Owner Scorecard


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AR, Antero Resources

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Cyclical

Revenue is led by Natural gas sales (54%) and Natural Gas Liquids Sales (38%), with 3 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AR · Antero Resources
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$5.3B
+22.0% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.9B 5-yr avg $5.2B
Operating margin 22.9% 5-yr avg 12.3%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 33% 5-yr avg 23%
Free cash flow margin 33% 5-yr avg 22%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 0.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −56% and 36% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 15% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 1 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 23% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Natural gas sales at 54%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Natural gas sales54%$2.9B
  • Natural Gas Liquids Sales38%$2.0B
  • Oil sales3%$150M
  • Marketing2%$126M
  • Commodity derivative fair value gains2%$111M
  • Amortization Of Deferred Revenue VPP0%$25M
  • Other Revenue And Income0%$3M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.7B$3.7B$4.1B$4.4B$3.5B$4.6B$7.1B$4.7B$4.3B$5.3B$5.9BRevenueRevenue
14%7%6%4%4%3%2%5%5%4%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($976M)$740M$72M($987M)($953M)$24M$2.5B$396M$460K$884M$1.3BOperating incomeOp. inc.
−55.9%20.2%1.7%−22.4%−27.3%0.5%35.6%8.5%0.0%16.7%22.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($849M)$615M($398M)($340M)($1.3B)($187M)$1.9B$198M$57M$634M$962MNet incomeNet inc.
19%24%25%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.2B$2.0B$2.1B$1.1B$736M$1.7B$3.1B$995M$849M$1.6B$2.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$810M$825M$972M$915M$862M$742M$715M$747M$762M$750M$770MDepreciationDeprec.
$1.2B$463M$1.4B$505M$1.1B$1.1B$429M($10M)($36M)$186M$244MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$612M$2.2B$2.2B$1.4B$874M$716M$944M$151M$91M$253M$86MCapexCapex
35.1%60.6%53.4%32.3%25.0%15.5%13.2%3.2%2.1%4.8%1.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$630M$1.2B$1.1B$189M($139M)$944M$2.3B$844M$758M$1.4B$1.9BOwner earningsOwner earn.
36.1%32.3%26.8%4.3%−4.0%20.4%32.7%18.0%17.5%26.1%33.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$630M($210M)($129M)($319M)($139M)$944M$2.1B$844M$758M$1.4B$1.9BFree cash flowFCF
36.1%−5.8%−3.1%−7.2%−4.0%20.4%29.5%18.0%17.5%26.1%33.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$129M$39M$43M$874M$75M$136MBuybacksBuybacks
-7%6%-7%-8%0%26%4%0%8%8%ROICROIC
-14%8%-5%-5%-22%-3%28%3%1%8%12%Return on equityROE
−14%8%−5%−5%−22%−3%28%3%1%8%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$32M$28M$0$0$0$0$0$0$0$210M$0Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$30M$35M$51M$46M$28M$79M$35M$43M$34M$34M$32MReceivablesReceiv.
$39M$63M$66M$14M$27M$25M$78M$84MAccounts payablePayables
($9M)($28M)($15M)$32M$2M$54M($42M)$43M$34M$34M($51M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$403M$833M$807M$923M$574M$686M$788M$476M$508M$832M$678MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$817M$762M$854M$1.0B$983M$2.1B$1.8B$1.5B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×1.1×0.9×0.9×0.6×0.3×0.4×0.3×0.4×0.6×0.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$14.3B$15.3B$15.5B$15.2B$13.2B$13.9B$14.1B$13.5B$13.0B$13.2B$15.3BTotal assetsAssets
$4.7B$4.8B$5.5B$3.8B$3.1B$2.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$4.5BTotal debtDebt
$4.7B$4.8B$5.5B$3.8B$3.1B$2.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.5B$1.2B$4.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-3.8×2.8×0.3×4.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$6.3B$8.1B$7.7B$7.0B$5.8B$5.8B$6.8B$6.9B$7.0B$7.6B$8.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
5.9%2.8%1.7%0.5%0.7%0.4%0.5%1.3%1.5%1.2%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
295M316M316M306M272M308M329M312M313M312M311MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.91$11.56$13.10$14.39$12.82$14.99$21.68$15.03$13.80$16.89$18.84Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.88$1.94$-1.26$-1.11$-4.65$-0.61$5.69$0.64$0.18$2.03$3.09EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.13$3.74$3.51$0.62$-0.51$3.06$7.10$2.71$2.42$4.41$6.25Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.13$-0.67$-0.41$-1.04$-0.51$3.06$6.40$2.71$2.42$4.41$6.25Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.07$7.01$6.99$4.64$3.21$2.32$2.87$0.49$0.29$0.81$0.27Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$21.23$25.77$24.26$22.75$21.17$18.68$20.52$22.15$22.40$24.17$25.89Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.4%/yr+5.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−9.9%/yr−24.1%/yr
Book value / share+1.5%/yr+2.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
312Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
8%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.9×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.4Bowner earningsvs.$634Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $634M of profit into $1.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$634M
Owner earnings$1.4B · 26% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$634M$57M$198M$1.9B($187M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$750M+$762M+$747M+$715M+$742M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$61M+$66M+$60M+$35M+$20M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$186M−$36M−$10M+$429M+$1.1B
Cash from operations$1.6B$849M$995M$3.1B$1.7B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$253M−$91M−$151M−$715M−$716M
Owner earnings$1.4B$758M$844M$2.3B$944M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$229M
Free cash flow$1.4B$758M$844M$2.1B$944M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue26%18%18%33%20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $61M), owner earnings is nearer $1.3B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $884M ÷ interest expense $287M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.2B · 4.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $210M − debt $4.4B
    What this means

    Netting $210M of cash and short-term investments against $4.4B of debt leaves $4.2B owed, about 4.7× a year's operating profit (4.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -8%–26%; 6% latest = NOPAT $659M ÷ invested capital $11.7B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -4%–36%; latest $1.4B = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $253M
    Industry peers: median 24%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 20% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $61M of SBC) leaves $1.3B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.6B ÷ net income $634M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $136M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.4B
    What this means

    Of $1.4B Owner Earnings, $136M (10%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $136M buybacks. Net of $61M stock comp, the real buyback was about $76M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.34×
    Harvesting
    Capex $253M ÷ depreciation $750M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.4B vs ($672M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.96/share (latest year $2.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −11% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −11% early to 8% lately, median 1% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −55.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.6%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$678M
  • Receivables$32M
  • Other current assets$645M
Current liabilities$1.7B
  • Accounts payable$84M
  • Other current liabilities$1.6B
Current ratio0.40×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratioinventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio0.00×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.0B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+34.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.3× → 0.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$8.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($6.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.7B$2.1B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $6.5B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$30Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$644M
'27$488M
'28$407M
'29$322M
'30$249M
later$409M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$644Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$2.5Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$2.1Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$4.4B
Lease obligations (present value)$2.1B
Total fixed claims on the business$6.5B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $6.5B, of which the leases are 33%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $15.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$9.5B · 62%
  • Buybacks$1.3B · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$4.6B · 30%
  • Returned to owners$1.3B

    14% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.3B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $1.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count5.6%

    The diluted count rose from 295M to 311M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$6.5M$34.0M$944M
2022$24.6M$65.6M$2.3B
2023$13.5M−$6.5M$844M
2024Paul M. Rady$14.2M$40.5M$758M
2025$12.2M$12.8M$1.4B
2025$6.7M$6.9M$1.4B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership4.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio65:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$61M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Antero Resources is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?20.6% vs 31.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 31.7% early in the record and 20.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.6%

    Diluted shares grew 5.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.3B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $3.7B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PARRPar Pacific Holdings$7.5B78%2.6%11%1%
ARAntero Resources$5.3B1.1%0%23%
CIVICivitas Resources$5.2B29.6%9%60%
PRPermian Resources$5.1B31.8%7%50%
CHRDChord Energy$4.9B80%8.1%1%24%
CRGYCrescent Energy$3.6B13.6%2%23%
SMSM Energy$3.2B62%19.8%8%47%
CRCCalifornia Resources$2.9B24%19.7%13%12%
Group median16.7%7%24%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Antero Resources has delivered.

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Through the cycle, Antero Resources earns about $1.2B on its 23.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+20%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.9B on 310M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $4.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Antero Resources (AR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AQST its page in the Manual ARCB →

Industry order: ← 1605 the Oil & Gas Producers chapter BKV →