Share count
173Mpeak FY2018
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BDN, Brandywine Realty Trust
We are a self-administered and self-managed real estate investment trust engaged in the acquisition, development, redevelopment, ownership, management, and operation of a portfolio of office, life science/lab, residential and mixed-use properties.
During the twelve months ended December 31, 2025, we owned and managed properties within four segments: (1) Philadelphia Central Business District ("Philadelphia CBD"), (2) Pennsylvania Suburbs, (3) Austin, Texas, and (4) Other.
Copies are also available, free of charge, upon written request to Investor Relations, Brandywine Realty Trust, 2929 Arch Street, Suite 1800, Philadelphia, PA 19104.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$484M
−4.2% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $127M +4.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 1.2% yr-ago 12.5%
Net income ($49M) yr-ago ($27M)
Net margin −38.4% yr-ago −22.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share do not form a clean trend in the record. Debt is 73% of assets, heavy for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $525M | $520M | $544M | $580M | $535M | $487M | $506M | $515M | $506M | $484M | $490M | RevenueRevenue |
| $40M | $120M | $135M | $34M | $306M | $12M | $54M | ($197M) | ($196M) | ($178M) | ($200M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $104M | $268M | $305M | $242M | $204M | $187M | $206M | ($17M) | ($20M) | ($11M) | ($25M) | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| 112% | 43% | 42% | 55% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | Dividend payout (FFO)Payout |
| $3.6B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.0B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.8B | $3.8B | Real estate (gross)RE gross |
| $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $3.9B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $3.7B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| 49% | 48% | 50% | 53% | 47% | 41% | 42% | 57% | 63% | 71% | 73% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.8B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.0B | $793M | $734M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 176M | 177M | 180M | 177M | 172M | 172M | 172M | 172M | 173M | 173M | 174M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.59 | $1.51 | $1.70 | $1.37 | $1.18 | $1.09 | $1.20 | $-0.10 | $-0.12 | $-0.06 | $-0.14 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $0.66 | $0.66 | $0.72 | $0.76 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.77 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $10.60 | $10.35 | $10.01 | $9.50 | $10.41 | $9.81 | $9.43 | $7.66 | $6.02 | $4.57 | $4.23 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −0.7%/yr | −2.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +4.9%/yr (3-yr) | +4.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −8.9%/yr | −15.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$484Mlow FY2025
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations (FFO) ($11M)about $-0.06 per shareNet income ($178M) + depreciation $176M − gains on sale $9M
What this means
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- Not enough data
What this means
FFO or dividends missing.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 71%HeavyTotal debt $2.6B ÷ assets $3.6BIndustry peers: median 33%
What this means
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Thin(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $133MIndustry peers: median 4.4×
What this means
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Gerard H. Sweeney | $6.1M | $7.9M | $12M |
| 2022 | Gerard H. Sweeney | $6.4M | $818k | $54M |
| 2023 | Gerard H. Sweeney | $6.0M | $5.7M | ($197M) |
| 2024 | Gerard H. Sweeney | $4.9M | $8.4M | ($196M) |
| 2025 | Gerard H. Sweeney | $5.8M | $3.0M | ($178M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$18M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 66% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Office REITs
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SLGSL Green Realty | $1.0B | 37% | 3.4% | 69% | 27% |
| CUZCousins Properties | $994M | 52% | 5.7% | 45% | 31% |
| HIWHighwoods Properties | $806M | 55% | 8.1% | 47% | — |
| ESRTEmpire State Realty Trust Inc. | $768M | 30% | 5.1% | 17% | 20% |
| CDPCopt Defense Properties | $764M | 36% | 5.6% | 55% | 52% |
| JBGSJBG SMITH Properties | $499M | 20% | 2.0% | 81% | 35% |
| BDNBrandywine Realty Trust | $484M | 38% | 5.1% | 49% | 49% |
| DEAEasterly Government Properties Inc. | $336M | 43% | 4.1% | 86% | 42% |
| Group median | — | 38% | 5.1% | 52% | 35% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Brandywine Realty Trust (BDN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BDN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BDC its page in the Manual BDX →
Industry order: ← AVB the REITs — Specialty & Diversified chapter BFS →