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BMR, Beamr Imaging Ltd. Ordinary Share

Software asset-light UnprofitableNet current asset value

Beamr is a world leader in content-adaptive video compression.

We are trusted by leading global technology companies, including NVIDIA and Amazon Web Services (AWS), and serve top media companies such as Netflix, Paramount and JioHotstar.

Our solutions enable customers to deliver media content with exceptional quality and performance, and allow efficient, cost-effective petabyte-scale machine vision video data workflows.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F

BMR · Beamr Imaging Ltd. Ordinary Share

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3M

+1.0% YoY · −1% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM

Cash & investments $14M

Cash burn · annual $5M

Runway 2.9 yrs

Gross margin 90%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Term-Based Software License (68%) and Perpetual Based Software License (21%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation: Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −52% through the cycle on a 97% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −11 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −54%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Term-Based Software License is 68% of revenue, with Perpetual Based Software License the other meaningful line at 21%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Term-Based Software License68%$2M
Perpetual Based Software License21%$639K
Web Advertising at a Point of Time Upon Clicks6%$192K
PCS services transferred over a period of time5%$148K
Sales-based Software License1%$23K

By geographyUnited States79%Rest of the World20%Israel1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
							Income statement
$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	RevenueRevenue
97%	97%	97%	97%	92%	90%	90%	Gross marginGross mgn
($2M)	($425K)	($1M)	($878K)	($3M)	($6M)	($6M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−52.5%	−12.9%	−36.0%	−30.2%	−104.9%	−208.6%	−208.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($2M)	($952K)	($1M)	($695K)	($3M)	($6M)	($6M)	Net incomeNet inc.
							Cash flow & returns
($1M)	$569K	($645K)	($659K)	($2M)	($5M)	($5M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$679K	$193K	$28K	$26K	$170K	$242K	$242K	DepreciationDeprec.
$760K	$1M	$575K	$10K	$1M	$1M	$1M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$7K	$4K	$2K	$10K	$36K	$27K	$27K	CapexCapex
0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	1.2%	0.9%	0.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($1M)	$565K	($647K)	($669K)	($2M)	($5M)	($5M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−32.3%	17.1%	−22.6%	−23.0%	−62.7%	−152.8%	−152.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($1M)	$565K	($647K)	($669K)	($2M)	($5M)	($5M)	Free cash flowFCF
−32.3%	17.1%	−22.6%	−23.0%	−62.7%	−152.8%	−152.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-57%	-120%	—	-15%	-52%	-54%	-51%	ROICROIC
-197%	-210%	—	-7%	-16%	-38%	-38%	Return on equityROE
−197%	−210%	—	−7%	−16%	−38%	−38%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
							Balance sheet
—	$1M	$693K	$6M	$20M	$14M	$14M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$891K	$581K	$597K	$506K	$266K	$266K	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$27K	$33K	$7K	$10K	$120K	$120K	Accounts payablePayables
—	$864K	$548K	$590K	$496K	$146K	$146K	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$2M	$1M	$7M	$17M	$12M	$12M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$1M	$945K	$1M	$967K	$915K	$915K	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.4×	1.4×	6.7×	17.8×	13.1×	13.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$4M	$4M	$4M	$4M	$4M	$4M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$7M	$6M	$12M	$22M	$17M	$17M	Total assetsAssets
$1M	$853K	$513K	$554K	$250K	—	$554K	Total debtDebt
$1M	($175K)	($180K)	($6M)	($20M)	—	($13M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$1M	$454K	($460K)	$10M	$21M	$16M	$16M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
							Per share
2.6M	2.6M	2.6M	11.4M	15.2M	15.5M	15.5M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.23	$1.28	$1.11	$0.25	$0.20	$0.20	$0.20	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.96	$-0.37	$-0.48	$-0.06	$-0.22	$-0.39	$-0.39	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.40	$0.22	$-0.25	$-0.06	$-0.13	$-0.30	$-0.30	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.40	$0.22	$-0.25	$-0.06	$-0.13	$-0.30	$-0.30	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.49	$0.18	$-0.18	$0.90	$1.39	$1.02	$1.01	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×4.44 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	5-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−30.6%/yr	−30.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	−8.5%/yr	−8.5%/yr
Book value / share	+15.9%/yr	+15.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

16Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−54%low FY2021

Gross margin

90%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($5M)owner earningsvs.($6M)net incomelow FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $6M loss into ($5M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($6M)	($3M)	($695K)	($1M)	($952K)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$242K	+$170K	+$26K	+$28K	+$193K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1M	+$1M	+$10K	+$575K	+$1M
Cash from operations	($5M)	($2M)	($659K)	($645K)	$569K
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$27K	−$36K	−$10K	−$2K	−$4K
Owner earnings	($5M)	($2M)	($669K)	($647K)	$565K
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-153%	-63%	-23%	-23%	17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$13M

Net cash

Cash $6M + ST investments $8M − debt $554K

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $13M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -106d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 31 + DIO 0 − DPO 138 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -54%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -120%–-15%; -51% latest = NOPAT ($5M) ÷ invested capital $10M

Industry peers: median -18%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -51% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -32%

Consumes cash through the cycle

6-yr median margin, range -153%–17%; latest ($5M) = operating cash ($5M) − maintenance capex $27K

Industry peers: median -161%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -153% of revenue this year, a -32% median across 6 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? ($5M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($6M) · cash from operations ($5M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.11×

Harvesting

Capex $27K ÷ depreciation $242K

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 13.15×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $554K vs $11M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.22/share (latest year $-0.39), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 6

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −34% → −115% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −34% early to −115% lately, median −52% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Worst year 2025 · −208.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Additionally, failures in the performance of our AI models could damage our reputation, erode customer trust, and result in loss of business and negative publicity.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$12M

Cash & short-term investments$14M
Receivables$266K

Current liabilities$915K

Debt due within a year$278K
Accounts payable$120K
Other current liabilities$517K

Current ratio13.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio13.15×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio15.07×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$11Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$278K due · $14M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet

Cash runway2.9 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$11Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$554Kno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

Deferred revenue$9Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5M28% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity28%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 6 years buying other businesses, against $86K of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
QXLQuantum X Labs Inc.	$27M	95%	-9.4%	-2%	3%
GEGGLGreat Elm Group, Inc.	$16M	93%	-46.5%	-12%	-3%
NXTTNext Technology Holding Inc.	$12M	59%	-24.0%	-1%	-29%
PDYNPalladyne AI Corp.	$5M	30%	-916.4%	-333%	-500%
DJTTrump Media & Technology Group Corp.	$4M	55%	-3360.9%	-18%	-943%
BMRBeamr Imaging Ltd. Ordinary Share	$3M	97%	-44.2%	-54%	-28%
ODYSOdysight.ai Inc.	$3M	29%	-593.1%	-442%	-584%
PHUNPhunware Inc.	$3M	51%	-175.0%	-124%	-161%
Group median	—	57%	-110.7%	-36%	-95%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Beamr Imaging Ltd. Ordinary Share reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Beamr Imaging Ltd. Ordinary Share is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered−1%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−153%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh BMR against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Beamr Imaging Ltd. Ordinary Share (BMR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BMR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BMO its page in the Manual BN →

Industry order: ← BLZE the Software chapter BOX →