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $30M | $23M | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $4M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $2M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $5M | $17M | $22M | $28M | $22M | $38M | $36M | $56M | $31M | $4M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 9% | 8% | 16% | 10% | -9% | 4% | 5% | 3% | — | — | — | ROICROIC |
| 32% | 6% | 14% | 10% | -19% | 9% | 4% | 2% | -60% | -20% | -15% | Return on equityROE |
| 31% | 6% | 14% | 10% | −19% | 9% | 4% | — | — | — | −15% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $126M | $86M | $107M | $107M | $366M | $352M | $180M | $394M | $445M | $903M | $500M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $128M | $95M | $71M | $140M | $138M | $105M | $167M | $201M | $137M | $123M | $394M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $189M | $262M | $338M | $457M | $353M | $534M | $959M | $794M | $628M | $625M | $596M | InventoryInvent. |
| $55M | $63M | $42M | $68M | $66M | $139M | $159M | $131M | $62M | $110M | $108M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $263M | $294M | $367M | $529M | $425M | $500M | $967M | $864M | $704M | $639M | $883M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $460M | $466M | $525M | $789M | $913M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $5.9B | $1.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $187M | $314M | $303M | $523M | $391M | $866M | $1.2B | $948M | $826M | $4.4B | $714M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.5× | 1.5× | 1.7× | 1.5× | 2.3× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.7× | 1.9× | 1.4× | 2.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $26M | $56M | $56M | $204M | $57M | $2.0B | $2.0B | $619M | $619M | $620M | $620M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $801M | $991M | $1.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $7.7B | $8.6B | $9.1B | $7.6B | $7.3B | $3.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $0 | $12M | $10M | $451M | $665M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $427M | Total debtDebt |
| ($126M) | ($74M) | ($97M) | $344M | $299M | $673M | $996M | $1.1B | $984M | $513M | ($72M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 18.7× | 18.1× | 23.2× | 3.4× | -2.2× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 0.9× | 2.4× | 2.1× | 3.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $599M | $650M | $725M | $767M | $676M | $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $2.4B | $2.1B | $2.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.0% | 1.2% | 1.1% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 1.2% | 1.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | — | $148M | — | — | — | $1.4B | — | $1.4B | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 95.8M | 96.6M | 97.2M | 96.3M | 94.2M | 177M | 201M | 201M | 199M | 186M | 203M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.09 | $10.86 | $12.79 | $17.67 | $16.87 | $17.71 | $19.85 | $10.61 | $10.42 | $11.09 | $10.45 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.98 | $0.42 | $1.08 | $0.82 | $-1.35 | $1.82 | $0.78 | $0.47 | $-7.26 | $-2.20 | $-1.57 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.64 | $1.04 | $0.74 | $0.54 | $2.01 | $0.69 | $-1.13 | $1.56 | $1.67 | $1.63 | $1.08 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.64 | $0.95 | $0.57 | $0.33 | $2.01 | $-0.25 | $-2.82 | $1.56 | $1.67 | $1.63 | $1.08 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.17 | $0.27 | $0.38 | $0.57 | $0.42 | $1.82 | $2.64 | $0.25 | $0.24 | $0.17 | $0.15 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.25 | $6.73 | $7.46 | $7.97 | $7.17 | $20.82 | $18.75 | $19.28 | $12.08 | $11.14 | $10.48 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.88 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.2%/yr | −8.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +10.9%/yr | −4.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +0.2%/yr | −16.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.6%/yr | +9.2%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue-0.8%
“Net sales and operating segment results (in millions, except percentages) Net sales for the year ended December 31, 2025 decreased $17.6 million, or 0.8% as compared to the year ended December 31, 2024 due to a decrease in the Apparel, Gear and Other operating segment, impacted by soft macroeconomic conditions primarily in the U.S. and Asia, while Golf Equipment sales were approximately flat.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Apparel, Gear and Other-1.4%
“Apparel, Gear and Other Net sales During the year ended December 31, 2025, net sales in our Apparel, Gear and Other segment decreased $10.0 million (1.4%) compared to the same period in 2024, primarily due to a decline in sales of apparel and gear resulting from soft market conditions globally, partially offset by the continued expansion of TravisMathew product lines and the opening of new retail stores.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Asia-4.2%
“Asia During the year ended December 31, 2025, net sales in Asia decreased $16.0 million (4.2%) compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The decrease was primarily due to soft demand in the apparel market in Korea and Japan. 45 Rest of World During the year ended December 31, 2025, net sales in Rest of World decreased $5.5 million (4.1%) compared to the year ended December 31, 2024.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Europe+11.9%
“Europe During the year ended December 31, 2025, net sales in Europe increased $21.7 million (11.9%) compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by increases in golf club and golf ball sales.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $409M loss into $302M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($409M) | ($1.4B) | $95M | $158M | $322M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$46M | +$45M | +$46M | +$193M | +$156M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$24M | +$28M | +$33M | +$47M | +$39M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$673M | +$1.8B | +$191M | −$433M | −$238M |
| Cash from operations | $334M | $382M | $365M | ($35M) | $278M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$32M | −$49M | −$50M | −$193M | −$156M |
| Owner earnings | $302M | $333M | $315M | ($228M) | $123M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$340M | −$167M |
| Free cash flow | $302M | $333M | $315M | ($567M) | ($44M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 15% | 16% | 15% | -6% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $278M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $128M ÷ interest expense $61M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $513M · 4.0× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $903M − debt $1.4B
What this means
Netting $903M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $513M owed, about 4.0× a year's operating profit (11.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 22 + DIO 191 − DPO 34 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -9%–16%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -6%–16%; latest $302M = operating cash $334M − maintenance capex $32MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $278M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($409M) · cash from operations $334M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $4M ÷ Owner Earnings $302M
What this means
Of $302M Owner Earnings, $4M (1%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $4M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($24M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.69×HarvestingCapex $32M ÷ depreciation $46M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.36×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1.4B vs $1.6B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −625%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.27/share (latest year $-2.28), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.51/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 8% early, 8% lately, median 7%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −6.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“If we fail to obtain protection for our intellectual property rights developed using AI Technologies, or later have our intellectual property rights invalidated or otherwise diminished, our competitors may be able to take advantage of our research and development efforts to develop competing products which could advers…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$500M
- Receivables$394M
- Inventory$596M
- Other current assets$136M
- Debt due within a year$274M
- Accounts payable$108M
- Other current liabilities$332M
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $802M against the $776M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.0 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$1.2B · 60%
- Dividends$17M · 1%
- Buybacks$260M · 13%
- Retained (debt / cash)$492M · 26%
- Returned to owners$277M
21% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $17M as dividends and $260M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $427M and cash and short-term investments rose $374M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $260M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count111.5%
The diluted count rose from 96M to 203M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$1.5B written down across 2 years (2020, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III | $27.1M | $39.5M | $123M |
| 2022 | Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III | $11.0M | −$127k | ($228M) |
| 2023 | Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III | $11.1M | −$3.0M | $315M |
| 2024 | Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III | $9.4M | −$2.1M | $333M |
| 2025 | Oliver G. (Chip) Brewer III | $14.0M | $26.4M | $302M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$24M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 19% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Callaway Golf Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?111.5%
Diluted shares grew 111.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $260M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $427M
Debt rose from $0 to $427M while owner earnings went from about $78M to $317M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?36% → 47% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $317M to $990M while revenue grew 143%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (36% of revenue then, 47% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Leisure Products
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MATMattel | $5.3B | 47% | 9.9% | 11% | 7% |
| HASHasbro Inc. | $4.7B | 67% | 10.5% | 12% | 12% |
| GOLFAcushnet Holdings Corp. | $2.6B | 51% | 11.4% | 12% | 7% |
| PTONPeloton Interactive Inc. | $2.5B | 43% | -15.3% | -10% | -5% |
| CALYCallaway Golf Company | $2.1B | 44% | 6.9% | 7% | 8% |
| YETIYETI Holdings | $1.9B | 54% | 11.4% | 30% | 12% |
| FNKOFunko Inc. | $908M | 36% | 4.7% | 6% | 5% |
| JOUTJohnson Outdoors Inc. | $592M | 42% | 9.1% | 16% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 45% | 9.5% | 11% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Callaway Golf Company has delivered.
Callaway Golf Company’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Callaway Golf Company earns about $171M on its 8.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $219M on 180M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $72M. The if-converted diluted count is 203M, 13% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CALX its page in the Manual CAPL →
Industry order: ← BC the Leisure Products chapter DOO →