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JBGS, JBG SMITH Properties
JBG SMITH, a Maryland real estate investment trust, owns, operates and develops mixed-use properties concentrated in amenity-rich, Metro-served submarkets in and around Washington, D.C., most notably National Landing, where through our focus on placemaking, we cultivate vibrant, highly amenitized, walkable neighborhoods.
Alternatively, during cycles marked by strong private-market demand, we have focused on monetizing multifamily assets — often at premiums to NAV — creating efficient sources of capital for opportunistic investments.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Occupancy, rents, and the cost of debt. Read on funds from operations and net asset value, because GAAP depreciation distorts the earnings, and a property downturn meets a balance sheet built on leverage. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Funds from operations per share have shrunk (−24% a year). The dividend takes 275% of FFO, more than it earns. Debt is 36% of assets, conservative for a REIT. The quality and location of the properties, the lease terms and occupancy, and the cost of the debt are what the 10-K settles, and no single ratio captures them.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $479M | $543M | $644M | $648M | $603M | $634M | $606M | $604M | $547M | $499M | $506M | RevenueRevenue |
| $62M | ($72M) | $40M | $66M | ($62M) | ($79M) | $85M | ($80M) | ($144M) | ($139M) | ($112M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $197M | $93M | $203M | $156M | $104M | $150M | $141M | $56M | $74M | $12M | $16M | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| 0% | 29% | 53% | 83% | 116% | 79% | 76% | 167% | 84% | 411% | 275% | Dividend payout (FFO)Payout |
| $4.2B | $6.0B | $5.8B | $5.8B | $6.0B | $6.2B | $6.2B | $5.9B | $5.5B | $5.2B | $5.1B | Real estate (gross)RE gross |
| $3.7B | $6.1B | $6.0B | $6.0B | $6.1B | $6.4B | $5.9B | $5.5B | $5.0B | $4.4B | $4.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| 32% | 34% | 36% | 24% | 33% | 34% | 41% | 45% | 49% | 52% | 36% | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $1.2B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $1.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.1B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.3B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $1.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.2× | -0.9× | 0.4× | 0.4× | -0.6× | -0.2× | 0.2× | 0.4× | 0.0× | -0.1× | 0.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $2.1B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $3.2B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.2B | $1.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 101M | 105M | 119M | 131M | 133M | 131M | 119M | 105M | 88.3M | 67.4M | 59.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.96 | $0.88 | $1.71 | $1.20 | $0.78 | $1.15 | $1.19 | $0.54 | $0.84 | $0.17 | $0.27 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.25 | $0.90 | $0.99 | $0.90 | $0.90 | $0.90 | $0.89 | $0.70 | $0.72 | $0.75 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $21.10 | $28.20 | $25.07 | $25.91 | $24.02 | $22.29 | $22.54 | $21.15 | $20.48 | $17.18 | $19.30 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.0%/yr | +10.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | — | −4.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | −2.3%/yr | −6.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- about $0.17 per shareNet income ($139M) + depreciation $197M − gains on sale $47M
What this means
GAAP net income with property depreciation added back, because the buildings a REIT charges against earnings usually hold or grow their value. This, not net income, is what a REIT is actually priced on. It is an approximation here: where a filing reports gains on property sales, we remove them, the way the NAREIT definition does.
- Not covered by FFODividends $48M ÷ FFO $12MIndustry peers: median 49%
What this means
A REIT must distribute most of its taxable income, so a high payout is normal and the question is whether FFO covers it. Above 100%, the trust is funding the dividend with debt or asset sales, and a cut usually follows.
Is it sound?
- Debt / assets 52%ElevatedTotal debt $2.3B ÷ assets $4.4BIndustry peers: median 37%
What this means
Every REIT runs on leverage; how much is the question. Heavy debt is what turns a property downturn into a wipeout, as 2008 showed, so a conservative balance sheet is part of the moat here, not a drag on it.
- Thin(operating income + depreciation) ÷ interest $142MIndustry peers: median 4.4×
What this means
How many times the property cash earnings cover the interest bill. Comfortable coverage is what lets a REIT refinance through a tight credit market instead of being forced to sell into one.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | W. Matthew Kelly | $16.1M | $7.4M | ($79M) |
| 2022 | W. Matthew Kelly | $7.9M | −$1.0M | $85M |
| 2023 | W. Matthew Kelly | $7.9M | $5.1M | ($80M) |
| 2024 | W. Matthew Kelly | $9.2M | $6.0M | ($144M) |
| 2025 | W. Matthew Kelly | $5.5M | $7.6M | ($139M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership11.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$25M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Office REITs
The same industry, side by side on the REIT lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | FFO margin | FFO / assets | Payout (FFO) | Debt / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SLGSL Green Realty | $1.0B | 37% | 3.4% | 69% | 27% |
| CUZCousins Properties | $994M | 52% | 5.7% | 45% | 31% |
| HIWHighwoods Properties | $806M | 55% | 8.1% | 47% | — |
| ESRTEmpire State Realty Trust Inc. | $768M | 30% | 5.1% | 17% | 20% |
| CDPCopt Defense Properties | $764M | 36% | 5.6% | 55% | 52% |
| JBGSJBG SMITH Properties | $499M | 20% | 2.0% | 81% | 35% |
| BDNBrandywine Realty Trust | $484M | 38% | 5.1% | 49% | 49% |
| DEAEasterly Government Properties Inc. | $336M | 43% | 4.1% | 86% | 42% |
| Group median | — | 38% | 5.1% | 52% | 35% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / FFOA REIT is priced on a multiple of its funds from operations (FFO), the cash it earns once the depreciation on its buildings is added back. Type today’s price; we show the multiple you would pay and the income and growth it implies.
FFO / share, delivered−23%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is 1 ÷ (required return − growth), a perpetuity on FFO. At an 8% required return and 3% growth, a REIT is worth about 20× FFO.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
FFO about $0.27 per share on 59M shares. The dials set the multiple they justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. FFO here adds back depreciation and removes property-sale gains, the NAREIT method; it does not net out maintenance capex (AFFO), occupancy or lease terms, which the 10-K does.
Manual order: ← JAZZ its page in the Manual JBHT →
Industry order: ← IVT the REITs — Specialty & Diversified chapter KIM →