Share count
12.2Bpeak FY2018
← All companies ← GOODO Manual GOOGL → ← GNS Software GOOGL →
GOOG, Alphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock
Alphabet runs Google. Most of what it earns comes from advertising — selling the attention of people who use Search, YouTube, and the Android and Chrome software that sits on their phones and screens — placed against each other in an auction that advertisers bid into. A smaller part rents out cloud computing and tools to businesses that would rather not build their own.
We report Google in two segments, Google Services and Google Cloud, and all non-Google businesses collectively as Other Bets.
Access and Technology for Everyone The Internet is one of the world's most powerful equalizers; it propels ideas, people, and businesses large and small.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$402.8B
+15.1% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $422.5B 5-yr avg $320.1B
Revenue $109.9B +21.8% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 36.1% yr-ago 33.9%
Net income $62.6B yr-ago $34.5B
Net margin 56.9% yr-ago 38.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Google Services (85%) and Google Cloud (15%).
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 23% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- The business turns on one question: does Alphabet own the front door to what people want to find, and can it charge for standing there? The test is the toll booth — users arriving by habit and default, and advertisers bidding against each other for the same attention because there is no equal place to go; pricing power would show in what an ad fetches, switching costs in whether users stay when nudged elsewhere. The bad case is that a single revenue stream carries the whole house, that advertising sinks with the economy, that regulators unwind the arrangements keeping Google the default (the filing's own emphasis on antitrust fines), and that a new way of answering questions routes around the booth — while the capital poured into cloud and machines must earn its keep, not merely defend the moat. The figures for margins, returns, and the balance sheet are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 21%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 31% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Google Services is 85% of revenue, with Google Cloud the other meaningful segment at 15%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Google Services85%$342.7B
- Google Cloud15%$58.7B
- Other Bets0%$1.5B
By geographyUnited States48%EMEA29%Asia Pacific17%Other Americas6%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $90.3B | $110.9B | $136.8B | $161.9B | $182.5B | $257.6B | $282.8B | $307.4B | $350.0B | $402.8B | $422.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 61% | 59% | 56% | 56% | 54% | 57% | 55% | 57% | 58% | 60% | 60% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 8% | 6% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 6% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 5% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 15% | 15% | 16% | 16% | 15% | 12% | 14% | 15% | 14% | 15% | 15% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $23.7B | $26.2B | $27.5B | $34.2B | $41.2B | $78.7B | $74.8B | $84.3B | $112.4B | $129.0B | $138.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 26.3% | 23.6% | 20.1% | 21.1% | 22.6% | 30.6% | 26.5% | 27.4% | 32.1% | 32.0% | 32.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $19.5B | $12.7B | $30.7B | $34.3B | $40.3B | $76.0B | $60.0B | $73.8B | $100.1B | $132.2B | $160.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 19% | 53% | 12% | 13% | 16% | 16% | 16% | 14% | 16% | 17% | 18% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $36.0B | $37.1B | $48.0B | $54.5B | $65.1B | $91.7B | $91.5B | $101.7B | $125.3B | $164.7B | $174.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | — | — | — | — | $10.3B | $13.5B | $11.9B | $15.3B | $21.1B | $23.1B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $9.9B | $16.8B | $7.9B | $9.4B | $11.9B | ($10.0B) | ($1.3B) | ($6.5B) | ($12.9B) | ($13.5B) | ($35.2B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $10.2B | $13.2B | $25.1B | $23.5B | $22.3B | $24.6B | $31.5B | $32.3B | $52.5B | $91.4B | $109.9B | CapexCapex |
| 11.3% | 11.9% | 18.4% | 14.5% | 12.2% | 9.6% | 11.1% | 10.5% | 15.0% | 22.7% | 26.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $32.1B | $32.2B | $42.0B | $47.4B | $57.1B | $81.4B | $78.0B | $89.8B | $110.0B | $143.6B | $151.2B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 35.5% | 29.1% | 30.7% | 29.3% | 31.3% | 31.6% | 27.6% | 29.2% | 31.4% | 35.6% | 35.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $25.8B | $23.9B | $22.8B | $31.0B | $42.8B | $67.0B | $60.0B | $69.5B | $72.8B | $73.3B | $64.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 28.6% | 21.6% | 16.7% | 19.1% | 23.5% | 26.0% | 21.2% | 22.6% | 20.8% | 18.2% | 15.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $7.4B | $10.0B | $10.2B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $3.7B | $4.8B | $9.1B | $18.4B | $31.1B | $50.3B | $59.3B | $61.5B | $62.2B | $45.7B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 15% | 9% | 15% | 16% | 16% | 27% | 25% | 26% | 30% | 25% | 22% | ROICROIC |
| 14% | 8% | 17% | 17% | 18% | 30% | 23% | 26% | 31% | 32% | 33% | Return on equityROE |
| 14% | 8% | — | — | — | — | 23% | 26% | 29% | 29% | 31% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $86.3B | $101.9B | $109.1B | $119.7B | $136.7B | $141.0B | $114.6B | $112.3B | $95.9B | $126.8B | $127.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $14.1B | $18.3B | $20.8B | $25.3B | $30.9B | $39.3B | $40.3B | $48.0B | $52.3B | $62.9B | $63.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $268M | $749M | $1.1B | $999M | $728M | $1.2B | $2.7B | — | — | — | $3.0B | InventoryInvent. |
| $2.0B | $3.1B | $4.4B | $5.6B | $5.6B | $6.0B | $5.1B | $7.5B | $8.0B | $12.2B | $16.9B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $12.4B | $15.9B | $17.6B | $20.8B | $26.1B | $34.4B | $37.8B | $40.5B | $44.4B | $50.7B | $49.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $105.4B | $124.3B | $135.7B | $152.6B | $174.3B | $188.1B | $164.8B | $171.5B | $163.7B | $206.0B | $213.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $16.8B | $24.2B | $34.6B | $45.2B | $56.8B | $64.3B | $69.3B | $81.8B | $89.1B | $102.7B | $111.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 6.3× | 5.1× | 3.9× | 3.4× | 3.1× | 2.9× | 2.4× | 2.1× | 1.8× | 2.0× | 1.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $16.5B | $16.7B | $17.9B | $20.6B | $21.2B | $23.0B | $29.0B | $29.2B | $31.9B | $33.4B | $57.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $167.5B | $197.3B | $232.8B | $275.9B | $319.6B | $359.3B | $365.3B | $402.4B | $450.3B | $595.3B | $703.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $3.9B | $4.0B | $4.0B | $4.7B | $16.3B | $15.4B | $15.3B | $14.7B | $11.9B | $48.5B | $79.5B | Total debtDebt |
| ($82.4B) | ($97.9B) | ($105.1B) | ($115.0B) | ($120.4B) | ($125.6B) | ($99.3B) | ($97.6B) | ($84.0B) | ($78.3B) | ($47.7B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 191.3× | 240.2× | 241.4× | 342.3× | 305.4× | 227.5× | 209.6× | 273.7× | 419.4× | 175.3× | 111.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $139.0B | $152.5B | $177.6B | $201.4B | $222.5B | $251.6B | $256.1B | $283.4B | $325.1B | $415.3B | $478.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 7.4% | 6.9% | 6.8% | 6.7% | 7.1% | 6.0% | 6.8% | 7.3% | 6.5% | 6.2% | 6.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 13.83B | 13.90B | 13.91B | 13.77B | 13.50B | 13.24B | 13.16B | 12.72B | 12.45B | 12.23B | 12.24B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $6.53 | $7.98 | $9.84 | $11.76 | $13.52 | $19.46 | $21.49 | $24.16 | $28.12 | $32.94 | $34.52 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.41 | $0.91 | $2.21 | $2.49 | $2.98 | $5.74 | $4.56 | $5.80 | $8.04 | $10.81 | $13.09 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.32 | $2.32 | $3.02 | $3.45 | $4.23 | $6.15 | $5.93 | $7.06 | $8.84 | $11.74 | $12.36 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.87 | $1.72 | $1.64 | $2.25 | $3.17 | $5.06 | $4.56 | $5.46 | $5.85 | $5.99 | $5.26 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.59 | $0.82 | $0.83 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.74 | $0.95 | $1.81 | $1.71 | $1.65 | $1.86 | $2.39 | $2.54 | $4.22 | $7.48 | $8.98 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $10.06 | $10.97 | $12.77 | $14.63 | $16.48 | $19.00 | $19.47 | $22.27 | $26.12 | $33.95 | $39.12 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2021 are restated ×20 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +19.7%/yr | +19.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +19.7%/yr | +22.6%/yr |
| EPS | +25.4%/yr | +29.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +29.3%/yr | +35.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +14.5%/yr | +15.6%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Google Cloud+35.8%
“Google Cloud revenues increased $15.5 billion from 2024 to 2025, primarily driven by growth in Google Cloud Platform largely from infrastructure and platform services.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
25%low FY2017
Gross margin
60%low FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$143.6Bowner earningsvs.$132.2Bnet incomelow FY2016
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $143.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $21.1B it takes just to hold its position. It put $70.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $73.3B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $132.2B | $100.1B | $73.8B | $60.0B | $76.0B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$21.1B | +$15.3B | +$11.9B | +$13.5B | +$10.3B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$25.0B | +$22.8B | +$22.5B | +$19.4B | +$15.4B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$13.5B | −$12.9B | −$6.5B | −$1.3B | −$10.0B |
| Cash from operations | $164.7B | $125.3B | $101.7B | $91.5B | $91.7B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$21.1B | −$15.3B | −$11.9B | −$13.5B | −$10.3B |
| Owner earnings | $143.6B | $110.0B | $89.8B | $78.0B | $81.4B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$70.3B | −$37.2B | −$20.3B | −$18.0B | −$14.4B |
| Free cash flow | $73.3B | $72.8B | $69.5B | $60.0B | $67.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 36% | 31% | 29% | 28% | 32% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $21.1B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $70.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $25.0B), owner earnings is nearer $118.6B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 175.3×ComfortableOperating income $129.0B ÷ interest expense $736M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $30.7B + ST investments $96.1B − debt $48.5B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $78.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $266M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $78.6B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 57 + DIO 6 − DPO 27 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 9%–30%; 25% latest = NOPAT $107.4B ÷ invested capital $433.1BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 25% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 28%–36%; latest $143.6B = operating cash $164.7B − maintenance capex $21.1BIndustry peers: median 32%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 36% of revenue this year, a 31% median across 10 years. It chose to put $70.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $73.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25.0B of SBC) leaves $118.6B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $164.7B ÷ net income $132.2B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $55.8B ÷ Owner Earnings $143.6B
What this means
Of $143.6B Owner Earnings, $55.8B (39%) went back to shareholders, $10.0B dividends, $45.7B buybacks. Net of $25.0B stock comp, the real buyback was about $20.8B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 4.33×ExpandingCapex $91.4B ÷ depreciation $21.1B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $402.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.01×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $48.5B vs $103.3B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +387%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.42/share (latest year $10.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $34.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 23% → 31% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 23% early to 31% lately, median 26% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 37%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 20.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$213.8B
- Cash & short-term investments$126.8B
- Receivables$63.0B
- Inventory$3.0B
- Other current assets$21.0B
Current liabilities$111.2B
- Debt due within a year$2.0B
- Accounts payable$16.9B
- Other current liabilities$92.3B
Current ratio1.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.90×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$102.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2.0B due · $126.8B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+21.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$411.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($11.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$95.7B$16.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $67.0B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$8.2Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Due in the next 12 months$2.0Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$3.0Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$5.5Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$49.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$126.8B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$143.6B
Together, against $2.0B due next year135.2×
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $270.4B against the $2.0B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 135 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$3.8Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$21.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$18.5Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$48.5B
Lease obligations (present value)$18.5B
Total fixed claims on the business$67.0B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $67.0B, of which the leases are 28%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $815.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$326.7B · 40%
- Dividends$17.4B · 2%
- Buybacks$346.2B · 42%
- Retained (debt / cash)$125.3B · 15%
- Returned to owners$363.6B
51% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $17.4B as dividends and $346.2B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $346.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−11.5%
The diluted count fell from 13826M to 12238M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.82/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained37%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($216.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $79.0B, so each retained $1 added about 0.37 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $6.3M | $267.3M | $81.4B |
| 2022 | $226.0M | $115.8M | $78.0B |
| 2023 | $8.8M | $235.1M | $89.8B |
| 2024 | $10.8M | $215.7M | $110.0B |
| 2025 | $10.9M | $213.9M | $143.6B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$25.0B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 19% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Alphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GOOGAlphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock | $402.8B | 57% | 26.4% | 21% | 31% |
| MSFTMicrosoft Corp. | $281.7B | 68% | 39.3% | 28% | 36% |
| METAMeta Platforms Inc. | $201.0B | 82% | 40.5% | 25% | 45% |
| ORCLOracle Corp. | $67.4B | 97% | 32.2% | 16% | 32% |
| CRMSalesforce Inc. | $41.5B | 74% | 3.7% | 3% | 22% |
| XYZBlock Inc. | $24.2B | 34% | -0.7% | -1% | 4% |
| ADBEAdobe Inc. | $23.8B | 87% | 32.2% | 33% | 39% |
| FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc | $16.4B | 48% | -0.4% | -0% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 71% | 29.3% | 18% | 31% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Alphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Alphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock earns about $124.9B on its 31.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 35.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+13%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $64.4B on 12116M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net cash $47.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($109.9B) runs well above depreciation ($23.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $153.2B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Alphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock (GOOG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GOOG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← GOODO its page in the Manual GOOGL →
Industry order: ← GNS the Software chapter GOOGL →