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PRLB, Proto Labs Inc.

Building Products capital-intensive Cyclical

From custom prototyping to end-use production, we support product developers, engineers, and supply chain teams along every phase of their manufacturing journey.

We are the world's fastest manufacturing service enabling companies across every industry to streamline production of quality parts throughout the entire product life cycle.

Our 25+ years of growth while expanding capabilities provide customers with the best digital manufacturing experience in the industry.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PRLB · Proto Labs Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$533M

+6.4% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $546M 5-yr avg $503M

Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 45%

Operating margin 5.6% 5-yr avg 0.5%

ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 0%

Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is United States (81%) and Europe (19%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 46% and operating margin about 8.3% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −20% and 21% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

United States is 81% of revenue, with Europe the other meaningful segment at 19%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

United States81%$432M
Europe19%$101M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$298M	$344M	$446M	$459M	$434M	$488M	$488M	$504M	$501M	$533M	$546M	RevenueRevenue
56%	56%	54%	51%	50%	46%	44%	44%	45%	44%	45%	Gross marginGross mgn
12%	12%	12%	11%	12%	11%	14%	13%	13%	13%	13%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
8%	7%	6%	7%	9%	9%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$62M	$72M	$89M	$80M	$60M	$40M	($98M)	$28M	$20M	$25M	$30M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
20.7%	21.0%	20.0%	17.4%	13.8%	8.3%	−20.1%	5.6%	4.0%	4.7%	5.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$43M	$52M	$77M	$64M	$51M	$33M	($103M)	$17M	$17M	$21M	$26M	Net incomeNet inc.
33%	30%	16%	22%	19%	17%	—	38%	33%	32%	29%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$77M	$82M	$123M	$116M	$107M	$55M	$62M	$73M	$78M	$75M	$74M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$17M	$18M	$27M	$31M	$33M	$40M	$39M	$38M	$36M	$34M	$33M	DepreciationDeprec.
$11M	$3M	$9M	$11M	$9M	($38M)	$109M	$3M	$8M	$4M	($241K)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$34M	$33M	$87M	$62M	$47M	$34M	$22M	$28M	$9M	$15M	$17M	CapexCapex
11.3%	9.5%	19.5%	13.6%	10.8%	7.0%	4.4%	5.6%	1.8%	2.8%	3.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$60M	$63M	$96M	$85M	$74M	$21M	$40M	$45M	$69M	$60M	$57M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
20.1%	18.4%	21.6%	18.6%	17.1%	4.3%	8.3%	9.0%	13.7%	11.2%	10.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$44M	$49M	$36M	$54M	$60M	$21M	$40M	$45M	$69M	$60M	$57M	Free cash flowFCF
14.7%	14.3%	8.0%	11.7%	13.8%	4.3%	8.3%	9.0%	13.7%	11.2%	10.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$111M	$90K	$0	$0	$127M	$0	$0	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$4M	$12M	$34M	$15M	$23M	$30M	$44M	$60M	$43M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
13%	12%	16%	14%	9%	4%	-12%	3%	2%	3%	4%	ROICROIC
11%	11%	14%	11%	8%	4%	-15%	2%	2%	3%	4%	Return on equityROE
11%	11%	14%	11%	8%	4%	−15%	2%	2%	3%	4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$193M	$131M	$155M	$174M	$221M	$92M	$107M	$111M	$121M	$142M	$158M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$34M	$52M	$59M	$57M	$58M	$80M	$76M	$73M	$67M	$79M	$86M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$9M	$11M	$10M	$10M	$11M	$13M	$14M	$14M	$12M	$14M	$15M	InventoryInvent.
$11M	$16M	$17M	$17M	$18M	$25M	$17M	$16M	$16M	$15M	$20M	Accounts payablePayables
$32M	$47M	$52M	$51M	$50M	$68M	$72M	$71M	$63M	$78M	$81M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$158M	$165M	$215M	$236M	$242M	$183M	$187M	$201M	$195M	$234M	$249M	Current assetsCur. assets
$23M	$44M	$53M	$48M	$50M	$55M	$72M	$50M	$53M	$67M	$71M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
6.7×	3.8×	4.1×	5.0×	4.8×	3.3×	2.6×	4.0×	3.7×	3.5×	3.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$29M	$129M	$129M	$129M	$129M	$401M	$274M	$274M	$274M	$274M	$274M	GoodwillGoodwill
$414M	$519M	$619M	$674M	$744M	$929M	$802M	$772M	$744M	$763M	$779M	Total assetsAssets
$380M	$461M	$541M	$586M	$644M	$828M	$698M	$695M	$670M	$674M	$683M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.3%	2.5%	2.5%	2.4%	3.4%	3.9%	3.6%	3.2%	3.4%	3.0%	2.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
26.6M	26.8M	27.3M	27.0M	26.9M	27.7M	27.4M	26.2M	25.2M	24.2M	24.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$11.22	$12.83	$16.33	$16.96	$16.15	$17.65	$17.82	$19.21	$19.87	$21.99	$22.49	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.61	$1.93	$2.81	$2.35	$1.89	$1.21	$-3.77	$0.66	$0.66	$0.88	$1.06	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.26	$2.36	$3.53	$3.15	$2.77	$0.76	$1.47	$1.72	$2.72	$2.46	$2.33	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.65	$1.83	$1.31	$1.99	$2.23	$0.76	$1.47	$1.72	$2.72	$2.46	$2.33	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.27	$1.22	$3.19	$2.30	$1.75	$1.24	$0.79	$1.07	$0.36	$0.61	$0.70	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.30	$17.18	$19.85	$21.66	$23.96	$29.96	$25.45	$26.51	$26.58	$27.80	$28.13	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+7.8%/yr	+6.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+1.0%/yr	−2.3%/yr
EPS	−6.5%/yr	−14.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	−7.8%/yr	−18.9%/yr
Book value / share	+7.7%/yr	+3.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

24Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

3%low FY2022

Gross margin

44%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$60Mowner earningsvs.$21Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $21M of profit into $60M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$21M

Owner earnings$60M · 11% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$21M	$17M	$17M	($103M)	$33M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$34M	+$36M	+$38M	+$39M	+$40M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$16M	+$17M	+$16M	+$18M	+$19M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$4M	+$8M	+$3M	+$109M	−$38M
Cash from operations	$75M	$78M	$73M	$62M	$55M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$15M	−$9M	−$28M	−$22M	−$34M
Owner earnings	$60M	$69M	$45M	$40M	$21M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	11%	14%	9%	8%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer $44M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$127M

Net cash

Cash $111M + ST investments $17M − debt $636K

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $127M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $14M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $142M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 53d

Tight

DSO 54 + DIO 18 − DPO 19 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -12%–16%; 3% latest = NOPAT $17M ÷ invested capital $564M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 14%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 4%–22%; latest $60M = operating cash $75M − maintenance capex $15M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves $44M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.51×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $75M ÷ net income $21M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 72%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $43M ÷ Owner Earnings $60M

What this means
Of $60M Owner Earnings, $43M (72%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $43M buybacks. Net of $16M stock comp, the real buyback was about $27M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.44×

Harvesting

Capex $15M ÷ depreciation $34M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $533M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.49×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $636K vs $167M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −68%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.77/share (latest year $0.89), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.32/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin 21% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 21% early to 5% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +0%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · −20.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −1.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our competitors may be more successful in their use of AI/ML and our failure to properly anticipate and timely respond to AI-related developments could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$249M

Cash & short-term investments$136M
Receivables$86M
Inventory$15M
Other current assets$12M

Current liabilities$71M

Debt due within a year$273K
Accounts payable$20M
Other current liabilities$51M

Current ratio3.51×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio3.30×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.93×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$178Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$273K due · $136M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.1× → 3.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$392Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$153MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$3M$2M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $848M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$371M · 44%
Buybacks$265M · 31%
Retained (debt / cash)$213M · 25%

Returned to owners$265M
43% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $265M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $265M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−8.6%
The diluted count fell from 27M to 24M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$293M38% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity41%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$238Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $371M of capital spent building

$118M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 50% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$3.0M	$504k	$21M
2021	$179k	−$5.6M	$21M
2022	$4.6M	$2.0M	$40M
2023	$5.1M	$6.7M	$45M
2024	$4.3M	$4.5M	$69M
2025	$7.2M	$10.0M	$60M
2025	$5.7M	$2,407	$60M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$16M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 63% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Proto Labs Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?11.3% vs 20.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 20.0% early in the record and 11.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 18% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $43M to $100M while revenue grew 83%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 18% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Building Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
JBIJanus International Group Inc.	$884M	39%	17.2%	13%	14%
BWBabcock & Wilcox Enterprises Inc.	$588M	24%	-2.3%	-18%	-15%
MECMayville Engineering Company Inc.	$546M	11%	3.0%	-1%	5%
RGRSturm Ruger & Company Inc.	$546M	28%	14.1%	26%	9%
PRLBProto Labs Inc.	$533M	48%	11.0%	7%	15%
SWBISmith & Wesson Brands Inc.	$524M	32%	9.3%	11%	8%
NPKNational Presto Industries Inc.	$504M	22%	13.2%	11%	7%
XPELXPEL Inc.	$476M	38%	14.4%	31%	8%
Group median	—	30%	12.1%	11%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Proto Labs Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Proto Labs Inc. earns about $82M on its 15.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($82M) Net of stock comp (−$15M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($59M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+20%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $57M on 24M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net cash $157M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($17M) runs well above depreciation ($33M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $59M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PRLB against another business →

The owners of PRLB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Proto Labs Inc. (PRLB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PRLB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PRKS its page in the Manual PRLD →

Industry order: ← OC the Building Products chapter REZI →