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BERY, Berry Global

Containers & Packaging consumer brand Serial acquirer

A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and the pricing power it commands.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K

BERY · Berry Global

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024

$12.3B

−3.2% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $12.3B 5-yr avg $13.0B

Gross margin 19% 5-yr avg 18%

Operating margin 9.2% 5-yr avg 8.8%

ROIC 9% 5-yr avg 8%

Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 7%

Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 40% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 9 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 18% and operating margin about 9.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. That margin has held in a narrow 7.6%–11% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Inventory runs near 12% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	TTMTTMMar 2025
										Income statement
$6.5B	$7.1B	$7.9B	$8.9B	$11.7B	$13.8B	$14.5B	$12.7B	$12.3B	$12.3B	RevenueRevenue
20%	20%	18%	18%	21%	18%	16%	18%	18%	19%	Gross marginGross mgn
8%	7%	6%	7%	7%	6%	6%	7%	7%	7%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$581M	$732M	$761M	$974M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$937M	$1.1B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.0%	10.3%	9.7%	11.0%	10.1%	9.3%	8.6%	8.5%	7.6%	9.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$236M	$340M	$496M	$404M	$559M	$733M	$766M	$609M	$516M	$548M	Net incomeNet inc.
23%	24%	-4%	18%	22%	19%	18%	18%	16%	26%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$857M	$975M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$525M	$521M	$538M	$613M	$845M	$854M	$819M	$818M	$857M	$856M	DepreciationDeprec.
$76M	$94M	($53M)	$157M	$93M	($47M)	($61M)	$146M	($14M)	($370M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$288M	$269M	$333M	$399M	$583M	$676M	$687M	$689M	$551M	$516M	CapexCapex
4.4%	3.8%	4.2%	4.5%	5.0%	4.9%	4.7%	5.4%	4.5%	4.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$569M	$706M	$671M	$802M	$947M	$904M	$876M	$926M	$854M	$568M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.8%	10.0%	8.5%	9.0%	8.1%	6.5%	6.0%	7.3%	7.0%	4.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$569M	$706M	$671M	$802M	$947M	$904M	$876M	$926M	$854M	$568M	Free cash flowFCF
8.8%	10.0%	8.5%	9.0%	8.1%	6.5%	6.0%	7.3%	7.0%	4.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.3B	$515M	$702M	$6.1B	—	$0	$0	$87M	$68M	$116M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$127M	$139M	$149M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$0	$33M	$74M	$0	$0	$709M	$601M	$120M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
8%	9%	11%	7%	8%	9%	9%	8%	7%	9%	ROICROIC
107%	33%	35%	25%	27%	23%	24%	19%	14%	22%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	—	—	23%	24%	15%	10%	16%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$323M	$306M	$381M	$750M	$750M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$483M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$704M	$847M	$941M	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.3B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$660M	$762M	$887M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$870M	InventoryInvent.
$539M	$638M	$783M	$1.2B	$1.1B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.1B	Accounts payablePayables
$825M	$971M	$1.0B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.1B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$3.8B	$3.8B	$5.1B	$5.2B	$4.5B	$4.6B	$3.3B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$3.2B	$2.8B	$2.7B	$3.7B	$3.6B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.8×	1.8×	1.8×	1.7×	1.6×	1.8×	1.7×	1.2×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.4B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$5.1B	$5.2B	$5.2B	$4.8B	$5.0B	$5.1B	$5.1B	GoodwillGoodwill
$7.7B	$8.5B	$9.1B	$16.5B	$16.7B	$17.9B	$17.0B	$16.6B	$16.6B	$12.9B	Total assetsAssets
$5.8B	$5.6B	$5.8B	$11.4B	$10.2B	$9.5B	$9.3B	$9.0B	$8.3B	$7.0B	Total debtDebt
$5.4B	$5.3B	$5.5B	$10.6B	$9.5B	$8.4B	$7.8B	$7.8B	$7.2B	$6.5B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$221M	$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$2.1B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$2.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
125M	133M	135M	135M	135M	138M	133M	123M	118M	119M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$51.91	$53.51	$58.20	$65.96	$86.67	$100.14	$109.15	$102.96	$104.15	$103.63	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.89	$2.56	$3.67	$3.00	$4.14	$5.30	$5.77	$4.95	$4.38	$4.61	EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.55	$5.32	$4.96	$5.96	$7.01	$6.54	$6.60	$7.53	$7.26	$4.78	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.55	$5.32	$4.96	$5.96	$7.01	$6.54	$6.60	$7.53	$7.26	$4.78	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$1.03	$1.18	$1.25	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.30	$2.03	$2.46	$2.96	$4.32	$4.89	$5.17	$5.60	$4.68	$4.34	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.77	$7.65	$10.61	$12.02	$15.48	$22.99	$24.07	$26.15	$30.65	$20.84	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.1%/yr	+9.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+6.0%/yr	+4.0%/yr
EPS	+11.1%/yr	+7.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+9.3%/yr	+9.6%/yr
Book value / share	+42.8%/yr	+20.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

118Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

7%low FY2019

Gross margin

18%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

8.5×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$854Mowner earningsvs.$516Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2024cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned $516M of profit into $854M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$516M

Owner earnings$854M · 7% of revenue

	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020
Reported net income	$516M	$609M	$766M	$733M	$559M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$857M	+$818M	+$819M	+$854M	+$845M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$46M	+$42M	+$39M	+$40M	+$33M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$14M	+$146M	−$61M	−$47M	+$93M
Cash from operations	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.5B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$551M	−$689M	−$687M	−$676M	−$583M
Owner earnings	$854M	$926M	$876M	$904M	$947M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	7%	7%	6%	7%	8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $46M), owner earnings is nearer $808M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 4.2×

Adequate

Operating income $937M ÷ interest expense $221M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $7.2B · 7.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $1.1B − debt $8.3B

What this means
Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $8.3B of debt leaves $7.2B owed, about 7.7× a year's operating profit (8.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 43d

Tight

DSO 48 + DIO 60 − DPO 64 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median, range 7%–11%; 7% latest = NOPAT $791M ÷ invested capital $10.8B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range 6%–10%; latest $854M = operating cash $1.4B − maintenance capex $551M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $46M of SBC) leaves $808M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.72×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.4B ÷ net income $516M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 30%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $259M ÷ Owner Earnings $854M

What this means
Of $854M Owner Earnings, $259M (30%) went back to shareholders, $139M dividends, $120M buybacks. Net of $46M stock comp, the real buyback was about $74M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.64×

Harvesting

Capex $551M ÷ depreciation $857M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.25×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $8.3B vs $902M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 9 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +76%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.40/share (latest year $4.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 9

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 10% early, 8% lately, median 9%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +4%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
Worst year 2024 · 7.6% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −0.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.3B

Cash & short-term investments$483M
Receivables$1.3B
Inventory$870M
Other current assets$676M

Current liabilities$3.6B

Debt due within a year$43M
Accounts payable$1.1B
Other current liabilities$2.5B

Current ratio0.91×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.67×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.13×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($311M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$43M due · $483M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 29, 2025 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($4.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($7.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$6.3B$582M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$106Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2024

Over the record, the business generated $11.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$4.5B · 38%
Dividends$266M · 2%
Buybacks$1.5B · 13%
Retained (debt / cash)$5.5B · 46%

Returned to owners$1.8B
25% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $266M as dividends and $1.5B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$58.59
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 26M shares were bought for $1.5B, about $58.59 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $45.14 (2018) to $61.33 (2023); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $58.11 ($709M).
Net change in share count−5.0%
The diluted count fell from 125M to 119M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.18/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained8%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $237M, so each retained $1 added about 0.08 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$6.6B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$9.7Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $4.5B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Kevin Kwilinski	$11.5M	$19.1M	$904M
2022	Kevin Kwilinski	$10.4M	$2.9M	$876M
2023	Kevin Kwilinski	$11.7M	$23.7M	$926M
2024	Kevin Kwilinski	$20.0M	$20.8M	$854M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$46M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Berry Global is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2024.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.8% vs 9.1%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 9.1% early in the record and 6.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 9 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 9 years, $41M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Containers & Packaging

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GTThe Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company	$18.3B	20%	3.8%	4%	1%
BERYBerry Global	$12.3B	18%	9.3%	8%	8%
NWLNewell Brands	$7.2B	33%	0.7%	1%	5%
ATRAptarGroup Inc.	$3.8B	—	12.3%	10%	8%
ENTGEntegris Inc.	$3.2B	45%	15.8%	11%	14%
WMSAdvanced Drainage Systems	$3.1B	24%	16.1%	16%	13%
AWIArmstrong World Industries Inc	$1.6B	37%	25.7%	23%	11%
AZEKThe Azek Company Inc.	$1.4B	32%	8.7%	5%	4%
Group median	—	32%	10.8%	9%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Berry Global has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Berry Global earns about $991M on its 8.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($991M) Net of stock comp (−$50M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24−1%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’24+4%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $568M on 117M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2025-04-30; net debt $6.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BERY against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Berry Global (BERY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BERY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BEN its page in the Manual BETA →

Industry order: ← BALL the Containers & Packaging chapter CCK →