Owner Scorecard


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BBY, Best Buy Co. Inc.

Best Buy is a big-box retailer of consumer electronics. It sells televisions, computers, phones, appliances and the cables and accessories around them, both in large stores and online, and it fixes and installs that gear through its Geek Squad service arm. It earns the markup between what it pays manufacturers and what customers pay, plus fees for delivery, installation, repair and the memberships that bundle those services.

We are driven by our purpose to enrich lives through technology and our vision to personalize and humanize technology solutions for every stage of life.

We accomplish this by leveraging our unique combination of tech expertise and a human touch to meet our customers' everyday needs, whether they come to us online, visit our stores or invite us into their homes.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
BBY · Best Buy Co. Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$41.7B
+0.4% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $41.9B 5-yr avg $44.9B
Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg 22%
Operating margin 3.7% 5-yr avg 3.9%
ROIC 42% 5-yr avg 48%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Domestic (92%) and International (8%).
What moves the needle
The hard question hangs over the whole model: electronics are branded goods a buyer can price-check in seconds, so the store risks becoming a showroom where people look, then buy the same box cheaper online. That makes it largely a price-taker, and the levers are the low-cost-producer's — buying scale, store and supply-chain expense, and inventory that must not go stale as gear is replaced by newer gear. The one place it can earn a real margin is service and advice: setup, repair, installation and membership are things a website struggles to ship in a carton, and they bind the customer. The bad case is plain — thin retail margins, Amazon and Walmart and the makers selling direct, and demand that swings with the upgrade cycle. Whether advice and service hold the line shows in the gross margin and the returns in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 44%, above 15% in 8 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Domestic is 92% of revenue, with International the other meaningful segment at 8%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
  • Domestic92%$38.3B
  • International8%$3.4B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$39.4B$42.2B$42.9B$43.6B$47.3B$51.8B$46.3B$43.5B$41.5B$41.7B$41.9BRevenueRevenue
24%23%23%23%22%22%21%22%23%22%23%Gross marginGross mgn
19%19%19%18%17%17%17%18%18%18%18%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$1.9B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.4B$3.0B$1.8B$1.6B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.7%4.4%4.4%4.6%5.1%5.9%3.9%3.6%3.0%3.3%3.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.2B$1.0B$1.5B$1.5B$1.8B$2.5B$1.4B$1.2B$927M$1.1B$1.1BNet incomeNet inc.
33%45%22%23%24%19%21%23%29%24%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$2.6B$2.1B$2.4B$2.6B$4.9B$3.3B$1.8B$1.5B$2.1B$2.0B$2.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$654M$683M$770M$812M$839M$869M$918M$923M$866M$831M$814MDepreciationDeprec.
$567M$329M$51M$69M$2.2B($212M)($651M)($839M)$166M($77M)$207MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$580M$688M$819M$743M$713M$737M$930M$795M$706M$704M$698MCapexCapex
1.5%1.6%1.9%1.7%1.5%1.4%2.0%1.8%1.7%1.7%1.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.0B$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$4.2B$2.5B$894M$675M$1.4B$1.3B$1.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.0%3.4%3.7%4.2%8.9%4.9%1.9%1.6%3.4%3.0%3.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.0B$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$4.2B$2.5B$894M$675M$1.4B$1.3B$1.6BFree cash flowFCF
5.0%3.4%3.7%4.2%8.9%4.9%1.9%1.6%3.4%3.0%3.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$787M$145M$468M$468MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$505M$409M$497M$527M$568M$688M$789M$801M$807M$801M$801MDividends paidDiv. paid
$698M$2.0B$1.5B$1.0B$312M$3.5B$1.0B$340M$500M$273MBuybacksBuybacks
32%31%54%62%68%43%38%44%42%ROICROIC
26%28%44%44%39%81%51%41%33%36%37%Return on equityROE
15%16%29%29%27%58%23%14%4%9%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3.9B$3.1B$2.0B$2.2B$5.5B$2.9B$1.9B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.1B$939M$1.0B$1.0B$906MReceivablesReceiv.
$4.9B$5.2B$5.4B$5.2B$5.6B$6.0B$5.1B$5.0B$5.1B$5.2B$5.6BInventoryInvent.
$5.0B$4.9B$5.3B$5.3B$7.0B$6.8B$5.7B$4.6B$5.0B$4.7B$5.1BAccounts payablePayables
$1.2B$1.4B$1.2B$1.0B($306M)$204M$594M$1.3B$1.1B$1.5B$1.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$10.5B$9.8B$8.9B$8.9B$12.5B$10.5B$8.8B$7.9B$8.2B$8.5B$8.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$7.1B$7.8B$7.5B$8.1B$10.5B$10.7B$9.0B$7.9B$8.0B$7.7B$7.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.3×1.2×1.1×1.2×1.0×1.0×1.0×1.0×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$425M$490M$915M$984M$986M$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$908M$790M$790MGoodwillGoodwill
$13.9B$13.0B$12.9B$15.6B$19.1B$17.5B$15.8B$15.0B$14.8B$14.7B$14.9BTotal assetsAssets
$1.4B$811M$1.4B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3BTotal debtDebt
($2.6B)($2.3B)($592M)($958M)($4.2B)($1.7B)($698M)($282M)($424M)($562M)($483M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
25.8×24.6×26.0×31.4×46.0×121.6×51.3×30.3×24.7×29.6×33.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.7B$3.6B$3.3B$3.5B$4.6B$3.0B$2.8B$3.1B$2.8B$3.0B$3.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$475M$171M$171MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
323M307M281M268M263M249M226M219M217M212M211MShares out (diluted)Shares
$122.14$137.25$152.38$162.77$179.70$207.63$205.13$198.86$191.73$196.56$198.11Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.81$3.26$5.20$5.75$6.84$9.84$6.29$5.68$4.28$5.04$5.41EPS (diluted)EPS
$6.13$4.73$5.65$6.80$16.02$10.09$3.96$3.09$6.43$5.93$7.60Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$6.13$4.73$5.65$6.80$16.02$10.09$3.96$3.09$6.43$5.93$7.60Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.57$1.33$1.77$1.97$2.16$2.76$3.50$3.67$3.73$3.78$3.79Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.80$2.24$2.91$2.77$2.71$2.96$4.12$3.64$3.26$3.32$3.30Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.60$11.76$11.75$12.98$17.44$12.11$12.38$13.97$12.96$13.97$14.59Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.4%/yr+1.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share−0.4%/yr−18.0%/yr
EPS+3.2%/yr−5.9%/yr
Dividends / share+10.3%/yr+11.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.0%/yr+4.1%/yr
Book value / share−0.5%/yr−4.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Domestic+0.1%
    “Domestic segment revenue increased slightly in fiscal 2026, primarily driven by comparable sales growth in computing, gaming and mobile phones, mostly offset by comparable sales declines in home theater and appliances.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record
  • International+3.7%
    “International segment revenue increased in fiscal 2026, primarily driven by revenue from Best Buy Express locations excluded from comparable sales and comparable sales growth primarily driven by computing and mobile phones, partially offset by the negative impact of foreign exchange rates.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
212Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
44%low FY2018
Gross margin
22%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.3Bowner earningsvs.$1.1Bnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $1.1B of profit into $1.3B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.1B
Owner earnings$1.3B · 3% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$1.1B$927M$1.2B$1.4B$2.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$831M+$866M+$923M+$918M+$869M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$139M+$139M+$145M+$138M+$141M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$77M+$166M−$839M−$651M−$212M
Cash from operations$2.0B$2.1B$1.5B$1.8B$3.3B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$704M−$706M−$795M−$930M−$737M
Owner earnings$1.3B$1.4B$675M$894M$2.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%3%2%2%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $139M), owner earnings is nearer $1.1B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.4B ÷ interest expense $47M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $1.7B − debt $1.4B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $373M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 9 + DIO 59 − DPO 54 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    8-yr median, range 31%–68%; 41% latest = NOPAT $1.1B ÷ invested capital $2.6B
    Industry peers: median 29%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 41% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–9%; latest $1.3B = operating cash $2.0B − maintenance capex $704M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $139M of SBC) leaves $1.1B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.0B ÷ net income $1.1B

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $1.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.3B
    What this means

    Of $1.3B Owner Earnings, $1.1B (85%) went back to shareholders, $801M dividends, $273M buybacks. Net of $139M stock comp, the real buyback was about $134M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.85×
    Maintaining
    Capex $704M ÷ depreciation $831M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $41.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.11×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.4B vs $825M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −12%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.12/share (latest year $5.07), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.06/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 5% early to 3% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 3.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −4.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We operate in a highly and increasingly dynamic industry sector fueled by constant technological innovation, advancement and disruption, including the rapid integration of artificial intelligence ("AI") into consumer products.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$8.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.8B
  • Receivables$906M
  • Inventory$5.6B
  • Other current assets$427M
Current liabilities$7.8B
  • Debt due within a year$10M
  • Accounts payable$5.1B
  • Other current liabilities$2.7B
Current ratio1.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.40×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$943Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$10M due · $1.8B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 2, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$4.1B$3.0B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.4B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$475Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$755M
'27$729M
'28$584M
'29$460M
'30$313M
later$545M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$755Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$3.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$3.0Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.4B
Lease obligations (present value)$3.0B
Total fixed claims on the business$4.4B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.4B, of which the leases are 69%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $25.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$7.4B · 29%
  • Dividends$6.4B · 25%
  • Buybacks$11.2B · 44%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$246M · 1%
  • Returned to owners$17.5B

    99% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $6.4B as dividends and $11.2B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$79.25

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 132M shares were bought for $10.5B, about $79.25 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $57.09 (2018) to $108.76 (2022), and 2022, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($3.5B).

  • Net change in share count−34.5%

    The diluted count fell from 323M to 211M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$3.78/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.1B7% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity27%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $7.4B of capital spent building

$646M written down across 2 years (2025, 2026): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 46% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Ms. Barry$15.6M$8.7M$2.5B
2023Ms. Barry$12.8M$3.3M$894M
2024Ms. Barry$14.4M$9.2M$675M
2025Ms. Barry$16.2M$19.5M$1.4B
2026Ms. Barry$17.3M$2.7M$1.3B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership0.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$139M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Best Buy Co. Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.6% vs 4.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 4.1% early in the record and 2.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BBYBest Buy Co. Inc.$41.7B23%4.4%44%4%
WSMWilliams-Sonoma$7.8B46%14.7%88%12%
GMEGameStop Corp.$3.6B28%-2.7%-59%2%
RHRH$3.4B44%11.7%29%9%
ARHSArhaus Inc.$1.4B39%6.4%45%8%
HVTHaverty Furniture Companies Inc.$759M56%5.7%12%5%
Group median42%6.1%36%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Best Buy Co. Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Best Buy Co. Inc. earns about $1.5B on its 3.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.6B on 211M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-03; net cash $483M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Best Buy Co. Inc. (BBY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BBY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BBWI its page in the Manual BC →

Industry order: ← BBWI the Specialty Retail chapter BKE →