Owner Scorecard


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BOX, Box, Inc.

Software asset-light

Box is the leading Intelligent Content Management provider.

Box gives organizations a single platform for their unstructured data which typically represents about 90% of all data within an organization.

The Box ICM platform enables our customers to securely manage the entire content lifecycle, from the moment a file is created or ingested to when it is shared, edited, published, approved, signed, classified, and retained.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
BOX · Box, Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$1.2B
+8.0% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.0B
Gross margin 80% 5-yr avg 76%
Operating margin 8.6% 5-yr avg 4.0%
Owner-earnings margin 30% 5-yr avg 30%
Free cash flow margin 30% 5-yr avg 30%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −4.9% through the cycle on a 72% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 20% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$399M$506M$608M$696M$771M$874M$991M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
72%73%71%69%71%71%75%75%79%79%80%Gross marginGross mgn
17%17%15%15%14%15%13%12%13%13%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
29%27%27%29%26%25%25%24%24%25%25%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($151M)($154M)($134M)($139M)($38M)($28M)$37M$51M$80M$83M$104MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−37.8%−30.4%−22.1%−20.0%−4.9%−3.2%3.7%4.9%7.3%7.1%8.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($152M)($155M)($135M)($144M)($43M)($41M)$27M$129M$245M$115M$125MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($2M)$35M$55M$45M$197M$235M$298M$319M$332M$356M$370MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$40M$40M$46M$59M$75M$78M$66M$51M$22M$33M$35MDepreciationDeprec.
$31M$53M$24M($16M)$10M$19M$20M($60M)($153M)($26M)($26M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$15M$12M$15M$5M$5M$5M$3M$6M$7MCapexCapex
3.8%2.3%2.4%0.8%0.5%0.5%0.2%0.5%0.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($17M)$24M$41M$39M$293M$314M$330M$350M$363MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−4.4%4.7%6.7%5.6%29.6%30.3%30.2%29.8%30.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($17M)$24M$41M$39M$293M$314M$330M$350M$363MFree cash flowFCF
−4.4%4.7%6.7%5.6%29.6%30.3%30.2%29.8%30.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$458K$59M$3M$3MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$562M$274M$177M$211M$290MBuybacksBuybacks
-203%-1035%-429%-646%-29%Return on equityROE
−203%n/m−429%−646%−29%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$177M$208M$218M$196M$595M$586M$461M$481M$723M$478M$477MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$120M$162M$175M$209M$228M$256M$265M$281M$293M$325M$192MReceivablesReceiv.
$7M$17M$15M$17M$5M$5MAccounts payablePayables
$113M$145M$160M$193M$224M$256M$265M$281M$293M$325M$188MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$322M$399M$429M$458M$879M$917M$807M$842M$1.1B$891M$766MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$298M$394M$463M$577M$613M$719M$716M$679M$922M$803M$717MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.0×0.9×0.8×1.4×1.3×1.1×1.2×1.2×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$16M$16M$19M$19M$19M$74M$74M$77M$77M$82M$82MGoodwillGoodwill
$494M$554M$650M$960M$1.4B$1.4B$1.2B$1.2B$1.7B$1.5B$1.4BTotal assetsAssets
$40M$40M$40M$40M$298M$367M$369M$371M$653M$451M$452MTotal debtDebt
($137M)($168M)($178M)($156M)($297M)($219M)($92M)($110M)($70M)($27M)($25M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
7.6×13.2×13.1×7.8×10.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$75M$15M$31M$22M$151M($395M)($524M)($431M)($297M)($299M)($338M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
19.7%19.3%19.6%21.0%20.0%20.5%18.7%19.2%20.1%19.9%19.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
127M134M141M148M156M156M150M149M149M149M140MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.13$3.78$4.30$4.71$4.95$5.62$6.60$6.98$7.33$7.89$8.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.19$-1.16$-0.95$-0.98$-0.28$-0.27$0.18$0.87$1.65$0.77$0.89EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.14$0.18$0.29$0.27$1.95$2.11$2.22$2.35$2.59Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.14$0.18$0.29$0.27$1.95$2.11$2.22$2.35$2.59Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.12$0.09$0.10$0.04$0.03$0.03$0.02$0.04$0.05Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.59$0.11$0.22$0.15$0.97$-2.54$-3.49$-2.90$-2.00$-2.01$-2.41Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.8%/yr+9.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.4%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share−11.1%/yr+6.7%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
149Mpeak FY2021
Gross margin
79%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$350Mowner earningsvs.$115Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $115M of profit into $350M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$115M
Owner earnings$350M · 30% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2020
Reported net income$115M$245M$129M$27M($144M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$33M+$22M+$51M+$66M+$59M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$234M+$219M+$199M+$186M+$146M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$26M−$153M−$60M+$20M−$16M
Cash from operations$356M$332M$319M$298M$45M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$6M−$3M−$5M−$5M−$5M
Owner earnings$350M$330M$314M$293M$39M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue30%30%30%30%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $234M), owner earnings is nearer $117M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $83M ÷ interest expense $11M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $375M + ST investments $103M − debt $451M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $27M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 101 + DIO 0 − DPO 7 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($223M) = debt $451M + equity ($299M) − cash
    Industry peers: median -1%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -4%–30%; latest $350M = operating cash $356M − maintenance capex $6M
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 30% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $234M of SBC) leaves $117M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $356M ÷ net income $115M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $290M ÷ Owner Earnings $350M
    What this means

    Of $350M Owner Earnings, $290M (83%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $290M buybacks. Net of $234M stock comp, the real buyback was about $56M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.18×
    Harvesting
    Capex $6M ÷ depreciation $33M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.11×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $451M vs $89M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.18/share (latest year $0.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-2.16/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −30% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −30% early to 6% lately, median −5% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth +68%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 68% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · −37.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +1.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“As AI becomes increasingly integrated into our markets, competitors may be able to incorporate AI capabilities more efficiently or achieve faster adoption than we do, which could adversely affect demand for our offerings.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$766M
  • Cash & short-term investments$477M
  • Receivables$192M
  • Other current assets$96M
Current liabilities$717M
  • Accounts payable$5M
  • Other current liabilities$712M
Current ratio1.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.07×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.67×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$49Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($519M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($498M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$556M$105M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$610Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$65M · 5%
  • Buybacks$952M · 66%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$421M · 29%
  • Returned to owners$952M

    69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $952M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $412M and cash and short-term investments rose $300M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $952M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count9.9%

    The diluted count rose from 127M to 140M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Aaron Levie$293k$253k
2023Aaron Levie$274k−$790k$293M
2024Aaron Levie$211k$211k$314M
2025Aaron Levie$12.6M$13.3M$330M
2026Aaron Levie$257k−$9.2M$350M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio45:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$234M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 20% of revenue, equal to 281% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Box, Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?9.9%

    Diluted shares grew 9.9% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $952M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KVYOKlaviyo Inc. Series A$1.2B75%-11.6%-44%17%
GWREGuidewire Software$1.2B55%-2.8%-1%16%
CVLTCommvault Systems$1.2B83%0.3%-1%18%
BOXBox, Inc.$1.2B73%-4.0%18%
CFLTConfluent Inc.$1.2B68%-65.5%-24%-28%
BLKBBlackbaud Inc.$1.1B54%4.1%3%20%
MANHManhattan Associates$1.1B55%23.3%214%25%
SAILSailPoint Inc.$1.1B64%-28.7%-4%-13%
Group median66%-3.4%17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Box, Inc. has delivered.

Box, Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Box, Inc. earns about $213M on its 18.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 29.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’26+13%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+68%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $363M on 138M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $25M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($7M) runs well above depreciation ($35M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $364M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Box, Inc. (BOX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BOX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BOW its page in the Manual BPOP →

Industry order: ← BMR the Software chapter BRZE →