Owner Scorecard


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CAL, Caleres

Footwear & Accessories consumer brand Cyclical

We employ our "One Caleres" capabilities design, sourcing, speed and marketing, working in unison to accelerate growth.

We meet consumers where they want to shop, whether in-store or online.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
CAL · Caleres
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$2.8B
+1.3% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $2.8B
Gross margin 43% 5-yr avg 44%
Operating margin 0.7% 5-yr avg 5.5%
ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 31%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Retail (50%) and E-commerce - Company websites (19%), with 4 more lines behind.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 43% and operating margin about 5.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −23% to 150% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 21% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Retail at 50%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • Retail50%$1.4B
  • E-commerce - Company websites19%$521M
  • Wholesale - landed17%$463M
  • Wholesale - e-commerce8%$226M
  • E-commerce - wholesale drop-ship4%$114M
  • Wholesale - first cost2%$59M
  • Other0%$9M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$91M$85M$86M$2.9B$2.1B$2.8B$3.0B$2.8B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8BRevenueRevenue
41%37%44%43%45%45%43%43%Gross marginGross mgn
n/mn/mn/m36%42%36%36%38%39%42%42%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$96M$128M$401K$104M($486M)$206M$214M$194M$150M$6M$19MOperating incomeOp. inc.
105.0%150.0%0.5%3.6%−22.9%7.4%7.2%6.9%5.5%0.2%0.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$66M$87M($5M)$63M($439M)$137M$182M$171M$107M($7M)$642KNet incomeNet inc.
32%29%21%27%16%5%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$184M$191M$130M$171M$126M$168M$126M$200M$105M$103M$81MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$56M$64M$63M$66M$61M$52M$49M$53M$40M$48M$50MDepreciationDeprec.
$54M$29M$59M$32M$497M($33M)($122M)($39M)($58M)$49M$18MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$51M$45M$62M$45M$17M$18M$56M$45M$49M$64M$54MCapexCapex
55.3%52.5%73.1%1.5%0.8%0.7%1.9%1.6%1.8%2.3%1.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$133M$147M$67M$126M$110M$150M$70M$156M$55M$55M$27MOwner earningsOwner earn.
145.6%172.3%78.5%4.3%5.2%5.4%2.4%5.5%2.0%2.0%0.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$133M$147M$67M$126M$110M$150M$70M$156M$55M$39M$27MFree cash flowFCF
145.6%172.3%78.5%4.3%5.2%5.4%2.4%5.5%2.0%1.4%0.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0$0$109M$109MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$12M$12M$12M$11M$11M$11M$10M$10M$10M$9M$9MDividends paidDiv. paid
$23M$6M$44M$33M$23M$17M$63M$17M$65M$5MBuybacksBuybacks
8%11%0%10%-123%52%47%34%21%1%1%ROICROIC
11%12%-1%10%-219%43%43%31%18%-1%0%Return on equityROE
9%10%−3%8%−225%40%41%29%16%−3%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$55M$64M$30M$45M$88M$30M$34M$21M$30M$30M$38MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$153M$153M$192M$162M$127M$122M$133M$140M$156M$147M$174MReceivablesReceiv.
$586M$569M$683M$618M$488M$597M$580M$541M$565M$610M$609MInventoryInvent.
$266M$273M$316M$267M$281M$331M$230M$252M$237M$191M$191MAccounts payablePayables
$473M$449M$559M$514M$334M$388M$483M$429M$484M$567M$593MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$844M$847M$976M$882M$783M$836M$831M$789M$837M$863M$913MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$528M$430M$853M$851M$906M$1.0B$911M$743M$758M$846M$883MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×2.0×1.1×1.0×0.9×0.8×0.9×1.1×1.1×1.0×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$127M$127M$243M$245M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$15M$16MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.5B$1.8B$2.4B$1.9B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0BTotal assetsAssets
$307M$197M$533M$198M$199M$0$516MTotal debtDebt
$252M$133M$503M$153M$111M($30M)$478MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.0×7.4×0.0×1.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$613M$717M$634M$646M$200M$319M$421M$561M$599M$602M$612MShareholders’ equityEquity
8.5%13.3%16.1%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.6%0.5%0.6%0.5%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
42.2M42.0M41.8M39.9M37.2M37.1M35.4M34.2M33.5M32.5M32.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.17$2.03$2.05$73.31$56.88$74.88$83.83$82.49$81.24$84.81$85.81Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.56$2.08$-0.13$1.58$-11.80$3.69$5.13$5.02$3.20$-0.21$0.02EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.16$3.49$1.61$3.17$2.94$4.04$1.98$4.56$1.65$1.69$0.81Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.16$3.49$1.61$3.17$2.94$4.04$1.98$4.56$1.65$1.21$0.81Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.29$0.29$0.29$0.29$0.29$0.29$0.29$0.29$0.29$0.29$0.29Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.20$1.07$1.50$1.12$0.45$0.50$1.58$1.31$1.47$1.96$1.66Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.54$17.09$15.18$16.21$5.38$8.59$11.88$16.42$17.87$18.51$18.69Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+50.3%/yr+8.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share−6.7%/yr−10.5%/yr
Dividends / share+0.1%/yr+0.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.6%/yr+34.2%/yr
Book value / share+2.7%/yr+28.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
33Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
1%low FY2021
Gross margin
43%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.2×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$55Mowner earningsvs.($7M)net incomelow FY2026

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $55M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $48M it takes just to hold its position. It put $15M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $39M.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($7M)$107M$171M$182M$137M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$48M+$40M+$53M+$49M+$52M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$12M+$15M+$15M+$17M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$49M−$58M−$39M−$122M−$33M
Cash from operations$103M$105M$200M$126M$168M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$48M−$49M−$45M−$56M−$18M
Owner earnings$55M$55M$156M$70M$150M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$15M
Free cash flow$39M$55M$156M$70M$150M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%2%6%2%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $48M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $15M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $42M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $6M ÷ interest expense $18M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $503M · 79.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $30M − debt $533M
    What this means

    Netting $30M of cash and short-term investments against $533M of debt leaves $503M owed, about 79.0× a year's operating profit (83.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 19 + DIO 142 − DPO 44 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -123%–52%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 20%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–172%; latest $55M = operating cash $103M − maintenance capex $48M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $42M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($7M) · cash from operations $103M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $14M ÷ Owner Earnings $55M
    What this means

    Of $55M Owner Earnings, $14M (26%) went back to shareholders, $9M dividends, $5M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($12M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.32×
    Expanding
    Capex $64M ÷ depreciation $48M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.02×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $533M vs $17M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +84%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.70/share (latest year $-0.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 85% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 85% early to 4% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −10%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 10% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −22.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$913M
  • Cash & short-term investments$38M
  • Receivables$174M
  • Inventory$609M
  • Other current assets$92M
Current liabilities$883M
  • Accounts payable$191M
  • Other current liabilities$693M
Current ratio1.03×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.34×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$29Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$410Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$602M$602M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.1B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$192M
'27$136M
'28$102M
'29$74M
'30$53M
later$136M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$192Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$693Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$595Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$533M
Lease obligations (present value)$595M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.1B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.1B, of which the leases are 53%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$451M · 30%
  • Dividends$108M · 7%
  • Buybacks$297M · 20%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$647M · 43%
  • Returned to owners$406M

    38% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $108M as dividends and $297M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $297M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−22.4%

    The diluted count fell from 42M to 33M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.29/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 0% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$204M10% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity3%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$369Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $451M of capital spent building

$325M written down across 2 years (2019, 2021): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 88% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Sullivan$10.2M$15.9M$150M
2023Schmidt$4.6M$5.1M$70M
2023Sullivan$13.8M$13.8M$70M
2024Schmidt$7.8M$9.8M$156M
2025Schmidt$8.3M$2.5M$55M
2026Schmidt$4.1M$2.0M$55M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio204:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$12M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 195% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Caleres is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.2% vs 76.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 76.1% early in the record and 3.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$307M → $516M

    Debt rose from $307M to $516M while owner earnings went from about $116M to $89M — about 2.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $406M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Footwear & Accessories

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SKXSkechers U.S.A.$9.0B48%9.5%20%5%
TPRTapestry Inc.$7.0B69%15.7%20%12%
CPRICapri Holdings$3.5B61%6.8%10%10%
CALCaleres$2.8B43%6.2%10%5%
SHOOSteven Madden Ltd.$2.5B39%10.7%23%9%
WWWWolverine World Wide$1.9B40%6.1%10%8%
Group median46%8.1%15%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Caleres has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Caleres earns about $131M on its 4.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $27M on 34M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-29; net debt $478M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($54M) runs well above depreciation ($50M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $33M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Caleres (CAL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CAL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CAKE its page in the Manual CALM →

Industry order: ← BIRK the Footwear & Accessories chapter CPRI →