Owner Scorecard


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XPEL, XPEL Inc.

Auto Components capital-intensive

We are a supplier of protective films, coatings and related services primarily to the automobile aftermarket, new car dealerships and automobile original equipment manufacturers, or OEMs.

The majority of our revenue is derived from the sale of our automotive products and related services while the remainder of our revenue is derived from non-automotive products including architectural window film and marine and flat surface protection films.

Began as a software company designing vehicle patterns used to produce cut-to-fit protective film for headlights and painted surfaces of automobiles.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
XPEL · XPEL Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$476M
+13.3% YoY · 25% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $490M 5-yr avg $375M
Gross margin 43% 5-yr avg 40%
Operating margin 13.2% 5-yr avg 15.2%
ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 27%
Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 36% and operating margin about 14% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 31%, above 15% in 8 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$110M$130M$159M$259M$324M$396M$420M$476M$490MRevenueRevenue
30%33%34%36%39%41%42%42%43%Gross marginGross mgn
13%14%13%13%15%16%18%18%18%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%0%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$12M$17M$23M$40M$54M$67M$59M$63M$65MOperating incomeOp. inc.
10.7%13.2%14.7%15.5%16.6%16.9%14.1%13.2%13.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$9M$14M$18M$32M$41M$53M$45M$51M$53MNet incomeNet inc.
24%17%20%20%20%20%20%20%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$7M$11M$18M$18M$12M$37M$48M$67M$71MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$736K$916K$1M$2M$3M$5M$6M$6M$6MDepreciationDeprec.
($3M)($4M)($1M)($15M)($33M)($22M)($7M)$7M$9MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2M$2M$2M$7M$8M$6M$7M$4M$13MCapexCapex
1.8%1.2%1.1%2.6%2.4%1.6%1.6%0.8%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$6M$10M$17M$16M$9M$33M$41M$63M$65MOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.5%7.7%10.8%6.3%2.7%8.3%9.8%13.2%13.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$5M$9M$17M$12M$4M$31M$41M$63M$58MFree cash flowFCF
4.3%7.2%10.5%4.5%1.3%7.8%9.8%13.2%11.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$832K$128K$3M$49M$5M$19M$10M$26M$26MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$3MBuybacksBuybacks
50%58%61%32%30%29%23%22%21%ROICROIC
42%40%34%37%33%29%20%18%18%Return on equityROE
42%40%34%37%33%29%20%18%18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$4M$12M$29M$10M$8M$12M$22M$51M$45MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$6M$7M$10M$13M$15M$24M$29M$50M$54MReceivablesReceiv.
$11M$15M$22M$52M$81M$107M$111M$123M$132MInventoryInvent.
$4M$7M$13M$25M$17M$24M$26M$38M$43MAccounts payablePayables
$12M$15M$19M$40M$79M$106M$114M$135M$142MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$21M$36M$63M$79M$107M$146M$168M$231M$237MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$8M$12M$21M$36M$27M$36M$42M$71M$77MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×3.1×3.0×2.2×3.9×4.0×4.1×3.2×3.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M$2M$4M$26M$27M$37M$44M$59M$57MGoodwillGoodwill
$31M$52M$84M$161M$193M$252M$286M$383M$394MTotal assetsAssets
$968K$807K$6M$25M$26M$19M$229K$0$458KTotal debtDebt
($3M)($11M)($23M)$15M$18M$7M($22M)($51M)($45M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
70.1×176.8×93.9×132.4×38.3×53.7×59.4×754.8×5378.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$21M$35M$53M$84M$125M$180M$225M$280M$288MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%0.0%0.1%0.2%0.4%0.8%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
27.6M27.6M27.6M27.6M27.6M27.6M27.6M27.7M27.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.98$4.71$5.76$9.39$11.73$14.34$15.21$17.20$17.70Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.32$0.51$0.66$1.14$1.50$1.91$1.65$1.85$1.92EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.22$0.36$0.62$0.59$0.31$1.19$1.49$2.27$2.34Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.17$0.34$0.60$0.42$0.15$1.12$1.49$2.27$2.11Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.07$0.06$0.06$0.24$0.29$0.23$0.24$0.14$0.46Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.75$1.27$1.93$3.06$4.52$6.51$8.16$10.12$10.39Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+23.3%/yr+24.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+39.6%/yr+29.6%/yr
EPS+28.8%/yr+22.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+10.2%/yr+17.5%/yr
Book value / share+44.9%/yr+39.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
28Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
22%low FY2025
Gross margin
42%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$63Mowner earningsvs.$51Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $51M of profit into $63M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$51M
Owner earnings$63M · 13% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$51M$45M$53M$41M$32M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$6M+$6M+$5M+$3M+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$3M+$3M+$2M+$522K+$169K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$7M−$7M−$22M−$33M−$15M
Cash from operations$67M$48M$37M$12M$18M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$4M−$7M−$5M−$3M−$2M
Owner earnings$63M$41M$33M$9M$16M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$2M−$5M−$5M
Free cash flow$63M$41M$31M$4M$12M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%10%8%3%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $3M), owner earnings is nearer $60M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $63M ÷ interest expense $83K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $51M − debt $458K
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $50M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 38 + DIO 163 − DPO 50 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    8-yr median, range 22%–61%; 22% latest = NOPAT $50M ÷ invested capital $230M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range 3%–13%; latest $63M = operating cash $67M − maintenance capex $4M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $60M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $67M ÷ net income $51M

    In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 6% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips here too. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $3M ÷ Owner Earnings $63M
    What this means

    Of $63M Owner Earnings, $3M (5%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $3M buybacks. Net of $3M stock comp, the real buyback was about $246K. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.64×
    Harvesting
    Capex $4M ÷ depreciation $6M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $476M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.25×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $458K vs $160M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +265%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.81/share (latest year $1.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.17/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 8
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 13% early, 15% lately, median 14%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 20%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +31%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 31% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · 10.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$237M
  • Cash & short-term investments$45M
  • Receivables$54M
  • Inventory$132M
  • Other current assets$7M
Current liabilities$77M
  • Accounts payable$43M
  • Other current liabilities$34M
Current ratio3.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.37×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.58×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$160Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.8× → 3.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$182Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$135MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$21M$21M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$8Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $219M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$37M · 17%
  • Buybacks$3M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$179M · 82%
  • Returned to owners$3M

    2% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $3M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.2%

    The diluted count barely moved (28M to 28M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained13%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($260M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $35M, so each retained $1 added about 0.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$109M28% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity21%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$112Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $37M of capital spent building

$36K written down across 1 year (2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Ryan L Pape$1.3M$1.3M$16M
2022Ryan L Pape$1.5M$1.4M$9M
2023Ryan L Pape$2.0M$1.5M$33M
2024Ryan L Pape$2.2M$1.6M$41M
2025Ryan L Pape$2.7M$3.9M$63M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership9.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio60:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$3M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why XPEL Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.83×

    Across the record the business reported $263M of net income but generated $219M of operating cash, a 0.83-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 38% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $16M to $185M while revenue grew 346%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 38% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Components

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AZZAZZ Inc.$1.7B24%13.1%7%10%
BWBabcock & Wilcox Enterprises Inc.$588M24%-2.3%-18%-15%
MECMayville Engineering Company Inc.$546M11%3.0%-1%5%
RGRSturm Ruger & Company Inc.$546M28%14.1%26%9%
PRLBProto Labs Inc.$533M48%11.0%7%15%
SWBISmith & Wesson Brands Inc.$524M32%9.3%11%8%
NPKNational Presto Industries Inc.$504M22%13.2%11%7%
XPELXPEL Inc.$476M38%14.4%31%8%
Group median26%12.1%9%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what XPEL Inc. has delivered.

XPEL Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, XPEL Inc. earns about $38M on its 8.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+43%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+33%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $58M on 28M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-08; net cash $45M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($13M) runs well above depreciation ($6M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $67M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "XPEL Inc. (XPEL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/XPEL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← XOMAP its page in the Manual XPER →

Industry order: ← VC the Auto Components chapter