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CCK, Crown Holdings Inc.

Containers & Packaging capital-intensive

Crown Holdings Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation.

The Company's transit packaging products include automation and equipment technologies, protective packaging solutions, and steel and plastic consumables which are sold into the metals, food and beverage, construction, agricultural, corrugated, and general industries.

At December 31, 2025, the Comp any operated 179 plants along with sales and service facilities throughout 39 countries an d had approximately 23,000 employees.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CCK · Crown Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$12.4B

+4.8% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $12.7B 5-yr avg $12.1B

Operating margin 12.2% 5-yr avg 11.5%

ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 12%

Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Metal beverage cans and ends (69%) and Transit Packaging (16%), with 3 more lines behind.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. That margin has held in a narrow 10%–13% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Metal beverage cans and ends is 69% of revenue, with Transit Packaging the other meaningful line at 16%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Metal beverage cans and ends69%$8.5B
Transit Packaging16%$2.0B
Metal food cans and ends8%$943M
Other metal packaging4%$433M
Other products3%$428M

By geographyUnited States39%Other28%Brazil9%Mexico8%Canada6%Spain3%Other6%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$8.3B	$8.7B	$11.2B	$9.6B	$9.4B	$11.4B	$12.9B	$12.0B	$11.8B	$12.4B	$12.7B	RevenueRevenue
4%	4%	5%	6%	6%	5%	4%	5%	5%	5%	5%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$997M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
12.0%	11.8%	9.8%	10.7%	11.2%	12.0%	10.3%	10.6%	12.0%	12.6%	12.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$496M	$323M	$439M	$510M	$579M	($560M)	$727M	$450M	$424M	$738M	$720M	Net incomeNet inc.
27%	55%	33%	21%	26%	—	25%	33%	30%	28%	30%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($134M)	($251M)	$571M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$905M	$803M	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$247M	$247M	$425M	$431M	$422M	$447M	$460M	$499M	$448M	$456M	$464M	DepreciationDeprec.
($897M)	($844M)	($320M)	$193M	$282M	$985M	($413M)	$473M	$278M	$288M	$231M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$473M	$498M	$462M	$391M	$554M	$816M	$839M	$793M	$403M	$413M	$467M	CapexCapex
5.7%	5.7%	4.1%	4.1%	5.9%	7.2%	6.5%	6.6%	3.4%	3.3%	3.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($381M)	($498M)	$109M	$772M	$893M	$458M	$343M	$954M	$789M	$1.1B	$995M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−4.6%	−5.7%	1.0%	8.1%	9.5%	4.0%	2.7%	7.9%	6.7%	9.0%	7.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($607M)	($749M)	$109M	$772M	$761M	$89M	($36M)	$660M	$789M	$1.1B	$995M	Free cash flowFCF
−7.3%	−8.6%	1.0%	8.1%	8.1%	0.8%	−0.3%	5.5%	6.7%	9.0%	7.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$3.9B	$11M	$0	$0	$31M	$126M	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	$0	$0	$105M	$106M	$115M	$119M	$120M	$129M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$8M	$339M	$4M	$7M	$66M	$950M	$722M	$12M	$217M	$505M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
15%	9%	8%	9%	9%	—	12%	10%	—	14%	13%	ROICROIC
136%	54%	47%	30%	26%	-29%	39%	19%	15%	25%	25%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	30%	26%	−35%	34%	14%	11%	21%	20%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$559M	$424M	$607M	$607M	$1.2B	$531M	$550M	$1.3B	$918M	$764M	$584M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$865M	$1.0B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.1B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.7B	InventoryInvent.
$2.0B	$2.4B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$2.1B	$2.9B	$2.8B	$2.5B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.6B	Accounts payablePayables
$159M	$59M	$560M	$508M	$644M	$723M	$351M	$247M	$45M	($43M)	$163M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2.8B	$3.1B	$4.1B	$4.0B	$4.9B	$4.5B	$4.7B	$4.8B	$4.2B	$4.4B	$4.5B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.9B	$3.3B	$3.9B	$3.9B	$4.3B	$4.1B	$3.9B	$4.2B	$3.5B	$4.3B	$4.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	0.9×	1.0×	1.0×	1.1×	1.1×	1.2×	1.2×	1.2×	1.0×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.8B	$3.0B	$4.4B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$3.1B	GoodwillGoodwill
$9.6B	$10.7B	$15.3B	$12.7B	$16.7B	$13.9B	$14.3B	$15.0B	$13.8B	$14.3B	$14.3B	Total assetsAssets
$4.9B	$5.3B	$8.6B	$7.9B	$8.1B	$6.2B	$6.9B	$7.5B	$6.1B	$5.9B	$6.2B	Total debtDebt
$4.3B	$4.9B	$8.0B	$7.3B	$6.9B	$5.7B	$6.4B	$6.1B	$5.2B	$5.1B	$5.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
4.1×	4.1×	2.9×	2.8×	3.6×	5.4×	4.7×	2.9×	3.1×	3.9×	3.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$366M	$601M	$937M	$1.7B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$2.4B	$2.8B	$3.0B	$2.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
139M	136M	134M	135M	135M	130M	121M	120M	119M	116M	113M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$59.46	$64.14	$83.29	$70.87	$69.80	$87.39	$106.63	$100.36	$98.81	$106.83	$113.22	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.56	$2.38	$3.28	$3.78	$4.30	$-4.30	$5.99	$3.76	$3.55	$6.38	$6.40	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.73	$-3.67	$0.81	$5.72	$6.64	$3.51	$2.83	$7.97	$6.61	$9.65	$8.84	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-4.36	$-5.52	$0.81	$5.72	$5.66	$0.68	$-0.30	$5.52	$6.61	$9.65	$8.84	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$0.81	$0.87	$0.96	$1.00	$1.04	$1.15	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.40	$3.67	$3.45	$2.90	$4.12	$6.26	$6.91	$6.63	$3.37	$3.57	$4.15	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.63	$4.43	$7.00	$12.70	$16.33	$14.66	$15.23	$20.14	$23.08	$25.91	$25.93	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.7%/yr	+8.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+7.8%/yr
EPS	+6.7%/yr	+8.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	+0.6%/yr	−2.8%/yr
Book value / share	+29.0%/yr	+9.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+4.8%
“Net sales and segment income in Other were as follows: 2025 2024 Net sales $ 1,303 $ 1,222 Segment income 148 82 Year ended December 31, 2025 compared to 2024 Net sales increased primarily due to 5% higher North America food can volumes and $63 from the pass-through of higher tinplate costs.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

116Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

14%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.6×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.1Bowner earningsvs.$738Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $738M of profit into $1.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$738M

Owner earnings$1.1B · 9% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$738M	$424M	$450M	$727M	($560M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$456M	+$448M	+$499M	+$460M	+$447M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$48M	+$42M	+$31M	+$29M	+$33M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$288M	+$278M	+$473M	−$413M	+$985M
Cash from operations	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$803M	$905M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$413M	−$403M	−$499M	−$460M	−$447M
Owner earnings	$1.1B	$789M	$954M	$343M	$458M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	−$294M	−$379M	−$369M
Free cash flow	$1.1B	$789M	$660M	($36M)	$89M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	9%	7%	8%	3%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $48M), owner earnings is nearer $1.1B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.9×

Adequate

Operating income $1.6B ÷ interest expense $398M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.1B · 3.3× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $764M − debt $5.9B

What this means
Netting $764M of cash and short-term investments against $5.9B of debt leaves $5.1B owed, about 3.3× a year's operating profit (3.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 9%

Solid through the cycle

8-yr median, range 8%–15%; 14% latest = NOPAT $1.1B ÷ invested capital $8.1B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 9%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.5B − maintenance capex $413M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $48M of SBC) leaves $1.1B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.07×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.5B ÷ net income $738M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 56%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $625M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B

What this means
Of $1.1B Owner Earnings, $625M (56%) went back to shareholders, $120M dividends, $505M buybacks. Net of $48M stock comp, the real buyback was about $457M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.91×

Maintaining

Capex $413M ÷ depreciation $456M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.03×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $5.9B vs $122M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +28%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.81/share (latest year $6.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $26.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 11% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 11% early, 12% lately, median 11%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2018 · 9.8% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −2.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.5B

Cash & short-term investments$584M
Receivables$1.1B
Inventory$1.7B
Other current assets$1.2B

Current liabilities$4.1B

Debt due within a year$507M
Accounts payable$2.6B
Other current liabilities$915M

Current ratio1.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.70×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$476Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$507M due · $584M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($1.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$6.4B$209M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $8.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$5.6B · 66%
Dividends$565M · 7%
Buybacks$2.8B · 33%

Returned to owners$3.4B
75% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $565M as dividends and $2.8B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$490M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $490M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $4.9B to $6.2B.
Average price paid for buybacks$90.01
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 31M shares were bought for $2.8B, about $90.01 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $43.40 (2018) to $109.82 (2022); its heaviest year, 2021, paid $104.15 ($950M).
Net change in share count−19.2%
The diluted count fell from 139M to 113M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.04/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained166%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($731M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $1.2B, so each retained $1 added about 1.66 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$4.1B29% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$4.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $5.6B of capital spent building

$25M written down across 1 year (2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership0.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio330:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$48M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Crown Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$4.9B → $6.2B
Debt rose from $4.9B to $6.2B while owner earnings went from about ($257M) to $953M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$6.1B · 48% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“The Company's top ten global customers represented in the aggregate approximately 48% of its 2025 consolidated net sales.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Containers & Packaging

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PHParker-Hannifin Corporation	$19.9B	29%	16.4%	13%	14%
SWKStanley Black & Decker Inc.	$15.1B	33%	13.5%	2%	5%
BALLBall Corp.	$13.2B	46%	8.8%	9%	6%
CCKCrown Holdings Inc.	$12.4B	—	11.5%	10%	5%
MASMasco	$7.6B	35%	16.6%	47%	11%
SLGNSilgan Holdings	$6.5B	16%	9.3%	9%	7%
SNASnap-on	$4.7B	53%	25.8%	17%	17%
GEFGreif	$4.4B	20%	8.7%	8%	6%
Group median	—	—	12.5%	10%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Crown Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Crown Holdings Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Crown Holdings Inc. earns about $662M on its 5.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($662M) Net of stock comp (−$47M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($1.0B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+24%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+30%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $995M on 112M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $5.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($467M) runs well above depreciation ($464M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CCK against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Crown Holdings Inc. (CCK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CCK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CCI its page in the Manual CCL →

Industry order: ← BERY the Containers & Packaging chapter DSWL →