Share count
92Mpeak FY2022
← All companies ← HGTY Manual HHH → ← HAFN Hotels & Resorts HLT →
HGV, Hilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock
We are a global timeshare company engaged in developing, marketing, selling, managing and operating timeshare resorts, timeshare plans and ancillary reservation services, primarily under the Hilton Grand Vacations brands.
During 2025, we began rebranding certain properties acquired in the Bluegreen Acquisition to Hilton Grand Vacations brands and expect to continue this process for the majority of the Bluegreen properties.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$4.5B
+1.1% YoY · 38% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.6B 5-yr avg $3.7B
Revenue $1.3B +11.9% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $68M yr-ago ($12M)
Net margin 5.3% yr-ago −1.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Real estate and financing (66%) and Resort Operations and Club Management (34%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 8.9% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −27% to 22% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Real estate and financing is 66% of revenue, with Resort Operations and Club Management the other meaningful segment at 34%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Real estate and financing66%$3.0B
- Resort Operations and Club Management34%$1.5B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $894M | $2.3B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 10% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 5% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $323M | $337M | $434M | $315M | ($245M) | $390M | $314M | $227M | ($58M) | ($74M) | ($7M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 20.4% | 19.7% | 21.7% | 17.1% | −27.4% | 16.7% | 8.9% | 6.3% | −1.3% | −1.6% | −0.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $168M | $327M | $298M | $216M | ($201M) | $176M | $352M | $313M | $47M | $81M | $164M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 43% | -5% | 26% | 21% | — | 35% | 27% | 30% | — | 48% | 32% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $182M | $356M | ($164M) | $143M | $79M | $168M | $747M | $312M | $309M | $300M | $390M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $24M | $29M | $33M | $44M | $45M | $126M | $244M | $213M | $268M | $273M | $277M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($10M) | ($15M) | ($511M) | ($139M) | $220M | ($182M) | $105M | ($254M) | ($53M) | ($118M) | ($114M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $26M | $35M | $44M | $37M | $8M | $18M | $58M | $31M | $42M | $70M | $62M | CapexCapex |
| 1.6% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.0% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 1.6% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.6% | 1.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $156M | $321M | ($197M) | $106M | $71M | $150M | $689M | $281M | $267M | $230M | $328M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 9.9% | 18.8% | −9.9% | 5.8% | 7.9% | 6.4% | 19.5% | 7.8% | 6.0% | 5.1% | 7.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $156M | $321M | ($208M) | $106M | $71M | $150M | $689M | $281M | $267M | $230M | $328M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 9.9% | 18.8% | −10.4% | 5.8% | 7.9% | 6.4% | 19.5% | 7.8% | 6.0% | 5.1% | 7.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $1.6B | $0 | $74M | $1.4B | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | $183M | $283M | $10M | $0 | $272M | $368M | $432M | $600M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 30% | 45% | 29% | 19% | -18% | 6% | 5% | 3% | -0% | -1% | -0% | ROICROIC |
| 100% | 63% | 48% | 38% | -54% | 9% | 16% | 15% | 3% | 6% | 14% | Return on equityROE |
| 100% | 63% | 48% | 38% | −54% | 9% | 16% | 15% | 3% | 6% | 14% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $48M | $246M | $108M | $67M | $428M | $432M | $223M | $589M | $328M | $239M | $261M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $123M | $112M | $153M | $174M | $119M | $302M | $511M | $507M | $315M | $270M | $274M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $123M | $112M | $153M | $174M | $119M | $302M | $511M | $507M | $315M | $270M | $274M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $8.0B | $8.0B | $8.7B | $11.4B | $11.5B | $11.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $490M | $482M | $604M | $828M | $1.2B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $4.6B | $4.5B | $4.8B | Total debtDebt |
| $442M | $236M | $496M | $761M | $731M | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 107.7× | 12.5× | 14.5× | 7.3× | -5.7× | 3.7× | 2.2× | 1.3× | -0.2× | -0.2× | -0.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $167M | $518M | $616M | $570M | $374M | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.3B | $1.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.0% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 1.2% | 1.7% | 2.1% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.4% | 1.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 99.0M | 99.6M | 97.9M | 89.3M | 85.0M | 101M | 120M | 112M | 103M | 91.5M | 83.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $15.99 | $17.18 | $20.42 | $20.58 | $10.52 | $23.10 | $29.58 | $32.19 | $43.31 | $49.32 | $55.36 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.69 | $3.28 | $3.05 | $2.42 | $-2.36 | $1.74 | $2.94 | $2.80 | $0.46 | $0.89 | $1.96 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.58 | $3.22 | $-2.01 | $1.19 | $0.84 | $1.48 | $5.76 | $2.52 | $2.59 | $2.51 | $3.92 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.58 | $3.22 | $-2.12 | $1.19 | $0.84 | $1.48 | $5.76 | $2.52 | $2.59 | $2.51 | $3.92 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.26 | $0.35 | $0.45 | $0.41 | $0.09 | $0.18 | $0.48 | $0.28 | $0.41 | $0.77 | $0.74 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.69 | $5.20 | $6.29 | $6.38 | $4.40 | $19.66 | $17.98 | $18.95 | $16.99 | $14.09 | $14.30 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +13.3%/yr | +36.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +5.3%/yr | +24.7%/yr |
| EPS | −7.0%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | +12.6%/yr | +52.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +26.6%/yr | +26.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−1%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
18.7×peak FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$230Mowner earningsvs.$81Mnet incomelow FY2018
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $81M of profit into $230M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $81M | $47M | $313M | $352M | $176M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$273M | +$268M | +$213M | +$244M | +$126M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$64M | +$47M | +$40M | +$46M | +$48M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$118M | −$53M | −$254M | +$105M | −$182M |
| Cash from operations | $300M | $309M | $312M | $747M | $168M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$70M | −$42M | −$31M | −$58M | −$18M |
| Owner earnings | $230M | $267M | $281M | $689M | $150M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 5% | 6% | 8% | 19% | 6% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $64M), owner earnings is nearer $166M.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We previously identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.2×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($74M) ÷ interest expense $311M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $239M − debt $4.5B
What this means
Netting $239M of cash and short-term investments against $4.5B of debt leaves $4.3B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -18%–45%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($38M) ÷ invested capital $5.6BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -10%–19%; latest $230M = operating cash $300M − maintenance capex $70MIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $64M of SBC) leaves $166M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $300M ÷ net income $81M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $600M ÷ Owner Earnings $230M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $230M of Owner Earnings, $600M (261%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $600M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $64M stock comp, the real buyback was about $536M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.26×HarvestingCapex $70M ÷ depreciation $273M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −44%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.84/share (latest year $1.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.16/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 21% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 21% early to 1% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −27.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Due in the next 12 months$25Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$48Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.3Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$4.6Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$261M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$230M
Together, against $25M due next year19.6×
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $491M against the $25M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 20 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$369M · 15%
- Buybacks$2.1B · 88%
- Returned to owners$2.1B
104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.1B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$85M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $85M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $490M to $4.8B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$40.78
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 41M shares were bought for $1.7B, about $40.78 each.
- Net change in share count−15.5%
The diluted count fell from 99M to 84M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$3.7B32% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$3.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $369M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Wang | $17.5M | $24.4M | $150M |
| 2022 | Mr. Wang | $10.6M | $7.2M | $689M |
| 2023 | Mr. Wang | $9.8M | $6.7M | $281M |
| 2024 | Mr. Wang | $14.0M | $11.4M | $267M |
| 2025 | Mr. Wang | $14.1M | $19.1M | $230M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership3.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$64M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Hilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$490M → $4.8B
Debt rose from $490M to $4.8B while owner earnings went from about $93M to $259M — about 5.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 18 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $236M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Hotels & Resorts
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MARMarriott International | $26.2B | — | 12.4% | 17% | 10% |
| HLTHilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. | $12.0B | — | 17.5% | 20% | 15% |
| HHyatt Hotels Corporation | $7.1B | — | 8.6% | 7% | 6% |
| HGVHilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock | $4.5B | — | 12.8% | 5% | 7% |
| BALYBally's Corporation | $2.5B | — | 5.7% | 5% | 2% |
| CHHChoice Hotels International | $1.6B | — | 28.9% | 30% | 20% |
| WHWyndham Hotels & Resorts | $1.4B | — | 25.7% | 12% | 18% |
| Group median | — | — | 12.8% | 12% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Hilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock earns about $321M on its 7.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
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The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+0%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $328M on 80M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $4.5B. The if-converted diluted count is 84M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hilton Grand Vacations Inc. Common Stock (HGV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HGV, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← HGTY its page in the Manual HHH →
Industry order: ← HAFN the Hotels & Resorts chapter HLT →