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GT, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company

Auto Components consumer brand Cyclical

We are one of the world's largest operators of commercial truck service and tire retreading centers.

We manufacture our products in 49 manufacturing facilities in 19 countries, including the United States, and we have marketing operations in almost every country around the world.

S BUSINESS Goodyear's strategic vision is to be #1 in tires and service.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GT · The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$18.3B

−3.2% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $17.9B 5-yr avg $19.1B

Gross margin 19% 5-yr avg 19%

Operating margin 11.1% 5-yr avg 2.7%

Owner-earnings margin −1% 5-yr avg −1%

Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Americas (59%), Europe, Middle East and Africa (30%) and Asia Pacific (11%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 20% and operating margin about 3.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −6.7% to 10% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Americas at 59%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Americas59%$10.8B
Europe, Middle East and Africa30%$5.5B
Asia Pacific11%$2.0B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$15.2B	$15.4B	$15.5B	$14.7B	$12.3B	$17.5B	$20.8B	$20.1B	$18.9B	$18.3B	$17.9B	RevenueRevenue
28%	24%	23%	21%	16%	22%	19%	17%	20%	18%	19%	Gross marginGross mgn
16%	15%	15%	16%	18%	15%	13%	14%	15%	15%	15%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$1.6B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$503M	($820M)	$884M	$843M	($187M)	$663M	$291M	$2.0B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
10.3%	7.8%	8.5%	3.4%	−6.7%	5.1%	4.1%	−0.9%	3.5%	1.6%	11.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.3B	$346M	$693M	($311M)	($1.3B)	$764M	$202M	($729M)	$46M	($1.7B)	($2.1B)	Net incomeNet inc.
-6%	60%	30%	—	—	—	48%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.6B	$1.2B	$916M	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$521M	$1.0B	$698M	$796M	$616M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$727M	$781M	$778M	$795M	$859M	$883M	$964M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	DepreciationDeprec.
($434M)	$31M	($555M)	$723M	$1.5B	($585M)	($645M)	$760M	($397M)	$1.5B	$1.7B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$996M	$881M	$811M	$770M	$647M	$981M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$826M	$742M	CapexCapex
6.6%	5.7%	5.2%	5.2%	5.3%	5.6%	5.1%	5.2%	6.3%	4.5%	4.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$830M	$277M	$105M	$437M	$468M	$81M	($540M)	($18M)	($490M)	($30M)	($126M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.5%	1.8%	0.7%	3.0%	3.8%	0.5%	−2.6%	−0.1%	−2.6%	−0.2%	−0.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$561M	$277M	$105M	$437M	$468M	$81M	($540M)	($18M)	($490M)	($30M)	($126M)	Free cash flowFCF
3.7%	1.8%	0.7%	3.0%	3.8%	0.5%	−2.6%	−0.1%	−2.6%	−0.2%	−0.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$0	$0	$1.9B	$0	$0	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$82M	$110M	$138M	$148M	$37M	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$500M	$400M	$220M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
17%	6%	9%	3%	-9%	8%	4%	-1%	3%	—	—	ROICROIC
28%	8%	14%	-7%	-41%	15%	4%	-16%	1%	-53%	-69%	Return on equityROE
26%	5%	11%	−11%	−42%	15%	4%	−16%	1%	−53%	−69%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$1.1B	$1.0B	$801M	$908M	$1.5B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$902M	$810M	$801M	$723M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.7B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$2.6B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2.6B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.2B	$3.6B	$4.6B	$3.7B	$3.6B	$3.6B	$3.9B	InventoryInvent.
$2.6B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$4.1B	$4.8B	$4.3B	$4.1B	$3.9B	$3.8B	Accounts payablePayables
$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$899M	$1.8B	$2.4B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.7B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$5.7B	$6.1B	$5.9B	$5.9B	$5.6B	$7.3B	$8.7B	$7.7B	$7.6B	$7.2B	$7.6B	Current assetsCur. assets
$4.8B	$5.0B	$4.8B	$5.3B	$5.1B	$6.6B	$7.1B	$7.1B	$7.4B	$6.8B	$7.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×	1.2×	1.2×	1.1×	1.1×	1.1×	1.2×	1.1×	1.0×	1.1×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$535M	$595M	$569M	$565M	$408M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$781M	$756M	$42M	$43M	GoodwillGoodwill
$16.5B	$17.1B	$16.9B	$17.2B	$16.5B	$21.4B	$22.4B	$21.6B	$20.9B	$18.2B	$18.5B	Total assetsAssets
$5.9B	$6.1B	$6.0B	$6.0B	$5.9B	$7.5B	$7.9B	$7.8B	$8.4B	$6.3B	$8.0B	Total debtDebt
$4.7B	$5.0B	$5.2B	$5.1B	$4.4B	$6.4B	$6.6B	$6.9B	$7.5B	$5.5B	$7.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
4.2×	3.6×	4.1×	1.5×	-2.5×	2.3×	1.9×	-0.4×	1.3×	0.7×	4.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.5B	$4.6B	$4.9B	$4.4B	$3.1B	$5.0B	$5.3B	$4.7B	$4.7B	$3.2B	$3.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	—	—	$182M	—	—	$230M	—	$674M	$674M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
266M	253M	239M	233M	234M	264M	286M	285M	288M	288M	288M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$56.98	$60.78	$64.75	$63.28	$52.65	$66.20	$72.74	$70.41	$65.55	$63.47	$62.18	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.75	$1.37	$2.90	$-1.33	$-5.36	$2.89	$0.71	$-2.56	$0.16	$-5.98	$-7.24	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.12	$1.09	$0.44	$1.88	$2.00	$0.31	$-1.89	$-0.06	$-1.70	$-0.10	$-0.44	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.11	$1.09	$0.44	$1.88	$2.00	$0.31	$-1.89	$-0.06	$-1.70	$-0.10	$-0.44	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.31	$0.43	$0.58	$0.64	$0.16	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.74	$3.48	$3.39	$3.30	$2.76	$3.72	$3.71	$3.68	$4.13	$2.87	$2.58	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.94	$18.19	$20.35	$18.67	$13.15	$18.94	$18.53	$16.38	$16.25	$11.23	$10.43	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.2%/yr	+3.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	−2.9%/yr	+0.7%/yr
Book value / share	−4.5%/yr	−3.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue-3.2%
“Net Sales Net sales in 2025 of $18,280 million decreased $598 million, or 3.2%, compared to $18,878 million in 2024, due to the impacts of divestitures, primarily the sale of the OTR tire business, of $671 million, excluding product supply agreement revenue of $268 million, lower global tire volume of $669 million and the negative impact of changes in foreign exchange rates of $18 million.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

288Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

3%low FY2020

Gross margin

18%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

79.0×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($30M)owner earningsvs.($1.7B)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $1.7B loss into ($30M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($1.7B)	$46M	($729M)	$202M	$764M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1.0B	+$1.0B	+$1.0B	+$964M	+$883M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1.5B	−$397M	+$760M	−$645M	−$585M
Cash from operations	$796M	$698M	$1.0B	$521M	$1.1B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$826M	−$1.2B	−$1.1B	−$1.1B	−$981M
Owner earnings	($30M)	($490M)	($18M)	($540M)	$81M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	0%	-3%	0%	-3%	0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 4.5×

Adequate

Operating income $2.0B ÷ interest expense $445M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.5B · 2.7× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $801M − debt $6.3B

What this means
Netting $801M of cash and short-term investments against $6.3B of debt leaves $5.5B owed, about 2.7× a year's operating profit (3.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 39d

Tight

DSO 47 + DIO 87 − DPO 95 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -9%–17%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 0%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -3%–5%; latest ($30M) = operating cash $796M − maintenance capex $826M

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -0% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? $796M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($1.7B) · cash from operations $796M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.79×

Harvesting

Capex $826M ÷ depreciation $1.0B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $18.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.06×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $6.3B vs $436M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −204%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.79/share (latest year $-5.99), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 9% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to 1% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −6.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.9%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$7.6B

Cash & short-term investments$723M
Receivables$2.6B
Inventory$3.9B
Other current assets$458M

Current liabilities$7.4B

Debt due within a year$1.7B
Accounts payable$3.8B
Other current liabilities$1.9B

Current ratio1.04×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.51×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$291Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$1.7B due · $723M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−8.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$2.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($7.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$9.0B$1.0B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $7.6B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$104Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$294M

'27$255M

'28$206M

'29$174M

'30$145M

later$1.1B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$294Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$2.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.3Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$6.3B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.3B

Total fixed claims on the business$7.6B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $7.6B, of which the leases are 17%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $10.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$9.2B · 92%
Dividends$515M · 5%
Buybacks$1.1B · 11%

Returned to owners$1.6B
146% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $515M as dividends and $1.1B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$784M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $784M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $5.9B to $8.0B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $409M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count8.3%
The diluted count rose from 266M to 288M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$705M4% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity1%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.9Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $9.2B of capital spent building

$1.1B written down across 3 years (2020, 2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 59% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.9% vs 2.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 2.7% early in the record and −0.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.3%
Diluted shares grew 8.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.1B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$5.9B → $8.0B
Debt rose from $5.9B to $8.0B while owner earnings went from about $404M to ($179M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Components

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
NKENike Inc.	$46.4B	44%	12.2%	34%	10%
GTThe Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company	$18.3B	20%	3.8%	4%	1%
BERYBerry Global	$12.3B	18%	9.3%	8%	8%
NWLNewell Brands	$7.2B	33%	0.7%	1%	5%
DECKDeckers Outdoor Corporation	$5.5B	52%	18.0%	65%	16%
CSLCarlisle Cos.	$5.0B	30%	14.5%	13%	14%
CROXCrocs Inc.	$4.0B	53%	13.0%	34%	16%
ATRAptarGroup Inc.	$3.8B	—	12.3%	10%	8%
Group median	—	33%	12.2%	12%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company has delivered.

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company earns about $104M on its 0.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($104M) Net of stock comp

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($126M) on 287M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $7.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GT against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (GT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GSHD its page in the Manual GTE →

Industry order: ← GNTX the Auto Components chapter GTX →