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GTE, Gran Tierra Energy Inc.

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Cyclical

We are a company focused on oil and gas exploration and production, with assets in Colombia, Canada and Ecuador.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GTE · Gran Tierra Energy Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$597M

−4.0% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $601M 5-yr avg $608M

Gross margin 56% 5-yr avg 67%

Operating margin −61.5% 5-yr avg 4.4%

ROIC −50% 5-yr avg 1%

Owner-earnings margin 27% 5-yr avg 12%

Free cash flow margin 27% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 68% and operating margin about 17% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −359% and 34% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −194 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 1 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Colombia is 70% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

Colombia70%$418M
Canada19%$116M
Ecuador10%$63M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2010–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2010’10	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$374M	$422M	$613M	$571M	$238M	$474M	$711M	$637M	$622M	$597M	$601M	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	—	—	69%	76%	68%	64%	55%	56%	Gross marginGross mgn
11%	9%	6%	6%	11%	8%	6%	7%	8%	10%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$94M	$81M	$149M	$108M	($853M)	$23M	$242M	$106M	$39M	($238M)	($369M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
25.2%	19.1%	24.4%	18.9%	−358.7%	4.9%	34.0%	16.7%	6.3%	−39.9%	−61.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$37M	($32M)	$103M	$39M	($778M)	$42M	$139M	($6M)	$3M	($193M)	($293M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	32%	60%	—	—	43%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$204M	$190M	$285M	$178M	$81M	$245M	$428M	$228M	$239M	$313M	$413M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$139M	$127M	$197M	$221M	$161M	$136M	$176M	$210M	$223M	$268M	$268M	DepreciationDeprec.
$19M	$85M	($23M)	($83M)	$697M	$58M	$104M	$19M	$3M	$235M	$414M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$152M	$251M	$347M	$379M	$96M	$150M	$210M	$227M	$234M	$276M	$250M	CapexCapex
40.7%	59.5%	56.6%	66.4%	40.5%	31.6%	29.6%	35.6%	37.7%	46.2%	41.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$52M	$63M	$88M	($43M)	($15M)	$95M	$217M	$1M	$5M	$37M	$163M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
13.8%	14.9%	14.3%	−7.6%	−6.4%	20.0%	30.6%	0.2%	0.8%	6.3%	27.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$52M	($61M)	($63M)	($202M)	($15M)	$95M	$217M	$1M	$5M	$37M	$163M	Free cash flowFCF
13.8%	−14.6%	−10.2%	−35.3%	−6.4%	20.0%	30.6%	0.2%	0.8%	6.3%	27.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	$0	$163M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$18M	$13M	$38M	$0	$0	$27M	$17M	$15M	$3M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
9%	—	7%	3%	-66%	2%	16%	6%	2%	-22%	-50%	ROICROIC
4%	-3%	10%	4%	-303%	14%	33%	-2%	1%	-84%	-269%	Return on equityROE
4%	−3%	10%	4%	−303%	14%	33%	−2%	1%	−84%	−269%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$355M	$57M	$92M	$103M	$62M	$26M	$127M	$62M	$103M	$83M	$169M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$43M	$45M	$26M	$36M	$8M	$13M	$11M	$12M	$35M	$33M	$80M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$6M	$7M	—	—	—	—	$20M	$29M	$43M	$55M	$47M	InventoryInvent.
$76M	$126M	$155M	$196M	$101M	$149M	$168M	$123M	$173M	$195M	$402M	Accounts payablePayables
($27M)	($74M)	($128M)	($159M)	($93M)	($136M)	($137M)	($81M)	($94M)	($106M)	($276M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$418M	$145M	$203M	$291M	$134M	$102M	$169M	$112M	$211M	$214M	$289M	Current assetsCur. assets
$152M	$157M	$169M	$199M	$114M	$228M	$242M	$260M	$322M	$356M	$544M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×	0.9×	1.2×	1.5×	1.2×	0.4×	0.7×	0.4×	0.7×	0.6×	0.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$103M	$103M	$103M	$103M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Total assetsAssets
—	$257M	$399M	$700M	$775M	$654M	$590M	$555M	$747M	$708M	$596M	Total debtDebt
—	$200M	$307M	$597M	$713M	$628M	$463M	$493M	$644M	$625M	$427M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$887M	$936M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$257M	$302M	$418M	$396M	$414M	$229M	$109M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.1%	2.3%	1.4%	0.3%	0.5%	1.8%	1.3%	0.9%	1.6%	0.5%	3.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
39.6M	39.7M	42.7M	37.7M	36.7M	36.8M	36.9M	33.5M	32.0M	35.4M	35.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$9.45	$10.63	$14.36	$15.17	$6.48	$12.88	$19.26	$19.03	$19.41	$16.84	$17.01	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.94	$-0.80	$2.40	$1.03	$-21.20	$1.15	$3.76	$-0.19	$0.10	$-5.45	$-8.30	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.30	$1.58	$2.05	$-1.15	$-0.41	$2.58	$5.89	$0.04	$0.16	$1.05	$4.61	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.30	$-1.55	$-1.47	$-5.36	$-0.41	$2.58	$5.89	$0.04	$0.16	$1.05	$4.61	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.84	$6.33	$8.13	$10.07	$2.62	$4.07	$5.70	$6.77	$7.31	$7.79	$7.08	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$22.37	$23.60	$24.11	$27.43	$7.00	$8.21	$11.31	$11.84	$12.91	$6.46	$3.09	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2017 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	15-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.9%/yr	+21.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−1.4%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+4.8%/yr	+24.3%/yr
Book value / share	−8.0%/yr	−1.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2010–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

35Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

−22%low FY2020

Gross margin

55%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

16.7×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$37Mowner earningsvs.($193M)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2010FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $193M loss into $37M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($193M)	$3M	($6M)	$139M	$42M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$268M	+$223M	+$210M	+$176M	+$136M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$3M	+$10M	+$6M	+$9M	+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$235M	+$3M	+$19M	+$104M	+$58M
Cash from operations	$313M	$239M	$228M	$428M	$245M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$276M	−$234M	−$227M	−$210M	−$150M
Owner earnings	$37M	$5M	$1M	$217M	$95M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	6%	1%	0%	31%	20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $3M), owner earnings is nearer $34M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -17.2×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($238M) ÷ interest expense $14M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $576M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $83M + ST investments $48M − debt $708M

What this means
Netting $131M of cash and short-term investments against $708M of debt leaves $576M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -171d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 20 + DIO 76 − DPO 267 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -66%–16%; -22% latest = NOPAT ($188M) ÷ invested capital $854M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 6%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -8%–31%; latest $37M = operating cash $313M − maintenance capex $276M

Industry peers: median 25%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $34M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $313M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($193M) · cash from operations $313M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 9%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $3M ÷ Owner Earnings $37M

What this means
Of $37M Owner Earnings, $3M (9%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $3M buybacks. Net of $3M stock comp, the real buyback was about $252K. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.03×

Maintaining

Capex $276M ÷ depreciation $268M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $597M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.60×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $708M vs ($142M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −282%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.85/share (latest year $-5.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2010–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 23% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 23% early to −6% lately, median 17% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −6%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 6% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −358.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$289M

Cash & short-term investments$169M
Receivables$80M
Inventory$47M

Current liabilities$544M

Debt due within a year$21M
Accounts payable$402M
Other current liabilities$121M

Current ratio0.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.45×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.31×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($255M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$21M due · $169M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$109Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$574Mno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

Deferred revenue$230Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2010–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.3B · 97%
Buybacks$132M · 6%

Returned to owners$132M
26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $132M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $132M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
Net change in share count−11.0%
The diluted count fell from 40M to 35M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$00% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$163Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.3B of capital spent building

$103M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 63% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Guidry	$2.7M	$3.7M	$95M
2022	Mr. Guidry	$2.6M	$3.3M	$217M
2023	Mr. Guidry	$2.5M	$290k	$1M
2024	Mr. Guidry	$3.0M	$2.4M	$5M
2025	Mr. Guidry	$3.1M	$1.4M	$37M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Gran Tierra Energy Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2010–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.4% vs 14.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 14.3% early in the record and 2.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?13% → 21% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $49M to $126M while revenue grew 60%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (13% of revenue then, 21% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BKVBKV Corporation	$894M	—	19.8%	7%	-2%
TTITetra Technologies Inc.	$631M	28%	8.6%	13%	-1%
GTEGran Tierra Energy Inc.	$597M	68%	17.8%	3%	10%
GRNTGranite Ridge Resources Inc.	$450M	—	19.3%	9%	56%
BSMBlack Stone Minerals L.P. Common	$422M	—	50.6%	—	65%
TXOTXO Partners L.P. Common	$363M	—	-5.7%	—	25%
EGYVAALCO Energy Inc.	$359M	—	27.2%	18%	23%
KRPKimbell Royalty Partners	$334M	—	20.1%	—	39%
Group median	—	—	19.6%	9%	24%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gran Tierra Energy Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Gran Tierra Energy Inc. earns about $60M on its 10.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($60M) Net of stock comp (−$23M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−39%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021−21%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $163M on 35M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $427M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GTE against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gran Tierra Energy Inc. (GTE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GTE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GT its page in the Manual GTES →

Industry order: ← GRNT the Oil & Gas Producers chapter HESM →