Share count
177Mpeak FY2024
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FLUT, Flutter Entertainment plc
Flutter is the world's leading online sports betting and iGaming operator based on revenue.
The Group consists of a diverse portfolio of leading recreational brands and products with a broad international reach.
We operate some of the world's most distinctive online sports betting and iGaming brands which offer our principal product categories of sportsbook, iGaming and other products (exchange betting, pari-mutuel wagering, daily fantasy sports ("DFS") and prediction markets in the U.S.).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$16.4B
+16.6% YoY · 20% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $17.0B 4-yr avg $12.9B
Revenue $4.3B +17.4% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 1.8% yr-ago 6.1%
Net income $209M yr-ago $335M
Net margin 4.9% yr-ago 9.1%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −0.9% through the cycle on a 47% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −11 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −0%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $9.5B | $11.8B | $14.0B | $16.4B | $17.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 49% | 47% | 48% | 45% | 44% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 12% | 14% | 13% | 13% | 13% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($88M) | ($549M) | $869M | $36M | ($108M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −0.9% | −4.7% | 6.2% | 0.2% | −0.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($432M) | ($1.2B) | $43M | ($310M) | ($375M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| $1.2B | $937M | $1.6B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.6B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $388M | $694M | $266M | ($269M) | ($181M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $122M | $159M | $144M | $105M | $111M | CapexCapex |
| 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.0% | 0.6% | 0.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1.0B | $778M | $1.5B | $1.1B | $1.2B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 11.0% | 6.6% | 10.4% | 6.6% | 7.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $1.0B | $778M | $1.5B | $1.1B | $1.2B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 11.0% | 6.6% | 10.4% | 6.6% | 7.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $2.1B | $0 | $160M | $2.7B | $2.7B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $3M | $212M | $219M | $1.1B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -1% | -3% | 5% | 0% | -0% | ROICROIC |
| -4% | -12% | 0% | -3% | -4% | Return on equityROE |
| −4% | −12% | 0% | −3% | −4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $966M | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $90M | $98M | $190M | $155M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $240M | $266M | $386M | $427M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($150M) | ($168M) | ($196M) | ($272M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $4.0B | $4.3B | $4.8B | $4.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $4.5B | $4.6B | $5.0B | $5.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.9× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $13.2B | $13.7B | $13.4B | $15.8B | $15.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $24.6B | $24.5B | $29.3B | $28.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $7.1B | $6.8B | $12.3B | $12.0B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $5.6B | $5.2B | $10.5B | $10.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $11.2B | $10.0B | $9.3B | $9.0B | $9.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | $517M | $517M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||
| 177M | 177M | 180M | 177M | 177M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $53.46 | $66.61 | $78.04 | $92.56 | $96.17 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.44 | $-6.90 | $0.24 | $-1.75 | $-2.12 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $5.88 | $4.40 | $8.10 | $6.10 | $6.86 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $5.88 | $4.40 | $8.10 | $6.10 | $6.86 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.69 | $0.90 | $0.80 | $0.59 | $0.63 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $63.23 | $56.75 | $51.63 | $51.06 | $51.21 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +20.1%/yr | +20.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +1.2%/yr | +1.2%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −4.9%/yr | −4.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −6.9%/yr | −6.9%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
0%low FY2023
Gross margin
45%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
9.7×peak FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$1.1Bowner earningsvs.($310M)net incomelow FY2023
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2022FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $310M loss into $1.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($310M) | $43M | ($1.2B) | ($432M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.5B | +$1.1B | +$1.3B | +$1.1B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$246M | +$196M | +$180M | +$132M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$269M | +$266M | +$694M | +$388M |
| Cash from operations | $1.2B | $1.6B | $937M | $1.2B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$105M | −$144M | −$159M | −$122M |
| Owner earnings | $1.1B | $1.5B | $778M | $1.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | 10% | 7% | 11% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $246M), owner earnings is nearer $833M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $10.5B · 290.9× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $1.8B − debt $12.3B
What this means
Netting $1.8B of cash and short-term investments against $12.3B of debt leaves $10.5B owed, about 290.9× a year's operating profit (341.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 4 + DIO 0 − DPO 16 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -3%–5%; 0% latest = NOPAT $28M ÷ invested capital $19.5BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle4-yr median margin, range 7%–11%; latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $105MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $246M of SBC) leaves $833M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($310M) · cash from operations $1.2B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $1.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $1.1B of Owner Earnings, $1.1B (104%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1.1B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $246M stock comp, the real buyback was about $877M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.07×HarvestingCapex $105M ÷ depreciation $1.5B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $16.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.95×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $12.3B vs ($247M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.85/share (latest year $-1.78), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $51.95/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −3% → 3% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −3% early to 3% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · −4.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“If we fail to keep pace with rapidly evolving technological developments in AI, our competitive position and business results may suffer.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$4.5B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.5B
- Receivables$155M
- Other current assets$2.8B
Current liabilities$5.0B
- Debt due within a year$171M
- Accounts payable$427M
- Other current liabilities$4.4B
Current ratio0.90×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.90×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.30×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($480M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$171M due · $1.5B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+17.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($13.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($14.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$12.6B$595M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$80Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2022–2025
Over the record, the business generated $4.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$530M · 11%
- Buybacks$1.6B · 32%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.8B · 57%
- Returned to owners$1.6B
36% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.6B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$277.86
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $431M, about $277.86 each.
- Net change in share count0.0%
The diluted count barely moved (177M to 177M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$22.8B78% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$4.9Bover 4 years buying other businesses, against $530M of capital spent building
$517M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$246M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 683% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Flutter Entertainment plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CTSHCognizant | $21.1B | — | 15.3% | 18% | 12% |
| ADPAutomatic Data Processing Inc. | $20.6B | 43% | 21.3% | 46% | 19% |
| INTUIntuit Inc. | $18.8B | 99% | 26.0% | 35% | 32% |
| LDOSLeidos Holdings Inc. | $17.1B | 14% | 7.5% | 10% | 7% |
| FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc | $16.4B | 48% | -0.4% | -0% | 8% |
| KDKyndryl Holdings Inc. | $15.1B | 15% | -2.5% | -7% | -0% |
| NOWServiceNow Inc. | $13.3B | 77% | 4.4% | 6% | 30% |
| DXCDXC Technology Company Common Stock | $12.6B | — | 8.0% | 12% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 45% | 7.8% | 11% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Flutter Entertainment plc has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Flutter Entertainment plc earns about $1.4B on its 8.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $1.2B on 174M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $10.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Flutter Entertainment plc (FLUT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FLUT, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← FLS its page in the Manual FLXS →
Industry order: ← FIG the Software chapter FROG →