Share count
544Mpeak FY2026
← All companies ← SAIC Manual SAM → ← SAIC Software SANG →
SAIL, SailPoint Inc.
SailPoint Inc. delivers solutions to enable adaptive identity security for the enterprise.
We do this via the SailPoint Platform that unifies identity data across systems and identity types, including employee identities, non-employee identities, machine identities, and AI agents for real-time governance.
Our SaaS and customer-hosted offerings leverage intelligent analytics to provide organizations with critical visibility into which identities currently have access to which resources, which identities should have access to those resources, and how that access is being used.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
$1.1B
+24.4% YoY
Vital signs · TTM, with 3-yr average
Revenue $1.1B 3-yr avg $878M
Revenue $280M +21.6% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −28.5% yr-ago −80.3%
Net income ($75M) yr-ago ($211M)
Net margin −26.7% yr-ago −91.6%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by SaaS (56%) and Term subscriptions (21%), with 3 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −29% through the cycle on a 64% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 5.4% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest SaaS at 56%.
Revenue by product line, FY2026
- SaaS56%$602M
- Term subscriptions21%$229M
- Maintenance14%$151M
- Services and other6%$61M
- Other subscription services3%$28M
By geographyUnited States65%EMEA21%Rest of the World14%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2024–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $700M | $862M | $1.1B | $1.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 60% | 65% | 64% | 66% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 16% | 13% | 19% | 15% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 26% | 20% | 21% | 19% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($333M) | ($189M) | ($307M) | ($202M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −47.6% | −21.9% | −28.7% | −18.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($395M) | ($316M) | ($270M) | ($157M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| ($250M) | ($106M) | $71M | $206M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $264M | $237M | $211M | $212M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($156M) | ($60M) | ($125M) | ($67M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $3M | $5M | $6M | $5M | CapexCapex |
| 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($253M) | ($112M) | $65M | $201M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −36.2% | −13.0% | 6.0% | 17.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($253M) | ($112M) | $65M | $201M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −36.2% | −13.0% | 6.0% | 17.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $8M | $15M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | -4% | -2% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -4% | -2% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −4% | −2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $212M | $121M | $358M | $391M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $254M | $335M | $256M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $4M | $6M | $14M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $251M | $329M | $242M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $512M | $851M | $823M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $575M | $643M | $590M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.9× | 1.3× | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $5.2B | $5.2B | $5.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $7.4B | $7.6B | $7.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $1.0B | $0 | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| — | $903M | ($358M) | ($391M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -1.8× | -1.0× | -12.5× | -80.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($541M) | ($5.6B) | $6.8B | $6.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 5.4% | 3.7% | 23.8% | 19.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||
| 80.7M | 83.7M | 544M | 565M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $8.66 | $10.29 | $1.97 | $1.99 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.90 | $-3.77 | $-0.50 | $-0.28 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-3.13 | $-1.33 | $0.12 | $0.36 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-3.13 | $-1.33 | $0.12 | $0.36 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.06 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-6.70 | $-66.75 | $12.58 | $12.12 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×6.5 into 2026 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The record, charted
FY2024–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Gross margin
64%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$65Mowner earningsvs.($270M)net incomelow FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $270M loss into $65M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($270M) | ($316M) | ($395M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$211M | +$237M | +$264M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$255M | +$32M | +$37M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$125M | −$60M | −$156M |
| Cash from operations | $71M | ($106M) | ($250M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$6M | −$5M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | $65M | ($112M) | ($253M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | -13% | -36% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $255M), owner earnings is nearer ($190M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -12.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($307M) ÷ interest expense $25M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $358M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $358M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 114 + DIO 0 − DPO 6 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($243M) ÷ invested capital $6.5B (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median 3%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $65M = operating cash $71M − maintenance capex $6M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (3-yr median -13%)Industry peers: median 20%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a -13% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $255M of SBC) leaves ($190M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($270M) · cash from operations $71M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.03×HarvestingCapex $6M ÷ depreciation $211M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.32×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $207M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.58/share (latest year $-0.48), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.07/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“The development process for competitive offerings that leverage AI and agentic AI technologies in particular may be more condensed than ours, accelerating the time that it takes for such offerings to become available in the market to compete with existing offerings.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$823M
- Cash & short-term investments$391M
- Receivables$256M
- Other current assets$177M
Current liabilities$590M
- Accounts payable$14M
- Other current liabilities$577M
Current ratio1.39×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.39×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.66×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$233Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+21.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$364Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$140MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$18M$18M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$535Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$6.5B86% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity75%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$24Mover 3 years buying other businesses, against $14M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio300:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$255M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 24% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BLKBBlackbaud Inc. | $1.1B | 54% | 4.1% | 3% | 20% |
| MANHManhattan Associates | $1.1B | 55% | 23.3% | 214% | 25% |
| SAILSailPoint Inc. | $1.1B | 64% | -28.7% | -4% | -13% |
| FIGFigma Inc. | $1.1B | 88% | -117.1% | -92% | 23% |
| DUOLDuolingo Inc. | $1.0B | 73% | -6.2% | 44% | 21% |
| ALRMAlarm.com | $1.0B | 63% | 8.7% | 16% | 13% |
| SSentinelOne | $1.0B | 66% | -95.4% | -20% | -47% |
| TENBTenable | $999M | 81% | -9.1% | -10% | 15% |
| Group median | — | 65% | -7.7% | -1% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what SailPoint Inc. has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $201M on 567M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-05; net cash $391M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "SailPoint Inc. (SAIL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SAIL, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SAIC its page in the Manual SAM →
Industry order: ← SAIC the Software chapter SANG →