Owner Scorecard


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CALM, Cal-Maine Foods

Agricultural Products diversified Cyclical

We are the largest producer and distributor of shell eggs in the United States.

Our operating approach is built around operational excellence, a "Culture of Sustainability" and creating value for our stockholders, customers, team members and communities.

We sell most of our products throughout much of the United States ("U.S.") and aim to maintain efficient, state-of-the-art operations located close to our customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CALM · Cal-Maine Foods
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.3B
+83.2% YoY · 26% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $2.6B
Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 27%
Operating margin 24.4% 5-yr avg 17.3%
ROIC 28% 5-yr avg 27%
Owner-earnings margin 22% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 19% and operating margin about 6.7% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −12% and 36% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMFeb 2026
Income statement
$1.1B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.8B$3.1B$2.3B$4.3B$3.5BRevenueRevenue
4%24%16%13%12%19%38%23%43%34%Gross marginGross mgn
16%12%13%13%14%11%7%11%7%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($134M)$101M$46M$1M($26M)$144M$968M$312M$1.5B$845MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−12.5%6.7%3.4%0.1%−1.9%8.1%30.8%13.4%36.1%24.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
($74M)$126M$54M$18M$2M$133M$758M$278M$1.2B$695MNet incomeNet inc.
-8%22%9%20%24%23%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($46M)$200M$115M$74M$26M$126M$863M$451M$1.2B$890MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$49M$54M$55M$58M$59M$68M$72M$80M$94M$115MDepreciationDeprec.
($21M)$20M$3M($7M)($39M)($79M)$29M$89M($94M)$75MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$67M$20M$68M$124M$95M$72M$137M$147M$161M$170MCapexCapex
6.2%1.3%5.0%9.2%7.0%4.1%4.3%6.3%3.8%4.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($95M)$181M$47M$16M($33M)$54M$791M$371M$1.1B$775MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−8.8%12.0%3.5%1.1%−2.5%3.0%25.1%16.0%26.5%22.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($113M)$181M$47M($51M)($69M)$54M$726M$304M$1.1B$720MFree cash flowFCF
−10.5%12.0%3.5%−3.7%−5.1%3.0%23.1%13.1%25.0%20.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$86M$0$18M$45M$0$45M$0$54M$116M$299MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$42M$0$2M$6M$252M$92M$330M$384MDividends paidDiv. paid
-13%11%4%0%-2%11%56%15%57%28%ROICROIC
-9%13%5%2%0%12%47%15%48%26%Return on equityROE
−9%13%1%2%0%11%31%10%35%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$159M$334M$323M$232M$57M$59M$293M$238M$499M$523MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$61M$81M$57M$85M$79M$169M$111M$139M$244M$185MReceivablesReceiv.
$161M$169M$172M$187M$218M$263M$284M$262M$296M$349MInventoryInvent.
$31M$38M$39M$56M$53M$82M$83M$76M$101M$106MAccounts payablePayables
$191M$212M$190M$216M$245M$350M$313M$324M$439M$428MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$436M$588M$568M$522M$520M$662M$1.1B$1.2B$2.0B$1.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$65M$108M$75M$93M$90M$185M$183M$228M$308M$213MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
6.7×5.4×7.6×5.6×5.8×3.6×6.2×5.5×6.4×8.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$36M$36M$36M$36M$36M$44M$44M$46M$47M$87MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.4B$2.0B$2.2B$3.1B$3.1BTotal assetsAssets
$11M$6M$2M$0$677KTotal debtDebt
($148M)($328M)($321M)($232M)($523M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-421.8×379.3×71.1×2.5×-123.3×356.2×1659.9×569.1×2510.7×1380.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$843M$953M$987M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.6B$1.8B$2.6B$2.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.3%0.3%0.2%0.1%0.2%0.1%0.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
48.4M48.5M48.6M48.6M48.7M48.7M48.8M48.9M48.9M48.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$22.22$31.01$28.01$27.82$27.72$36.47$64.43$47.60$87.17$72.14Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.54$2.60$1.12$0.38$0.04$2.72$15.52$5.69$24.95$14.48EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.96$3.73$0.97$0.32$-0.69$1.10$16.19$7.59$23.13$16.15Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.33$3.73$0.97$-1.04$-1.42$1.10$14.88$6.23$21.75$15.01Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.86$0.00$0.03$0.13$5.17$1.88$6.76$8.01Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.38$0.41$1.40$2.56$1.95$1.49$2.80$3.01$3.30$3.53Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.42$19.67$20.31$20.78$20.82$22.66$32.99$36.83$52.37$56.25Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+18.6%/yr+25.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+135.5%/yr
EPS+131.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.5%/yr+5.2%/yr
Book value / share+14.7%/yr+20.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
49Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
57%low FY2017
Gross margin
43%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.1Bowner earningsvs.$1.2Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $94M it takes just to hold its position. It put $67M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.1B.

Reported net income$1.2B
Owner earnings$1.1B · 27% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.2B$278M$758M$133M$2M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$94M+$80M+$72M+$68M+$59M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$5M+$4M+$4M+$4M+$4M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$94M+$89M+$29M−$79M−$39M
Cash from operations$1.2B$451M$863M$126M$26M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$94M−$80M−$72M−$72M−$59M
Owner earnings$1.1B$371M$791M$54M($33M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$67M−$67M−$64M−$36M
Free cash flow$1.1B$304M$726M$54M($69M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue27%16%25%3%-2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $94M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $67M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer $1.1B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.5B ÷ interest expense $612K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $499M + ST investments $154M − debt $641K
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $653M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $3M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $656M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 21 + DIO 45 − DPO 15 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -13%–57%; 57% latest = NOPAT $1.2B ÷ invested capital $2.1B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 57% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High, recently turned positive
    latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $94M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median 3%)
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 27% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves $1.1B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $1.2B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $330M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B
    What this means

    Of $1.1B Owner Earnings, $330M (29%) went back to shareholders, $330M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.72×
    Expanding
    Capex $161M ÷ depreciation $94M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 6.38×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $641K vs $1.7B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +2031%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $15.87/share (latest year $25.75), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $54.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −1% → 27% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −1% early to 27% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +43%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 43% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · −12.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.1%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Feb 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$520M
  • Receivables$185M
  • Inventory$349M
  • Other current assets$695M
Current liabilities$213M
  • Accounts payable$106M
  • Other current liabilities$106M
Current ratio8.21×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio6.58×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.44×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−53.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.5× → 8.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.3BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2M$1M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$891M · 29%
  • Dividends$724M · 24%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.4B · 47%
  • Returned to owners$724M

    29% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $724M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count−0.7%

    The diluted count barely moved (48M to 48M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$6.76/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained40%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $720M, so each retained $1 added about 0.40 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$1.2M$949k($33M)
2022$1.3M$1.6M$54M
2023$985k$959k$791M
2023$1.1M$1.1M$791M
2024$1.1M$1.2M$371M
2025$1.7M$2.0M$1.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$5M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cal-Maine Foods is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
RBARB Global Inc.$4.6B16.4%8%17%
HGVHilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock$4.5B12.8%5%7%
VVXV2X Inc.$4.5B9%3.6%11%3%
CALMCal-Maine Foods$4.3B19%6.7%11%3%
KELYAKelly Services Inc.$4.3B19%0.7%2%1%
CHEFChefs' Warehouse$4.1B24%3.2%6%2%
ASGNEverforth, Inc.$4.0B29%8.1%9%7%
HUBGHub Group$3.9B12%3.6%9%3%
Group median19%5.1%9%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cal-Maine Foods has delivered.

Cal-Maine Foods’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Cal-Maine Foods earns about $147M on its 3.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+193%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+45%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $720M on 47M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-01; net cash $523M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($170M) runs well above depreciation ($115M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $796M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cal-Maine Foods (CALM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CALM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CAL its page in the Manual CALX →

Industry order: ← BG the Agricultural Products chapter CHSCO →