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BIDU, Baidu Inc. ADS
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 48% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −4.5% to 19% — on a steadier 48% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| CN¥70.5B | CN¥84.8B | CN¥102.3B | CN¥107.4B | CN¥107.1B | CN¥124.5B | CN¥123.7B | CN¥134.6B | CN¥133.1B | CN¥129.1B | CN¥129.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 50% | 49% | 49% | 41% | 48% | 48% | 48% | 52% | 50% | 44% | 44% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| CN¥10.0B | CN¥15.7B | CN¥15.5B | CN¥6.3B | CN¥14.3B | CN¥10.5B | CN¥15.9B | CN¥21.9B | CN¥21.3B | (CN¥5.8B) | (CN¥5.8B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 14.2% | 18.5% | 15.2% | 5.9% | 13.4% | 8.4% | 12.9% | 16.2% | 16.0% | −4.5% | −4.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| CN¥11.6B | CN¥18.3B | CN¥22.6B | (CN¥2.3B) | CN¥19.0B | CN¥7.6B | CN¥7.5B | CN¥21.5B | CN¥24.2B | CN¥5.5B | CN¥5.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 20% | 14% | 17% | — | 18% | 30% | 25% | 14% | 16% | 19% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| CN¥22.5B | CN¥32.8B | CN¥36.0B | CN¥28.5B | CN¥24.2B | CN¥20.1B | CN¥26.2B | CN¥36.6B | CN¥21.2B | (CN¥3.0B) | (CN¥3.0B) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥3.5B | CN¥3.8B | CN¥3.7B | CN¥5.6B | CN¥5.7B | CN¥5.7B | CN¥6.2B | CN¥7.1B | CN¥6.6B | CN¥7.4B | CN¥7.4B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| CN¥7.4B | CN¥10.7B | CN¥9.7B | CN¥25.1B | (CN¥526M) | CN¥6.8B | CN¥12.4B | CN¥8.0B | (CN¥9.5B) | (CN¥15.9B) | (CN¥15.9B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥4.2B | CN¥4.8B | CN¥8.8B | CN¥6.4B | CN¥5.1B | CN¥10.9B | CN¥8.3B | CN¥11.2B | CN¥8.1B | CN¥12.1B | CN¥12.1B | CapexCapex |
| 5.9% | 5.6% | 8.6% | 6.0% | 4.7% | 8.8% | 6.7% | 8.3% | 6.1% | 9.4% | 9.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| CN¥18.3B | CN¥29.0B | CN¥32.3B | CN¥22.0B | CN¥19.1B | CN¥14.4B | CN¥20.0B | CN¥29.5B | CN¥13.1B | (CN¥10.4B) | (CN¥10.4B) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 25.9% | 34.2% | 31.5% | 20.5% | 17.9% | 11.6% | 16.1% | 21.9% | 9.8% | −8.1% | −8.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| CN¥18.3B | CN¥28.0B | CN¥27.2B | CN¥22.0B | CN¥19.1B | CN¥9.2B | CN¥17.9B | CN¥25.4B | CN¥13.1B | (CN¥15.1B) | (CN¥15.1B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 25.9% | 33.1% | 26.6% | 20.5% | 17.9% | 7.4% | 14.5% | 18.9% | 9.8% | −11.7% | −11.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| CN¥0 | CN¥1.7B | CN¥3.3B | CN¥5.0B | CN¥13.1B | CN¥7.6B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥4.8B | CN¥6.3B | CN¥5.5B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 7% | 10% | 7% | 3% | 6% | 3% | 5% | 7% | 7% | -2% | -2% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 16% | 14% | -1% | 10% | 4% | 3% | 9% | 9% | 2% | 2% | Return on equityROE |
| 13% | 16% | 14% | −1% | 10% | 4% | 3% | 9% | 9% | 2% | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| CN¥82.1B | CN¥100.5B | CN¥139.3B | CN¥146.4B | CN¥162.2B | CN¥180.1B | CN¥174.0B | CN¥193.9B | CN¥127.4B | CN¥115.3B | CN¥115.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| CN¥4.1B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥6.0B | CN¥7.4B | CN¥8.7B | CN¥10.0B | CN¥11.7B | CN¥10.8B | CN¥10.1B | CN¥13.0B | CN¥13.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| CN¥4.1B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥6.0B | CN¥7.4B | CN¥8.7B | CN¥10.0B | CN¥11.7B | CN¥10.8B | CN¥10.1B | CN¥13.0B | CN¥13.0B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| CN¥99.8B | CN¥151.2B | CN¥155.1B | CN¥165.6B | CN¥183.3B | CN¥213.3B | CN¥212.8B | CN¥230.3B | CN¥168.8B | CN¥152.0B | CN¥152.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| CN¥46.1B | CN¥82.1B | CN¥56.9B | CN¥57.4B | CN¥68.4B | CN¥74.5B | CN¥79.6B | CN¥76.5B | CN¥81.0B | CN¥86.3B | CN¥86.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.2× | 1.8× | 2.7× | 2.9× | 2.7× | 2.9× | 2.7× | 3.0× | 2.1× | 1.8× | 1.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| CN¥15.3B | CN¥15.8B | CN¥18.5B | CN¥18.3B | CN¥22.2B | CN¥22.6B | CN¥22.5B | CN¥22.6B | CN¥22.6B | CN¥36.8B | CN¥36.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| CN¥182.0B | CN¥251.7B | CN¥297.6B | CN¥301.3B | CN¥332.7B | CN¥380.0B | CN¥391.0B | CN¥406.8B | CN¥427.8B | CN¥449.2B | CN¥449.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| CN¥32.9B | CN¥35.6B | CN¥49.6B | CN¥43.3B | CN¥48.4B | CN¥53.6B | CN¥53.6B | CN¥43.7B | CN¥36.2B | CN¥42.8B | CN¥42.8B | Total debtDebt |
| (CN¥49.2B) | (CN¥64.9B) | (CN¥89.7B) | (CN¥103.1B) | (CN¥113.8B) | (CN¥126.5B) | (CN¥120.4B) | (CN¥150.2B) | (CN¥91.2B) | (CN¥72.5B) | (CN¥72.5B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| CN¥92.3B | CN¥115.3B | CN¥162.9B | CN¥163.6B | CN¥182.7B | CN¥211.5B | CN¥223.5B | CN¥243.6B | CN¥263.6B | CN¥266.3B | CN¥266.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned (CN¥10.4B) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥7.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥4.7B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (CN¥15.1B).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | CN¥5.5B | CN¥24.2B | CN¥21.5B | CN¥7.5B | CN¥7.6B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥7.4B | +CN¥6.6B | +CN¥7.1B | +CN¥6.2B | +CN¥5.7B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −CN¥15.9B | −CN¥9.5B | +CN¥8.0B | +CN¥12.4B | +CN¥6.8B |
| Cash from operations | (CN¥3.0B) | CN¥21.2B | CN¥36.6B | CN¥26.2B | CN¥20.1B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −CN¥7.4B | −CN¥8.1B | −CN¥7.1B | −CN¥6.2B | −CN¥5.7B |
| Owner earnings | (CN¥10.4B) | CN¥13.1B | CN¥29.5B | CN¥20.0B | CN¥14.4B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −CN¥4.7B | — | −CN¥4.1B | −CN¥2.1B | −CN¥5.2B |
| Free cash flow | (CN¥15.1B) | CN¥13.1B | CN¥25.4B | CN¥17.9B | CN¥9.2B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -8% | 10% | 22% | 16% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥7.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥4.7B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +CN¥72.5BNet cashCash CN¥24.6B + ST investments CN¥90.7B − debt CN¥42.8B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥72.5B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -2%–10%; -2% latest = NOPAT (CN¥4.7B) ÷ invested capital CN¥284.5BIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -8%–34%; latest (CN¥10.4B) = operating cash (CN¥3.0B) − maintenance capex CN¥7.4BIndustry peers: median 31%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -8% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years. It chose to put CN¥4.7B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (CN¥15.1B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Are earnings backed by cash? -0.55×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops (CN¥3.0B) ÷ net income CN¥5.5B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.63×ExpandingCapex CN¥12.1B ÷ depreciation CN¥7.4B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥129.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.76×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · CN¥42.8B vs CN¥65.6B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −2%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥6.27/share (latest year CN¥2.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥97.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 16% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 9% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −27%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 27% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −4.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Traditional link-based results are increasingly replaced by AI-generated, intelligent and multimodal-first answers that better match user intent.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥115.3B
- ReceivablesCN¥13.0B
- Other current assetsCN¥23.7B
- Debt due within a yearCN¥1.5B
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥84.9B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated CN¥245.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- ReinvestedCN¥79.8B · 33%
- BuybacksCN¥49.2B · 20%
- Retained (debt / cash)CN¥116.1B · 47%
- Returned to ownersCN¥49.2B
26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥0 as dividends and CN¥49.2B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran CN¥49.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count—
No continuous share count across the span.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−18%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (CN¥86.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell CN¥15.8B, so each retained CN¥1 gave back about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Baidu Inc. ADS is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?7.9% vs 30.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 30.6% early in the record and 7.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?CN¥32.9B → CN¥42.8B
Debt rose from CN¥32.9B to CN¥42.8B while owner earnings went from about CN¥26.5B to CN¥10.7B — about 1.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?6% → 10% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from CN¥4.1B to CN¥13.0B while revenue grew 83%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (6% of revenue then, 10% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GOOGAlphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock | $402.8B | 57% | 26.4% | 21% | 31% |
| MSFTMicrosoft Corp. | $281.7B | 68% | 39.3% | 28% | 36% |
| METAMeta Platforms Inc. | $201.0B | 82% | 40.5% | 25% | 45% |
| BIDUBaidu Inc. ADS | CN¥129.1B | 49% | 13.8% | 6% | 19% |
| CRMSalesforce Inc. | $41.5B | 74% | 3.7% | 3% | 22% |
| XYZBlock Inc. | $24.2B | 34% | -0.7% | -1% | 4% |
| ADBEAdobe Inc. | $23.8B | 87% | 32.2% | 33% | 39% |
| FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc | $16.4B | 48% | -0.4% | -0% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 62% | 20.1% | 13% | 27% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares (each American depositary share representing eight Class”; Baidu Inc. ADS reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Baidu Inc. ADS has delivered.
Baidu Inc. ADS’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Baidu Inc. ADS earns about $3.7B on its 19.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −8.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($2.2B) on 340M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net cash $10.7B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.8B) runs well above depreciation ($1.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($1.5B), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
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