Gross margin
27%low FY2023
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BIPI, BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS L.P.
Marine Shipping capital-intensive
Brookfield Infrastructure 75 The objectives for our utilities segment are to invest capital in the expansion of our rate base, as well as to provide safe and reliable service for our customers on a cost-efficient basis.
Our rate base increases with capital that we invest to upgrade and expand our systems.
For our regulated assets, the return that we earn is typically determined by a regulator or bilateral customer contract for prescribed periods of time.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$23.1B
+9.8% YoY · 21% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $23.1B 5-yr avg $17.6B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Utilities (39%) and Midstream (22%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 27% and operating margin about 24% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −90 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Utilities at 39%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Utilities39%$9.1B
- Midstream22%$5.0B
- Transport20%$4.6B
- Data19%$4.4B
By geographyUnited States28%Canada19%India14%United Kingdom11%Other8%Brazil7%Other12%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.1B | $3.5B | $4.7B | $6.6B | $8.9B | $11.5B | $14.4B | $17.9B | $21.0B | $23.1B | $23.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 50% | — | 53% | 30% | 26% | 29% | 27% | 25% | 25% | 27% | 27% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $439M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.9B | $3.5B | $4.0B | $5.0B | $5.8B | $5.8B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 20.8% | 31.6% | 30.5% | 25.9% | 22.8% | 25.0% | 24.1% | 22.6% | 23.6% | 25.1% | 25.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $528M | $574M | $806M | $650M | $904M | $2.7B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.5B | $2.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 3% | 23% | 31% | 30% | 24% | 18% | 29% | 29% | 14% | 19% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $753M | $1.5B | $1.4B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $4.1B | $4.7B | $6.0B | $6.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $447M | $671M | $801M | $1.2B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.7B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.0B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($222M) | $236M | ($245M) | $279M | ($79M) | ($2.0B) | ($402M) | ($109M) | ($674M) | ($585M) | ($585M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $690M | $714M | $839M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.8B | $2.5B | $5.0B | $6.0B | $6.0B | CapexCapex |
| 32.6% | 20.2% | 18.0% | 17.9% | 16.6% | 17.9% | 19.2% | 13.9% | 23.6% | 26.1% | 26.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $306M | $767M | $523M | $961M | $1.1B | $705M | $973M | $1.6B | $1.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 14.5% | 21.7% | 11.2% | 14.6% | 11.9% | 6.1% | 6.7% | 8.9% | 4.8% | 8.4% | 8.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $63M | $767M | $523M | $961M | $1.1B | $705M | $356M | $1.6B | ($322M) | ($53M) | ($53M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.0% | 21.7% | 11.2% | 14.6% | 11.9% | 6.1% | 2.5% | 8.9% | −1.5% | −0.2% | −0.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $615M | $764M | $878M | $978M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $6M | $0 | $30M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 5% | 4% | 5% | 3% | 4% | 10% | 5% | 4% | 6% | 7% | 7% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | −1% | −0% | −1% | −1% | 6% | 0% | −0% | 0% | 2% | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $819M | $428M | $607M | $852M | $878M | $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $3.4B | $3.4B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $504M | $838M | $1.2B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $4.7B | $4.5B | $5.3B | $5.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $101M | $108M | $141M | $242M | $221M | $400M | $531M | $512M | $454M | $583M | $583M | InventoryInvent. |
| $712M | $864M | $1.3B | $2.4B | $3.3B | $4.0B | $4.5B | $5.4B | $5.8B | $6.9B | $6.9B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($107M) | $82M | $4M | ($208M) | ($1.1B) | ($1.4B) | ($1.3B) | ($214M) | ($849M) | ($974M) | ($974M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.6B | $1.5B | $2.3B | $5.8B | $3.7B | $4.9B | $6.7B | $8.0B | $9.6B | $12.0B | $12.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.4B | $5.4B | $5.5B | $8.7B | $8.4B | $11.7B | $10.9B | $15.3B | $15.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.1× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 1.1× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.8× | 0.7× | 0.9× | 0.8× | 0.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $502M | $1.3B | $3.9B | $6.6B | $6.6B | $9.0B | $8.8B | $14.5B | $14.1B | $19.2B | $19.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $21.3B | $29.5B | $36.6B | $56.3B | $61.3B | $74.0B | $73.0B | $100.8B | $104.6B | $128.2B | $128.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| 1.1× | 2.6× | 2.6× | 1.9× | 1.7× | 2.0× | 1.9× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.5× | 1.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $9.6B | $13.5B | $14.7B | $22.2B | $21.7B | $26.4B | $25.6B | $34.0B | $29.9B | $35.5B | $35.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$1.9Bowner earningsvs.$2.5Bnet incomelow FY2016
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $4.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($53M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $2.5B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $2.7B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$4.0B | +$3.6B | +$2.7B | +$2.2B | +$2.0B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$585M | −$674M | −$109M | −$402M | −$2.0B |
| Cash from operations | $6.0B | $4.7B | $4.1B | $3.1B | $2.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$4.0B | −$3.6B | −$2.5B | −$2.2B | −$2.1B |
| Owner earnings | $1.9B | $1.0B | $1.6B | $973M | $705M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$2.0B | −$1.3B | — | −$617M | — |
| Free cash flow | ($53M) | ($322M) | $1.6B | $356M | $705M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 5% | 9% | 7% | 6% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $4.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $5.8B ÷ interest expense $3.9B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 84 + DIO 13 − DPO 149 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 5%–22%; latest $1.9B = operating cash $6.0B − maintenance capex $4.0BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($53M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $6.0B ÷ net income $2.5B
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $1.7B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.9B
What this means
Of $1.9B Owner Earnings, $1.7B (86%) went back to shareholders, $1.7B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.50×ExpandingCapex $6.0B ÷ depreciation $4.0B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $23.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.78×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +197%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. . Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 28% → 24% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.
What this means
The recent-years average (24%) sits below the early years (28%), but the latest year (25%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 24% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 20.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Brookfield Infrastructure 91 Overview Our data segment is comprised of critical infrastructure that provides telecommunication, fiber and data storage services, including a growing portfolio of AI-related infrastructure to support the build-out and development of artificial intel…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$12.0B
- Cash & short-term investments$3.4B
- Receivables$5.3B
- Inventory$583M
- Other current assets$2.7B
Current liabilities$15.3B
- Accounts payable$6.9B
- Other current liabilities$8.4B
Current ratio0.78×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.75×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.22×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($3.3B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$565Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($80.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $28.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$23.2B · 80%
- Dividends$11.6B · 40%
- Buybacks$36M · 0%
- Returned to owners$11.6B
118% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $11.6B as dividends and $36M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$6.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $6.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $36M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count—
No continuous share count across the span.
- Dividend recordPays
Paid in 10 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained61%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $984M, so each retained $1 added about 0.61 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$35.0B27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity54%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $23.2B of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS L.P. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?7.4% vs 15.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 15.8% early in the record and 7.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
And these came back clean
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Marine Shipping
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCLCarnival Corp. | $26.6B | 38% | 15.0% | 9% | 13% |
| BIPIBROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS L.P. | $23.1B | 27% | 24.6% | — | 10% |
| RCLRoyal Caribbean Cruises | $17.9B | 44% | 19.4% | 7% | 22% |
| NCLHNorwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd. | $9.8B | 38% | 15.7% | 9% | 11% |
| KEXKirby | $3.4B | — | 7.7% | 4% | 10% |
| MATXMatson | $3.3B | 96% | 11.4% | 11% | 12% |
| TDWTidewater Inc. | $1.4B | — | -12.5% | -6% | 3% |
| INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock | $843M | — | 12.3% | 3% | 33% |
| Group median | — | 38% | 13.6% | — | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS L.P.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS L.P. has delivered.
BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS L.P.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
million The share count isn’t tagged in a form this tool can read; enter it too (any quote page lists it). The rest is from the record.
Through the cycle, BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS L.P. earns about $2.3B on its 10.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+15%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow ($53M) on the share count you enter above; net cash $3.4B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6.0B) runs well above depreciation ($4.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS L.P. (BIPI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BIPI, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BIPH its page in the Manual BIPJ →
Industry order: ← BIPH the Marine Shipping chapter BIPJ →