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BALL, Ball Corp.
Ball Corporation and its consolidated subsidiaries is one of the world's leading suppliers of aluminum packaging for the beverage, personal care and household products industries.
Our sustainable, aluminum packaging products are produced for a variety of end uses and are manufactured in facilities around the world.
Our largest product line is aluminum beverage containers and we also produce extruded aluminum aerosol containers, recloseable aluminum bottles across multiple consumer categories and aluminum slugs.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 8.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from 5.1% to 38% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →53% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States47%$6.2B
- Other42%$5.5B
- Brazil11%$1.5B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $9.1B | $11.0B | $11.6B | $11.5B | $11.8B | $13.8B | $13.4B | $12.1B | $11.8B | $13.2B | $13.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 6% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 4% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | — | — | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $463M | $802M | $935M | $932M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $4.4B | $1.5B | $1.2B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.1% | 7.3% | 8.0% | 8.1% | 8.5% | 9.3% | 9.1% | 10.6% | 37.6% | 11.3% | 8.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $263M | $374M | $454M | $566M | $585M | $878M | $719M | $707M | $4.0B | $912M | $938M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 31% | 29% | 11% | 14% | 15% | 16% | 17% | 3% | 21% | 21% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $193M | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $301M | $1.9B | $115M | $1.3B | $1.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $453M | $729M | $702M | $678M | $668M | $700M | $594M | $605M | $611M | $622M | $631M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($523M) | $375M | $410M | $304M | $179M | $182M | ($1.0B) | $551M | ($4.5B) | ($272M) | ($419M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $606M | $556M | $816M | $598M | $1.1B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.0B | $484M | $474M | $554M | CapexCapex |
| 6.7% | 5.1% | 7.0% | 5.2% | 9.4% | 12.5% | 12.3% | 8.7% | 4.1% | 3.6% | 4.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($260M) | $922M | $750M | $950M | $764M | $1.1B | ($293M) | $1.3B | ($369M) | $788M | $596M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −2.9% | 8.4% | 6.4% | 8.3% | 6.5% | 7.7% | −2.2% | 10.4% | −3.1% | 6.0% | 4.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($413M) | $922M | $750M | $950M | $319M | $34M | ($1.4B) | $818M | ($369M) | $788M | $596M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −4.6% | 8.4% | 6.4% | 8.3% | 2.7% | 0.2% | −10.1% | 6.8% | −3.1% | 6.0% | 4.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $3.4B | — | — | — | $69M | — | — | — | $74M | $159M | $75M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $83M | $129M | $137M | $182M | $198M | $229M | $254M | $252M | $244M | $220M | $217M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $107M | $103M | $739M | $964M | $57M | $766M | $618M | $3M | $1.7B | $1.3B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 5% | 5% | 7% | 9% | 9% | 10% | 9% | 9% | 41% | 10% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| 8% | 9% | 13% | 19% | 18% | 24% | 21% | 19% | 68% | 17% | 17% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | 6% | 9% | 13% | 12% | 18% | 13% | 12% | 64% | 13% | 13% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $597M | $448M | $721M | $1.8B | $1.4B | $563M | $548M | $695M | $885M | $1.2B | $730M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.4B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| $2.0B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.4B | $4.8B | $4.4B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $4.5B | $3.8B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $538M | $107M | ($544M) | ($676M) | ($733M) | ($942M) | ($97M) | ($460M) | ($205M) | ($382M) | $836M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $4.9B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $4.9B | $4.8B | $6.1B | $6.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $3.0B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $5.6B | $4.4B | $6.0B | $7.0B | $6.2B | $4.8B | $5.5B | $5.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 1.1× | 0.9× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $5.1B | $4.9B | $4.5B | $4.4B | $4.5B | $4.4B | $4.2B | $4.3B | $4.2B | $4.4B | $4.4B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $16.2B | $17.2B | $16.6B | $17.4B | $18.3B | $19.7B | $19.9B | $19.3B | $17.6B | $19.5B | $19.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $7.4B | $6.6B | $6.5B | $7.8B | $7.8B | $7.7B | $8.5B | $8.4B | $5.5B | $7.0B | $8.3B | Total debtDebt |
| $6.8B | $6.2B | $5.8B | $6.0B | $6.4B | $7.2B | $8.0B | $7.7B | $4.6B | $5.8B | $7.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.4× | 2.8× | 3.1× | 2.9× | 3.2× | 4.6× | 3.7× | 2.8× | 15.0× | 4.5× | 3.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.4B | $3.9B | $3.5B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $5.9B | $5.4B | $5.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 323M | 357M | 352M | 340M | 333M | 332M | 320M | 317M | 308M | 276M | 267M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $28.06 | $30.77 | $33.02 | $33.74 | $35.40 | $41.65 | $41.79 | $38.05 | $38.27 | $47.69 | $51.11 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.81 | $1.05 | $1.29 | $1.66 | $1.76 | $2.65 | $2.25 | $2.23 | $13.00 | $3.30 | $3.51 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.81 | $2.58 | $2.13 | $2.79 | $2.30 | $3.20 | $-0.92 | $3.97 | $-1.20 | $2.86 | $2.23 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.28 | $2.58 | $2.13 | $2.79 | $0.96 | $0.10 | $-4.22 | $2.58 | $-1.20 | $2.86 | $2.23 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.26 | $0.36 | $0.39 | $0.54 | $0.59 | $0.69 | $0.79 | $0.79 | $0.79 | $0.80 | $0.81 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.88 | $1.56 | $2.32 | $1.76 | $3.34 | $5.20 | $5.16 | $3.30 | $1.57 | $1.72 | $2.07 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $10.64 | $11.04 | $9.81 | $8.67 | $9.84 | $10.94 | $10.82 | $11.89 | $19.02 | $19.64 | $20.94 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.1%/yr | +6.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +4.5%/yr |
| EPS | +16.8%/yr | +13.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +13.4%/yr | +6.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −1.0%/yr | −12.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.1%/yr | +14.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $912M of profit but $788M of owner earnings: $124M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $912M | $4.0B | $707M | $719M | $878M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$622M | +$611M | +$605M | +$594M | +$700M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$272M | −$4.5B | +$551M | −$1.0B | +$182M |
| Cash from operations | $1.3B | $115M | $1.9B | $301M | $1.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$474M | −$484M | −$605M | −$594M | −$700M |
| Owner earnings | $788M | ($369M) | $1.3B | ($293M) | $1.1B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$440M | −$1.1B | −$1.0B |
| Free cash flow | $788M | ($369M) | $818M | ($1.4B) | $34M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | -3% | 10% | -2% | 8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $1.3B ÷ interest expense $333M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.8B · 4.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $1.2B − debt $7.0B
What this means
Netting $1.2B of cash and short-term investments against $7.0B of debt leaves $5.8B owed, about 4.5× a year's operating profit (5.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 57 + DIO 104 − DPO 229 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 5%–41%; 9% latest = NOPAT $1.0B ÷ invested capital $11.2BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -3%–10%; latest $788M = operating cash $1.3B − maintenance capex $474MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $912M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $1.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $788M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $788M of Owner Earnings, $1.5B (196%) went back to shareholders, $220M dividends, $1.3B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.76×HarvestingCapex $474M ÷ depreciation $622M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $13.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.11×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $7.0B vs $626M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +416%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.04/share (latest year $3.43), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.36/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 20% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 20% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 5.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$730M
- Receivables$2.4B
- Inventory$2.2B
- Other current assets$841M
- Debt due within a year$647M
- Accounts payable$3.8B
- Other current liabilities$1.1B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.5B against the $4M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 380 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $11.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$9.1B · 79%
- Dividends$1.9B · 17%
- Buybacks$6.4B · 55%
- Returned to owners$8.3B
149% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.9B as dividends and $6.4B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$5.9B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $5.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $7.4B to $8.3B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $6.4B over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
- Net change in share count−17.2%
The diluted count fell from 323M to 267M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.80/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained8%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $88M, so each retained $1 added about 0.08 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$62M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $13.9M | $17.3M | $1.1B |
| 2022 | $9.4M | −$13.8M | ($293M) |
| 2022 | $6.8M | −$1.2M | ($293M) |
| 2023 | $9.3M | $12.8M | $1.3B |
| 2024 | $12.3M | $18.3M | ($369M) |
| 2025 | $13.5M | $4.5M | $788M |
| 2025 | $4.2M | $4.8M | $788M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Ball Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Containers & Packaging
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PHParker-Hannifin Corporation | $19.9B | 29% | 16.4% | 13% | 14% |
| SWKStanley Black & Decker Inc. | $15.1B | 33% | 13.5% | 2% | 5% |
| BALLBall Corp. | $13.2B | 46% | 8.8% | 9% | 6% |
| CCKCrown Holdings Inc. | $12.4B | — | 11.5% | 10% | 5% |
| MASMasco | $7.6B | 35% | 16.6% | 47% | 11% |
| SLGNSilgan Holdings | $6.5B | 16% | 9.3% | 9% | 7% |
| SNASnap-on | $4.7B | 53% | 25.8% | 17% | 17% |
| GEFGreif | $4.4B | 20% | 8.7% | 8% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 33% | 12.5% | 10% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ball Corp. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Ball Corp. earns about $851M on its 6.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $596M on 266M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $7.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($554M) runs well above depreciation ($631M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $676M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← BAH its page in the Manual BALY →
Industry order: ← AZEK the Containers & Packaging chapter BERY →