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MANH, Manhattan Associates

Software asset-light

Manhattan Associates develops modern, cloud-based, supply chain commerce solutions that help our customers in three distinct areas of their business: Supply Chain Execution - We provide companies with the tools needed to manage distribution and optimize transportation costs throughout their entire commercial network.

We develop, sell, deploy, service and maintain software solutions designed to manage supply chains, inventory and omnichannel operations for retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers, logistics providers and other organizations.

We run our Manhattan Active applications in the cloud and deliver them as subscription-based software as a service ("SaaS").

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MANH · Manhattan Associates

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.1B

+3.7% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $897M

Gross margin 56% 5-yr avg 55%

Operating margin 25.6% 5-yr avg 22.7%

Owner-earnings margin 36% 5-yr avg 28%

Free cash flow margin 34% 5-yr avg 28%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Services (47%) and Cloud Subscriptions (38%), with 3 more lines behind.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 55% and operating margin about 23% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Stock-based pay runs about 5.7% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 214%, above 15% in 3 of 3 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 25% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Services at 47%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Services47%$503M
Cloud Subscriptions38%$408M
Maintenance12%$130M
Hardware2%$25M
Software License1%$15M

By geographyAmericas75%EMEA20%Asia Pacific5%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$605M	$595M	$559M	$618M	$586M	$664M	$767M	$929M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	RevenueRevenue
59%	59%	57%	54%	54%	55%	53%	54%	55%	56%	56%	Gross marginGross mgn
8%	8%	9%	10%	10%	10%	10%	9%	9%	9%	8%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%	10%	13%	14%	14%	15%	15%	14%	13%	13%	13%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$194M	$186M	$134M	$116M	$114M	$134M	$153M	$210M	$262M	$280M	$282M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
32.1%	31.2%	23.9%	18.8%	19.5%	20.2%	19.9%	22.6%	25.1%	25.9%	25.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$124M	$116M	$105M	$86M	$87M	$110M	$129M	$177M	$218M	$220M	$217M	Net incomeNet inc.
37%	37%	23%	26%	23%	18%	18%	17%	18%	23%	25%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$139M	$164M	$137M	$147M	$141M	$185M	$180M	$246M	$295M	$389M	$398M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$9M	$9M	$9M	$8M	$9M	$8M	$7M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$7M	DepreciationDeprec.
($10M)	$22M	$4M	$21M	$11M	$24M	($15M)	($8M)	($23M)	$52M	$66M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$7M	$6M	$7M	$15M	$3M	$4M	$7M	$5M	$9M	$15M	$19M	CapexCapex
1.1%	1.0%	1.3%	2.5%	0.5%	0.6%	0.9%	0.5%	0.8%	1.4%	1.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$133M	$158M	$130M	$139M	$138M	$181M	$173M	$241M	$289M	$383M	$392M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
21.9%	26.6%	23.3%	22.5%	23.6%	27.3%	22.6%	26.0%	27.7%	35.4%	35.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$133M	$158M	$130M	$132M	$138M	$181M	$173M	$241M	$286M	$374M	$380M	Free cash flowFCF
21.9%	26.6%	23.3%	21.3%	23.6%	27.3%	22.6%	26.0%	27.5%	34.6%	34.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$168M	$132M	$149M	$121M	$44M	$120M	$204M	$196M	$286M	$315M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
167%	237%	214%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	ROICROIC
73%	67%	71%	60%	40%	44%	57%	63%	73%	70%	106%	Return on equityROE
73%	67%	71%	60%	40%	44%	57%	63%	73%	70%	106%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$96M	$126M	$101M	$111M	$205M	$264M	$225M	$271M	$266M	$329M	$226M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$100M	$92M	$100M	$101M	$109M	$124M	$167M	$181M	$205M	$215M	$227M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$12M	$14M	$18M	$21M	$18M	$20M	$26M	$25M	$27M	$22M	$22M	Accounts payablePayables
$88M	$78M	$82M	$80M	$91M	$105M	$141M	$157M	$179M	$192M	$205M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$207M	$228M	$215M	$232M	$334M	$408M	$415M	$479M	$503M	$583M	$516M	Current assetsCur. assets
$118M	$124M	$145M	$182M	$197M	$249M	$316M	$366M	$400M	$456M	$467M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×	1.8×	1.5×	1.3×	1.7×	1.6×	1.3×	1.3×	1.3×	1.3×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$62M	$62M	$62M	$62M	$62M	$62M	$62M	$62M	$62M	$62M	$62M	GoodwillGoodwill
$297M	$315M	$307M	$372M	$465M	$540M	$570M	$673M	$758M	$839M	$741M	Total assetsAssets
($96M)	($126M)	($101M)	($111M)	($205M)	($264M)	($225M)	($271M)	($266M)	($329M)	($226M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$169M	$175M	$147M	$142M	$219M	$251M	$227M	$278M	$299M	$315M	$205M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.6%	2.7%	3.6%	5.2%	5.7%	6.5%	7.7%	7.7%	8.9%	10.3%	9.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
72.1M	69.4M	66.4M	65.1M	64.3M	64.3M	63.4M	62.6M	62.2M	61.1M	60.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$8.39	$8.56	$8.42	$9.49	$9.11	$10.32	$12.10	$14.83	$16.76	$17.71	$18.34	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.72	$1.68	$1.58	$1.32	$1.36	$1.72	$2.03	$2.82	$3.51	$3.60	$3.61	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.84	$2.27	$1.96	$2.13	$2.15	$2.82	$2.73	$3.86	$4.64	$6.28	$6.52	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.84	$2.27	$1.96	$2.02	$2.15	$2.82	$2.73	$3.86	$4.60	$6.13	$6.32	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.09	$0.09	$0.11	$0.23	$0.04	$0.06	$0.10	$0.08	$0.14	$0.25	$0.31	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.35	$2.52	$2.21	$2.19	$3.40	$3.90	$3.58	$4.44	$4.81	$5.16	$3.42	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.7%/yr	+14.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+14.6%/yr	+23.9%/yr
EPS	+8.5%/yr	+21.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+11.5%/yr	+42.9%/yr
Book value / share	+9.1%/yr	+8.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

61Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

214%low FY2016

Gross margin

56%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$383Mowner earningsvs.$220Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $383M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $6M it takes just to hold its position. It put $9M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $374M.

Reported net income$220M

Owner earnings$383M · 35% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$220M	$218M	$177M	$129M	$110M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$6M	+$6M	+$6M	+$7M	+$8M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$111M	+$93M	+$72M	+$59M	+$43M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$52M	−$23M	−$8M	−$15M	+$24M
Cash from operations	$389M	$295M	$246M	$180M	$185M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$6M	−$6M	−$5M	−$7M	−$4M
Owner earnings	$383M	$289M	$241M	$173M	$181M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$9M	−$2M	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$374M	$286M	$241M	$173M	$181M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	35%	28%	26%	23%	27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $6M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $9M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $111M), owner earnings is nearer $272M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$330M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $329M + ST investments $1M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $330M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 55d

Tight

DSO 72 + DIO 0 − DPO 17 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median -4%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 24%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 22%–35%; latest $383M = operating cash $389M − maintenance capex $6M

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 35% of revenue this year, a 24% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $111M of SBC) leaves $272M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.77×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $389M ÷ net income $220M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 82%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $315M ÷ Owner Earnings $383M

What this means
Of $383M Owner Earnings, $315M (82%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $315M buybacks. Net of $111M stock comp, the real buyback was about $204M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.45×

Expanding

Capex $15M ÷ depreciation $6M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.28×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +78%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.46/share (latest year $3.72), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.32/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Operating margin 29% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 29% early to 25% lately, median 23% — competition or costs are biting in.
Owner earnings growth +10%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 18.8% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −1.8%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“This risk is intensified by the current trend of entities seeking patents and other intellectual property protections in AI to gain a competitive edge.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$516M

Cash & short-term investments$226M
Receivables$227M
Other current assets$63M

Current liabilities$467M

Accounts payable$22M
Other current liabilities$445M

Current ratio1.10×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.48×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$48Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$140Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$61M$61M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$356Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$78M · 4%
Buybacks$1.7B · 86%
Retained (debt / cash)$210M · 10%

Returned to owners$1.7B
88% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.7B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−16.7%
The diluted count fell from 72M to 60M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$7.1M	$19.8M	$181M
2022	$10.4M	$4.8M	$173M
2023	$10.4M	$31.9M	$241M
2024	$10.8M	$23.6M	$289M
2025	$10.2M	−$8.0M	$383M
2025	$16.7M	$16.5M	$383M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio121:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$111M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue, equal to 40% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Manhattan Associates is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$110M · 10% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our top five customers (new or pre-existing) in the aggregate accounted for 10%, 12%, and 11% of total revenue for the years ended December 31, 2025, 2024, and 2023, respectively.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CFLTConfluent Inc.	$1.2B	68%	-65.5%	-24%	-28%
BLKBBlackbaud Inc.	$1.1B	54%	4.1%	3%	20%
MANHManhattan Associates	$1.1B	55%	23.3%	214%	25%
SAILSailPoint Inc.	$1.1B	64%	-28.7%	-4%	-13%
FIGFigma Inc.	$1.1B	88%	-117.1%	-92%	23%
DUOLDuolingo Inc.	$1.0B	73%	-6.2%	44%	21%
ALRMAlarm.com	$1.0B	63%	8.7%	16%	13%
TENBTenable	$999M	81%	-9.1%	-10%	15%
Group median	—	66%	-7.7%	-1%	17%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Manhattan Associates has delivered.

Manhattan Associates’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Manhattan Associates earns about $268M on its 24.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 35.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($268M) Net of stock comp (−$109M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($392M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+17%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $380M on 59M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-21; net cash $226M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($19M) runs well above depreciation ($7M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $392M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh MANH against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Manhattan Associates (MANH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MANH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MAN its page in the Manual MAR →

Industry order: ← LSPD the Software chapter MBLY →