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BWNB, Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc.

Industrial Machinery capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a globally-focused energy technologies provider with nearly 160 years of experience providing diversified energy and emissions control solutions to a broad range of industrial, electrical utility, municipal and other customers.

We support global energy needs and baseload power demand by providing advanced technologies that utilize coal, natural gas, hydrogen, waste and biomass to produce energy, environmental solutions and carbon capture systems.

Our proven platforms help utilities, data centers, oil and gas, and other industries meet rising demand, while our comprehensive aftermarket services keep existing power plants operating efficiently.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BWNB · Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$588M

+1.1% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $653M 5-yr avg $615M

Gross margin 24% 5-yr avg 23%

Operating margin 3.2% 5-yr avg 0.3%

Owner-earnings margin −10% 5-yr avg −14%

Free cash flow margin −10% 5-yr avg −14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −3.4% through the cycle on a 25% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −18%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

29% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States71%$418M
Canada15%$91M
All Other Countries6%$36M
Indonesia3%$16M
United Kingdom3%$15M
Philippines2%$11M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$859M	$566M	$711M	$609M	$587M	$581M	$588M	$653M	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	—	—	25%	24%	21%	22%	24%	24%	Gross marginGross mgn
15%	16%	19%	18%	25%	21%	25%	23%	21%	20%	21%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	—	—	—	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($110M)	($316M)	($427M)	($29M)	($2M)	$19M	($1M)	($20M)	($6M)	$21M	$21M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−7.7%	−23.6%	−40.2%	−3.4%	−0.3%	2.7%	−0.2%	−3.4%	−1.1%	3.5%	3.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($116M)	($380M)	($725M)	($122M)	($10M)	$31M	($23M)	($197M)	($60M)	($36M)	($91M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$2M	($190M)	($282M)	($176M)	($41M)	($111M)	($31M)	($42M)	($119M)	($69M)	($43M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$40M	$40M	$32M	$24M	$17M	$18M	$24M	$21M	$17M	$10M	$10M	DepreciationDeprec.
$78M	$150M	$411M	($78M)	($47M)	($160M)	($32M)	$134M	($76M)	($43M)	$31M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$22M	$14M	$5M	$4M	$8M	$7M	$13M	$10M	$11M	$17M	$20M	CapexCapex
1.6%	1.1%	0.5%	0.4%	1.5%	0.9%	2.2%	1.7%	1.9%	2.9%	3.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($20M)	($204M)	($287M)	($180M)	($49M)	($118M)	($44M)	($52M)	($130M)	($86M)	($62M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−1.4%	−15.2%	−27.0%	−21.0%	−8.7%	−16.6%	−7.2%	−8.9%	−22.4%	−14.6%	−9.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($20M)	($204M)	($287M)	($180M)	($49M)	($118M)	($44M)	($52M)	($130M)	($86M)	($62M)	Free cash flowFCF
−1.4%	−15.2%	−27.0%	−21.0%	−8.7%	−16.6%	−7.2%	−8.9%	−22.4%	−14.6%	−9.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$145M	$53M	$0	$0	$0	$55M	$65M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$78M	$967K	$805K	$117K	$283K	$5M	$3M	$1M	$336K	$386K	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-19%	-181%	—	—	—	14%	-0%	-22%	-17%	—	—	ROICROIC
-21%	-209%	—	—	—	93%	—	—	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
−21%	−209%	—	—	—	93%	—	—	—	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$87M	$44M	$43M	$44M	$57M	$225M	$77M	$65M	$27M	$89M	$111M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$282M	$253M	$197M	$142M	$128M	$132M	$158M	$77M	$92M	$118M	$126M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$86M	$73M	$61M	$63M	$74M	$80M	$103M	$98M	$58M	$61M	$61M	InventoryInvent.
$221M	$205M	$200M	$110M	$73M	$86M	$131M	$83M	$88M	$69M	$109M	Accounts payablePayables
$147M	$120M	$59M	$95M	$129M	$126M	$130M	$92M	$62M	$110M	$78M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$778M	$732M	$550M	$412M	$396M	$582M	$558M	$498M	$553M	$471M	$491M	Current assetsCur. assets
$618M	$744M	$712M	$602M	$271M	$253M	$372M	$350M	$407M	$387M	$495M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×	1.0×	0.8×	0.7×	1.5×	2.3×	1.5×	1.4×	1.4×	1.2×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$163M	$86M	$47M	$47M	$47M	$116M	$84M	$54M	$51M	$53M	$53M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B	$1.3B	$745M	$627M	$599M	$913M	$942M	$776M	$727M	$663M	$758M	Total assetsAssets
—	$0	$61M	$104M	$183M	$326M	$335M	$338M	$340M	—	$233M	Total debtDebt
—	($44M)	$18M	$60M	$126M	$101M	$259M	$273M	$313M	—	$122M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-29.7×	-12.2×	-8.6×	-0.3×	-0.0×	0.5×	-0.0×	-0.5×	-0.1×	0.6×	0.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$552M	$182M	($286M)	($296M)	($332M)	$33M	($3M)	($201M)	($284M)	($132M)	($172M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	$87M	$40M	—	—	—	$7M	$57M	—	—	$57M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
16.7M	15.6M	13.8M	31.5M	48.7M	83.6M	88.3M	89.0M	91.7M	105M	134M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$85.04	$85.74	$76.82	$27.26	$11.63	$8.51	$6.91	$6.60	$6.34	$5.57	$4.89	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-6.92	$-24.28	$-52.45	$-3.87	$-0.21	$0.37	$-0.26	$-2.22	$-0.65	$-0.34	$-0.68	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.21	$-13.05	$-20.78	$-5.72	$-1.01	$-1.41	$-0.50	$-0.58	$-1.42	$-0.81	$-0.46	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.21	$-13.05	$-20.78	$-5.72	$-1.01	$-1.41	$-0.50	$-0.58	$-1.42	$-0.81	$-0.46	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.34	$0.91	$0.40	$0.12	$0.17	$0.08	$0.15	$0.11	$0.12	$0.16	$0.15	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$33.04	$11.64	$-20.69	$-9.40	$-6.82	$0.40	$-0.03	$-2.26	$-3.09	$-1.25	$-1.29	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×2.28 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.55 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.72 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−26.1%/yr	−13.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	−21.1%/yr	−1.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income+427.3%
“Operating income increased by $27.1 million to $20.7 million in 2025 compared to an operating loss of $6.3 million in 2024, primarily due to the revenue as described above and an increase in gross profit due to the improvement in cost of operations in product mix.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

105Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−17%low FY2017

Gross margin

24%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($86M)owner earningsvs.($36M)net incomelow FY2018

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $36M loss but ($86M) of owner earnings: $50M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($36M)	($60M)	($197M)	($23M)	$31M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$10M	+$17M	+$21M	+$24M	+$18M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$43M	−$76M	+$134M	−$32M	−$160M
Cash from operations	($69M)	($119M)	($42M)	($31M)	($111M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$17M	−$11M	−$10M	−$13M	−$7M
Owner earnings	($86M)	($130M)	($52M)	($44M)	($118M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-15%	-22%	-9%	-7%	-17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $21M ÷ interest expense $38M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $247M · 11.9× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $89M + ST investments $4M − debt $340M

What this means
Netting $93M of cash and short-term investments against $340M of debt leaves $247M owed, about 11.9× a year's operating profit (16.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 67d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 74 + DIO 50 − DPO 57 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -19%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -181%–14%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -15%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -27%–-1%; latest ($86M) = operating cash ($69M) − maintenance capex $17M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -15% of revenue this year, a -15% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves ($93M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($69M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($36M) · cash from operations ($69M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 1.65×

Expanding

Capex $17M ÷ depreciation $10M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $588M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.22×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $340M vs $84M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.72/share (latest year $-0.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −24% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −24% early to −0% lately, median −3% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2018 · −40.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$491M

Cash & short-term investments$111M
Receivables$126M
Inventory$61M
Other current assets$194M

Current liabilities$495M

Accounts payable$109M
Other current liabilities$386M

Current ratio0.99×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.87×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.22×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($3M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Cash runway1.8 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+44.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($239M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($439M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$199M$18M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$106Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$68M10% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$318Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $112M of capital spent building

$191M written down across 4 years (2017, 2018, 2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 60% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Young	$2.2M	$4.8M	($118M)
2022	Mr. Young	$3.2M	$2.7M	($44M)
2023	Mr. Young	$1.1M	−$469k	($52M)
2024	Mr. Young	$2.9M	$3.0M	($130M)
2025	Mr. Young	$1.9M	$3.5M	($86M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 37% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $290M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Machinery

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TRSTriMas Corporation	$646M	24%	9.4%	5%	8%
BWNBBabcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc.	$588M	24%	-2.3%	-18%	-15%
MECMayville Engineering Company Inc.	$546M	11%	3.0%	-1%	5%
RGRSturm Ruger & Company Inc.	$546M	28%	14.1%	26%	9%
PRLBProto Labs Inc.	$533M	48%	11.0%	7%	15%
SWBISmith & Wesson Brands Inc.	$524M	32%	9.3%	11%	8%
NPKNational Presto Industries Inc.	$504M	22%	13.2%	11%	7%
XPELXPEL Inc.	$476M	38%	14.4%	31%	8%
Group median	—	26%	10.2%	9%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered−1%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−10%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh BWNB against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc. (BWNB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BWNB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BWMN its page in the Manual BWXT →

Industry order: ← BW the Industrial Machinery chapter CECO →