Owner Scorecard


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BIDU, Baidu Inc. ADS

Software asset-light Cyclical

A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in CNY · 1 ADS = 8 ordinary shares
BIDU · Baidu Inc. ADS
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
CN¥129.1B
−3.0% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥129.1B 5-yr avg CN¥129.0B
Gross margin 44% 5-yr avg 49%
Operating margin −4.5% 5-yr avg 9.8%
ROIC −2% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin −8% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin −12% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 48% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −4.5% to 19% — on a steadier 48% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
CN¥70.5BCN¥84.8BCN¥102.3BCN¥107.4BCN¥107.1BCN¥124.5BCN¥123.7BCN¥134.6BCN¥133.1BCN¥129.1BCN¥129.1BRevenueRevenue
50%49%49%41%48%48%48%52%50%44%44%Gross marginGross mgn
CN¥10.0BCN¥15.7BCN¥15.5BCN¥6.3BCN¥14.3BCN¥10.5BCN¥15.9BCN¥21.9BCN¥21.3B(CN¥5.8B)(CN¥5.8B)Operating incomeOp. inc.
14.2%18.5%15.2%5.9%13.4%8.4%12.9%16.2%16.0%−4.5%−4.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
CN¥11.6BCN¥18.3BCN¥22.6B(CN¥2.3B)CN¥19.0BCN¥7.6BCN¥7.5BCN¥21.5BCN¥24.2BCN¥5.5BCN¥5.5BNet incomeNet inc.
20%14%17%18%30%25%14%16%19%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
CN¥22.5BCN¥32.8BCN¥36.0BCN¥28.5BCN¥24.2BCN¥20.1BCN¥26.2BCN¥36.6BCN¥21.2B(CN¥3.0B)(CN¥3.0B)Operating cash flowOp. cash
CN¥3.5BCN¥3.8BCN¥3.7BCN¥5.6BCN¥5.7BCN¥5.7BCN¥6.2BCN¥7.1BCN¥6.6BCN¥7.4BCN¥7.4BDepreciationDeprec.
CN¥7.4BCN¥10.7BCN¥9.7BCN¥25.1B(CN¥526M)CN¥6.8BCN¥12.4BCN¥8.0B(CN¥9.5B)(CN¥15.9B)(CN¥15.9B)Working capital & otherWC & other
CN¥4.2BCN¥4.8BCN¥8.8BCN¥6.4BCN¥5.1BCN¥10.9BCN¥8.3BCN¥11.2BCN¥8.1BCN¥12.1BCN¥12.1BCapexCapex
5.9%5.6%8.6%6.0%4.7%8.8%6.7%8.3%6.1%9.4%9.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
CN¥18.3BCN¥29.0BCN¥32.3BCN¥22.0BCN¥19.1BCN¥14.4BCN¥20.0BCN¥29.5BCN¥13.1B(CN¥10.4B)(CN¥10.4B)Owner earningsOwner earn.
25.9%34.2%31.5%20.5%17.9%11.6%16.1%21.9%9.8%−8.1%−8.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
CN¥18.3BCN¥28.0BCN¥27.2BCN¥22.0BCN¥19.1BCN¥9.2BCN¥17.9BCN¥25.4BCN¥13.1B(CN¥15.1B)(CN¥15.1B)Free cash flowFCF
25.9%33.1%26.6%20.5%17.9%7.4%14.5%18.9%9.8%−11.7%−11.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
CN¥0CN¥1.7BCN¥3.3BCN¥5.0BCN¥13.1BCN¥7.6BCN¥1.9BCN¥4.8BCN¥6.3BCN¥5.5BBuybacksBuybacks
7%10%7%3%6%3%5%7%7%-2%-2%ROICROIC
13%16%14%-1%10%4%3%9%9%2%2%Return on equityROE
13%16%14%−1%10%4%3%9%9%2%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
CN¥82.1BCN¥100.5BCN¥139.3BCN¥146.4BCN¥162.2BCN¥180.1BCN¥174.0BCN¥193.9BCN¥127.4BCN¥115.3BCN¥115.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
CN¥4.1BCN¥4.6BCN¥6.0BCN¥7.4BCN¥8.7BCN¥10.0BCN¥11.7BCN¥10.8BCN¥10.1BCN¥13.0BCN¥13.0BReceivablesReceiv.
CN¥4.1BCN¥4.6BCN¥6.0BCN¥7.4BCN¥8.7BCN¥10.0BCN¥11.7BCN¥10.8BCN¥10.1BCN¥13.0BCN¥13.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
CN¥99.8BCN¥151.2BCN¥155.1BCN¥165.6BCN¥183.3BCN¥213.3BCN¥212.8BCN¥230.3BCN¥168.8BCN¥152.0BCN¥152.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
CN¥46.1BCN¥82.1BCN¥56.9BCN¥57.4BCN¥68.4BCN¥74.5BCN¥79.6BCN¥76.5BCN¥81.0BCN¥86.3BCN¥86.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×1.8×2.7×2.9×2.7×2.9×2.7×3.0×2.1×1.8×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
CN¥15.3BCN¥15.8BCN¥18.5BCN¥18.3BCN¥22.2BCN¥22.6BCN¥22.5BCN¥22.6BCN¥22.6BCN¥36.8BCN¥36.8BGoodwillGoodwill
CN¥182.0BCN¥251.7BCN¥297.6BCN¥301.3BCN¥332.7BCN¥380.0BCN¥391.0BCN¥406.8BCN¥427.8BCN¥449.2BCN¥449.2BTotal assetsAssets
CN¥32.9BCN¥35.6BCN¥49.6BCN¥43.3BCN¥48.4BCN¥53.6BCN¥53.6BCN¥43.7BCN¥36.2BCN¥42.8BCN¥42.8BTotal debtDebt
(CN¥49.2B)(CN¥64.9B)(CN¥89.7B)(CN¥103.1B)(CN¥113.8B)(CN¥126.5B)(CN¥120.4B)(CN¥150.2B)(CN¥91.2B)(CN¥72.5B)(CN¥72.5B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
CN¥92.3BCN¥115.3BCN¥162.9BCN¥163.6BCN¥182.7BCN¥211.5BCN¥223.5BCN¥243.6BCN¥263.6BCN¥266.3BCN¥266.3BShareholders’ equityEquity

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

ROIC
−2%low FY2025
Gross margin
44%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

(CN¥10.4B)owner earningsvs.CN¥5.5Bnet incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned (CN¥10.4B) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥7.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥4.7B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (CN¥15.1B).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net incomeCN¥5.5BCN¥24.2BCN¥21.5BCN¥7.5BCN¥7.6B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+CN¥7.4B+CN¥6.6B+CN¥7.1B+CN¥6.2B+CN¥5.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−CN¥15.9B−CN¥9.5B+CN¥8.0B+CN¥12.4B+CN¥6.8B
Cash from operations(CN¥3.0B)CN¥21.2BCN¥36.6BCN¥26.2BCN¥20.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−CN¥7.4B−CN¥8.1B−CN¥7.1B−CN¥6.2B−CN¥5.7B
Owner earnings(CN¥10.4B)CN¥13.1BCN¥29.5BCN¥20.0BCN¥14.4B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−CN¥4.7B−CN¥4.1B−CN¥2.1B−CN¥5.2B
Free cash flow(CN¥15.1B)CN¥13.1BCN¥25.4BCN¥17.9BCN¥9.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-8%10%22%16%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥7.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥4.7B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash CN¥24.6B + ST investments CN¥90.7B − debt CN¥42.8B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥72.5B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -2%–10%; -2% latest = NOPAT (CN¥4.7B) ÷ invested capital CN¥284.5B
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -8%–34%; latest (CN¥10.4B) = operating cash (CN¥3.0B) − maintenance capex CN¥7.4B
    Industry peers: median 31%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -8% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years. It chose to put CN¥4.7B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (CN¥15.1B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops (CN¥3.0B) ÷ net income CN¥5.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.63×
    Expanding
    Capex CN¥12.1B ÷ depreciation CN¥7.4B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥129.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.76×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · CN¥42.8B vs CN¥65.6B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −2%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥6.27/share (latest year CN¥2.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥97.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 9% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −27%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 27% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −4.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Traditional link-based results are increasingly replaced by AI-generated, intelligent and multimodal-first answers that better match user intent.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsCN¥152.0B
  • Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥115.3B
  • ReceivablesCN¥13.0B
  • Other current assetsCN¥23.7B
Current liabilitiesCN¥86.3B
  • Debt due within a yearCN¥1.5B
  • Other current liabilitiesCN¥84.9B
Current ratio1.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.76×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.34×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalCN¥65.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cashCN¥1.5B due · CN¥115.3B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Cash runway7.6 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥225.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(CN¥7.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥46.2BCN¥3.5B of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥1.9Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated CN¥245.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • ReinvestedCN¥79.8B · 33%
  • BuybacksCN¥49.2B · 20%
  • Retained (debt / cash)CN¥116.1B · 47%
  • Returned to ownersCN¥49.2B

    26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥0 as dividends and CN¥49.2B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran CN¥49.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count

    No continuous share count across the span.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained−18%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (CN¥86.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell CN¥15.8B, so each retained CN¥1 gave back about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Baidu Inc. ADS is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?7.9% vs 30.6%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 30.6% early in the record and 7.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?CN¥32.9B → CN¥42.8B

    Debt rose from CN¥32.9B to CN¥42.8B while owner earnings went from about CN¥26.5B to CN¥10.7B — about 1.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?6% → 10% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from CN¥4.1B to CN¥13.0B while revenue grew 83%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (6% of revenue then, 10% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GOOGAlphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock$402.8B57%26.4%21%31%
MSFTMicrosoft Corp.$281.7B68%39.3%28%36%
METAMeta Platforms Inc.$201.0B82%40.5%25%45%
BIDUBaidu Inc. ADSCN¥129.1B49%13.8%6%19%
CRMSalesforce Inc.$41.5B74%3.7%3%22%
XYZBlock Inc.$24.2B34%-0.7%-1%4%
ADBEAdobe Inc.$23.8B87%32.2%33%39%
FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc$16.4B48%-0.4%-0%8%
Group median62%20.1%13%27%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares (each American depositary share representing eight Class”; Baidu Inc. ADS reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Baidu Inc. ADS has delivered.

Baidu Inc. ADS’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Baidu Inc. ADS earns about $3.7B on its 19.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −8.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−47%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−27%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($2.2B) on 340M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net cash $10.7B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.8B) runs well above depreciation ($1.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($1.5B), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Baidu Inc. ADS (BIDU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BIDU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BHST its page in the Manual BILI →

Industry order: ← BBAI the Software chapter BILL →