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GPOR, Gulfport Energy

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Cyclical

Revenue is Natural gas sales (74%), Oil and Condensate (9%) and Natural gas liquid sales (9%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GPOR · Gulfport Energy

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.4B

+48.5% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.3B

Gross margin 78% 5-yr avg 68%

Operating margin 49.1% 5-yr avg −8.9%

ROIC 24% 5-yr avg 20%

Owner-earnings margin 36% 5-yr avg 22%

Free cash flow margin 22% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 54% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −25%) on a 69% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 46% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 23% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Natural gas sales is 74% of revenue, with Oil and Condensate the other meaningful line at 9%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Natural gas sales74%$1.1B
Oil and Condensate9%$134M
Natural gas liquid sales9%$133M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2015’15	2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$709M	$386M	$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$867M	$1.3B	$1.8B	$958M	$1.4B	$1.7B	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	69%	67%	47%	73%	81%	63%	75%	78%	Gross marginGross mgn
6%	11%	3%	3%	3%	7%	3%	2%	4%	3%	3%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($1.3B)	($868M)	$556M	$399M	($1.7B)	($1.4B)	$543M	$975M	($237M)	$600M	$816M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−188.3%	−225.0%	42.1%	25.7%	−109.0%	−157.2%	40.8%	54.4%	−24.7%	42.2%	49.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($1.2B)	($980M)	$435M	$431M	($2.0B)	($1.6B)	$495M	$1.5B	($261M)	$428M	$594M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	0%	-0%	—	—	0%	—	—	21%	21%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$322M	$338M	$680M	$786M	$724M	$95M	$739M	$723M	$650M	$803M	$919M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$338M	$246M	$365M	$487M	$550M	$240M	$268M	$320M	$326M	$304M	$314M	DepreciationDeprec.
$1.2B	$1.1B	($126M)	($138M)	$2.2B	$1.5B	($29M)	($1.1B)	$575M	$59M	$1M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.6B	$725M	$1.1B	$899M	$720M	$367M	$461M	$537M	$454M	$528M	$557M	CapexCapex
222.7%	187.8%	80.6%	57.9%	46.1%	42.4%	34.6%	30.0%	47.4%	37.1%	33.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($16M)	$92M	$315M	$300M	$174M	($144M)	$471M	$403M	$324M	$499M	$605M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−2.2%	23.8%	23.9%	19.3%	11.1%	−16.7%	35.4%	22.5%	33.8%	35.1%	36.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($1.3B)	($387M)	($385M)	($113M)	$4M	($272M)	$278M	$186M	$196M	$276M	$362M	Free cash flowFCF
−177.3%	−100.3%	−29.1%	−7.3%	0.3%	−31.4%	20.9%	10.4%	20.4%	19.4%	21.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$0	$0	$200M	$30M	$0	$250M	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-37%	-27%	11%	7%	-41%	—	36%	34%	-8%	18%	24%	ROICROIC
-60%	-45%	14%	13%	-152%	—	60%	68%	-15%	23%	33%	Return on equityROE
−60%	−45%	14%	13%	−152%	—	60%	68%	−15%	23%	33%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$113M	$1.3B	$100M	$52M	$6M	$90M	$7M	$2M	$1M	$2M	$3M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$72M	$137M	$147M	$210M	$121M	$120M	$278M	$123M	$156M	$185M	$129M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$265M	$265M	$554M	$518M	$415M	$245M	$38M	$44M	$35M	$53M	$68M	Accounts payablePayables
($193M)	($128M)	($407M)	($308M)	($294M)	($125M)	$241M	$79M	$121M	$132M	$61M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$332M	$1.6B	$366M	$316M	$306M	$410M	$402M	$397M	$231M	$249M	$225M	Current assetsCur. assets
$317M	$385M	$587M	$539M	$451M	$510M	$793M	$344M	$346M	$365M	$402M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	4.2×	0.6×	0.6×	0.7×	0.8×	0.5×	1.2×	0.7×	0.7×	0.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.3B	$4.2B	$5.8B	$6.1B	$3.9B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$3.3B	$2.9B	$3.0B	$3.1B	Total assetsAssets
$946M	$1.6B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$254M	$694M	$667M	$703M	$788M	$824M	Total debtDebt
$833M	$318M	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$164M	$687M	$665M	$701M	$786M	$821M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-26.1×	-13.7×	4.8×	2.8×	-12.0×	-11.3×	9.1×	17.1×	-3.9×	11.1×	14.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.0B	$2.2B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$1.3B	($301M)	$829M	$2.2B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%	1.9%	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	—	0.4%	0.5%	1.1%	0.9%	0.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
12.5M	15.4M	22.5M	21.9M	20.0M	20.0M	20.3M	18.9M	18.1M	18.4M	18.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$56.84	$25.11	$58.60	$70.77	$77.99	$43.26	$65.42	$94.79	$53.08	$77.15	$88.96	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-98.19	$-63.75	$19.31	$19.64	$-99.90	$-81.14	$24.31	$77.82	$-14.48	$23.20	$31.78	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.24	$5.98	$13.99	$13.67	$8.68	$-7.21	$23.16	$21.35	$17.97	$27.06	$32.35	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-100.77	$-25.19	$-17.08	$-5.15	$0.20	$-13.58	$13.68	$9.83	$10.86	$14.95	$19.35	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$126.59	$47.17	$47.25	$41.01	$35.93	$18.34	$22.65	$28.43	$25.16	$28.61	$29.80	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$163.45	$142.10	$137.66	$151.78	$65.59	$-15.00	$40.73	$114.36	$94.81	$99.50	$96.69	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before 2022 are restated ×1/8 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	10-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.1%/yr	+12.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	−13.8%/yr	+9.3%/yr
Book value / share	−4.8%/yr	—

The record, charted

FY2015–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

18Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

18%low FY2019

Gross margin

75%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.6×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$499Mowner earningsvs.$428Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2015FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $499M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $304M it takes just to hold its position. It put $223M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $276M.

Reported net income$428M

Owner earnings$499M · 35% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2020
Reported net income	$428M	($261M)	$1.5B	$495M	($1.6B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$304M	+$326M	+$320M	+$268M	+$240M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$12M	+$11M	+$9M	+$6M	—
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$59M	+$575M	−$1.1B	−$29M	+$1.5B
Cash from operations	$803M	$650M	$723M	$739M	$95M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$304M	−$326M	−$320M	−$268M	−$240M
Owner earnings	$499M	$324M	$403M	$471M	($144M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$223M	−$128M	−$218M	−$193M	−$128M
Free cash flow	$276M	$196M	$186M	$278M	($272M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	35%	34%	23%	35%	-17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $304M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $223M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $487M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 11.1×

Comfortable

Operating income $600M ÷ interest expense $54M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $786M · 1.3× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $2M − debt $788M

What this means
Netting $2M of cash and short-term investments against $788M of debt leaves $786M owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 7%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -41%–36%; 18% latest = NOPAT $473M ÷ invested capital $2.6B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 23%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -17%–35%; latest $499M = operating cash $803M − maintenance capex $304M

Industry peers: median 24%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 35% of revenue this year, a 23% median across 10 years. It chose to put $223M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $276M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $487M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.88×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $803M ÷ net income $428M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 50%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $250M ÷ Owner Earnings $499M

What this means
Of $499M Owner Earnings, $250M (50%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $250M buybacks. Net of $12M stock comp, the real buyback was about $238M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.73×

Expanding

Capex $528M ÷ depreciation $304M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.68×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $788M vs ($116M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $30.37/share (latest year $23.81), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $102.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −124% → 24% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −124% early to 24% lately, median −25% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +27%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 27% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · −225.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$225M

Cash & short-term investments$3M
Receivables$129M
Other current assets$93M

Current liabilities$402M

Accounts payable$68M
Other current liabilities$335M

Current ratio0.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio—inventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio

Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($178M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+122.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$824M$358K of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$7.3B · 125%
Buybacks$481M · 8%

Returned to owners$481M
20% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $481M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$2.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $2.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$82.14
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $451M, about $82.14 each.
Net change in share count49.9%
The diluted count rose from 12M to 19M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$3.8M	—	—
2021	$8.9M	—	—
2022	$6.4M	—	$471M
2023	$385k	—	$403M
2023	$5.5M	—	$403M
2024	$9.0M	—	$324M
2025	$7.3M	—	$499M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$12M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Gulfport Energy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?49.9%
Diluted shares grew 49.9% over 2015–2025, even as the company spent $481M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TALOTalos Energy Inc.	$1.8B	—	12.7%	6%	5%
HESMHess Midstream LP	$1.6B	—	60.4%	—	48%
GPORGulfport Energy	$1.4B	69%	0.5%	7%	23%
VNOMViper Energy	$1.3B	—	66.4%	18%	—
MGYMagnolia Oil & Gas	$1.3B	—	41.2%	19%	32%
MNRMach Natural Resources LP Common	$1.2B	—	39.6%	—	41%
AESIAtlas Energy Solutions Inc.	$1.1B	—	27.3%	9%	15%
BKVBKV Corporation	$894M	—	19.8%	7%	-2%
Group median	—	—	33.4%	8%	23%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gulfport Energy has delivered.

Gulfport Energy’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Gulfport Energy earns about $330M on its 23.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 35.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($330M) Net of stock comp (−$9M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($615M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+20%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022−0%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $362M on 18M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $821M. The if-converted diluted count is 19M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($557M) runs well above depreciation ($314M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $615M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GPOR against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gulfport Energy (GPOR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GPOR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GPN its page in the Manual GPRE →

Industry order: ← GFR the Oil & Gas Producers chapter GPRK →