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BKV, BKV Corporation
BKV Corporation is a forward-thinking, growth-driven energy company focused on creating long-term risk-adjusted stockholder value through the development of natural gas producing assets, the ownership and operation of natural gas-fired power generation assets, and selective accretive acquisitions.
Our core businesses are the production of natural gas and the generation of natural gas-fired power from our owned and operated assets, supported by a closed-loop strategy enabled by our upstream, midstream, power, and CCUS businesses.
Our operations are supported by four business lines: natural gas production, natural gas midstream, power generation, and CCUS.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Natural gas (76%) and NGLs (19%), with 4 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 34% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 18% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −26% to 24% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 17% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Natural gas is 76% of revenue, with NGLs the other meaningful line at 19%.
- Natural gas76%$675M
- NGLs19%$173M
- Related party and other2%$13M
- Marketing1%$12M
- Midstream revenues1%$10M
- Oil1%$9M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $1.7B | $739M | $605M | $894M | $998M | RevenueRevenue |
| 9% | 16% | 17% | 14% | 14% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $305M | $158M | ($155M) | $218M | $404M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 18.3% | 21.3% | −25.6% | 24.3% | 40.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $410M | $117M | ($143M) | $173M | $299M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 13% | 19% | — | 17% | 21% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| $349M | $123M | $119M | $243M | $298M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $130M | $224M | $218M | $159M | $163M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($223M) | ($244M) | $27M | ($102M) | ($179M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $188M | $101M | $300M | $349M | CapexCapex |
| 0.0% | 25.4% | 16.7% | 33.6% | 35.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $349M | ($65M) | $18M | ($57M) | ($51M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 21.0% | −8.7% | 2.9% | −6.4% | −5.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $349M | ($65M) | $18M | ($57M) | ($51M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 21.0% | −8.7% | 2.9% | −6.4% | −5.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $619M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | $600K | $0 | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 30% | 7% | -7% | 8% | 10% | ROICROIC |
| 40% | 9% | -9% | 8% | 14% | Return on equityROE |
| 40% | 9% | −9% | 8% | 14% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $153M | $25M | $15M | $199M | $289M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $10M | $6M | $6M | $19M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $48M | $53M | $84M | $120M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($38M) | ($47M) | ($78M) | $41M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $312M | $95M | $388M | $568M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $412M | $166M | $218M | $433M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.8× | 0.6× | 1.8× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $18M | $18M | $18M | $18M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $2.7B | $2.2B | $3.1B | $4.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $579M | $165M | $487M | $1.3B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $554M | $150M | $287M | $978M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.9% | 3.5% | 2.7% | 1.4% | 1.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||
| 62.0M | 64.4M | 71.3M | 86.8M | 102M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $26.78 | $11.48 | $8.48 | $10.29 | $9.75 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $6.62 | $1.82 | $-2.00 | $1.99 | $2.92 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $5.63 | $-1.00 | $0.25 | $-0.66 | $-0.50 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $5.63 | $-1.00 | $0.25 | $-0.66 | $-0.50 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $2.92 | $1.42 | $3.46 | $3.41 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $16.72 | $20.05 | $21.88 | $23.48 | $21.63 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −27.3%/yr | −27.3%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | −33.0%/yr | −33.0%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +12.0%/yr | +12.0%/yr (3-yr) |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Midstream revenues-16.8%
“Midstream Revenues Our midstream revenues decreased by $2.1 million, or 17%, to $10.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, from $12.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. This decrease was primarily due to the divestiture of Chaffee of $2.0 million as we sold our Repsol Midstream Interest in connection with this sale.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Oil+43.2%
“Oil Revenues Our oil revenues increased by $2.9 million, or 43%, to $9.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, from $6.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was due to higher production volumes during the year ended December 31, 2025, which accounted for a $4.4 million increase in year-over-year revenues (calculated as the change in year-over-year volumes times the prior year's average price).”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $173M of profit but ($57M) of owner earnings: $231M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $173M | ($143M) | $117M | $410M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$159M | +$218M | +$224M | +$130M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$13M | +$16M | +$26M | +$32M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$102M | +$27M | −$244M | −$223M |
| Cash from operations | $243M | $119M | $123M | $349M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$300M | −$101M | −$188M | — |
| Owner earnings | ($57M) | $18M | ($65M) | $349M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -6% | 3% | -9% | 21% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer ($70M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $287M · 1.3× operating profitModest net debtCash $199M − debt $487M
What this means
Netting $199M of cash and short-term investments against $487M of debt leaves $287M owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit (2.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -7%–30%; 8% latest = NOPAT $181M ÷ invested capital $2.3BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle4-yr median margin, range -9%–21%; latest ($57M) = operating cash $243M − maintenance capex $300MIndustry peers: median 19%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -6% of revenue this year, a -6% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves ($70M).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $243M ÷ net income $173M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.89×ExpandingCapex $300M ÷ depreciation $159M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $894M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.78×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $487M vs $170M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.45/share (latest year $1.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.64/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 20% → −1% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (−1%) sits below the early years (20%), but the latest year (24%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 18% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2024 · −25.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +11.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$289M
- Receivables$142M
- Inventory$19M
- Other current assets$119M
- Debt due within a year$185M
- Accounts payable$120M
- Other current liabilities$127M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2022–2025
Over the record, the business generated $834M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$589M · 71%
- Buybacks$600K · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)$244M · 29%
- Returned to owners$600K
0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $600K as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$28.92
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $600K, about $28.92 each.
- Net change in share count65.0%
The diluted count rose from 62M to 102M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−24%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($557M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $136M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership2.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$13M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why BKV Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−1.8% vs 6.1%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 6.1% early in the record and −1.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?65.0%
Diluted shares grew 65.0% over 2022–2025, even as the company spent $600K on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Oil & Gas Producers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPORGulfport Energy | $1.4B | 69% | 0.5% | 7% | 23% |
| VNOMViper Energy | $1.3B | — | 66.4% | 18% | — |
| MGYMagnolia Oil & Gas | $1.3B | — | 41.2% | 19% | 32% |
| MNRMach Natural Resources LP Common | $1.2B | — | 39.6% | — | 41% |
| AESIAtlas Energy Solutions Inc. | $1.1B | — | 27.3% | 9% | 15% |
| BKVBKV Corporation | $894M | — | 19.8% | 7% | -2% |
| TTITetra Technologies Inc. | $631M | 28% | 8.6% | 13% | -1% |
| GTEGran Tierra Energy Inc. | $597M | 68% | 17.8% | 3% | 10% |
| Group median | — | — | 23.5% | 9% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFBKV Corporation is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered−19%/yr’22→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← BKU its page in the Manual BL →
Industry order: ← AR the Oil & Gas Producers chapter BSM →