Share count
402Mpeak FY2017
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CB, Chubb Ltd.
Insurance — Property & Casualty financial
Chubb is an insurer. It sells property and casualty coverage to businesses and to individuals, along with accident and health and life insurance, across many countries, and it reaches customers through independent agents and brokers. It takes in premiums up front, invests the money it holds against future claims, and earns from the gap between what it collects, what it pays out, and what those investments return.
We expanded our personal accident and supplemental health (A&H), and life insurance business with the acquisition of Cigna's business in several Asian markets in 2022.
We further advanced our goal of greater product, customer, and geographical diversification with incremental purchases that led to a controlling majority interest in Huatai Insurance Group Co.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$59.5B
+6.6% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $61.1B 5-yr avg $50.2B
Revenue $14.8B +10.6% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $2.3B yr-ago $1.3B
Net margin 15.9% yr-ago 10.1%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- At root an insurance policy is a commodity — a promise to pay — and the filing itself flags that these markets run in cycles, with stretches of intense price competition. So the first test is underwriting discipline: whether Chubb prices each risk to earn a profit on the policy itself rather than leaning on investment income, and whether it will cede business instead of chasing volume when rivals cut price. Watch too its dependence on agents and brokers to place its products, the spread of geographies and lines that cushions any one market, and what it earns on the float it reinvests. The bad case is a soft cycle in which a disciplined writer must either follow rates down or surrender share; the record below carries the margins and returns.
- Is it a good business?
- It underwrites at a profit, about a 85% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 15% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 7% a year across the record. The float runs about 1.2× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $31.6B | $32.2B | $33.4B | $34.7B | $36.5B | $40.9B | $44.1B | $50.6B | $55.8B | $59.5B | $61.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| $28.7B | $29.0B | $30.1B | $31.3B | $33.1B | $36.3B | $40.4B | $45.7B | $49.8B | $53.0B | $54.5B | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $4.9B | $5.9B | $6.5B | $6.6B | Investment incomeInv. inc. |
| $4.1B | $3.9B | $4.0B | $4.5B | $3.5B | $8.5B | $5.2B | $9.0B | $9.3B | $10.3B | $11.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 16% | -4% | 15% | 15% | 15% | 13% | 19% | 5% | 16% | 19% | 20% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $5.3B | $4.5B | $5.5B | $6.3B | $9.8B | $11.2B | $11.3B | $12.6B | $16.2B | $12.8B | $15.2B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ≈ 92% | ≈ 98% | ≈ 93% | ≈ 92% | ≈ 96% | ≈ 86% | ≈ 91% | ≈ 88% | ≈ 89% | ≈ 87% | ≈ 85% | Combined ratioCombined |
| 56% | 64% | 60% | 60% | 66% | 58% | 56% | 53% | 52% | 50% | 48% | Loss ratioLoss |
| 9% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 6% | 15% | 10% | 15% | 14% | 14% | 15% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 4% | 12% | 8% | 13% | 12% | 12% | 13% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $60.5B | $63.2B | $63.0B | $62.7B | $67.2B | $72.3B | $75.7B | $80.1B | $84.0B | $88.0B | $88.9B | Float (reserves)Float |
| $159.8B | $167.0B | $167.8B | $176.9B | $190.8B | $200.1B | $199.0B | $230.7B | $246.5B | $272.3B | $275.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $4.0B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $5.8B | $6.1B | $4.8B | $7.0B | $7.2B | $7.7B | $7.3B | $7.7B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $48.3B | $51.2B | $50.3B | $55.3B | $59.4B | $58.3B | $50.5B | $59.5B | $64.0B | $73.8B | $73.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 466M | 471M | 467M | 459M | 453M | 443M | 424M | 414M | 408M | 402M | 395M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $8.87 | $8.19 | $8.49 | $9.71 | $7.79 | $19.24 | $12.39 | $21.80 | $22.70 | $25.68 | $28.63 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.52 | $2.78 | $2.86 | $2.95 | $3.06 | $3.16 | $3.25 | $3.37 | $3.52 | $3.75 | $3.85 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $103.61 | $108.60 | $107.78 | $120.57 | $131.09 | $131.61 | $119.28 | $143.67 | $156.73 | $183.70 | $186.99 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.1%/yr | +13.0%/yr |
| EPS | +12.5%/yr | +26.9%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +4.5%/yr | +4.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.6%/yr | +7.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$59.5Blow FY2016
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Combined ratio ≈ 87%Underwriting profitTotal benefits, losses and expenses $46.4B ÷ premiums earned $53.0BIndustry peers: median 100%
What this means
The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.
- Return on equity 14%SolidNet income $10.3B ÷ equity $73.8BIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $88.0B1.2× equityLoss and claim reserves $88.0B, 1.2× equity
What this means
Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $6.5B7.3% on the floatNet investment income $6.5B, 7.3% on the float
What this means
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Evan G. Greenberg | $23.2M | $42.0M | $8.5B |
| 2022 | Evan G. Greenberg | $25.2M | $44.2M | $5.2B |
| 2023 | Evan G. Greenberg | $27.7M | $35.7M | $9.0B |
| 2024 | Evan G. Greenberg | $30.1M | $55.4M | $9.3B |
| 2025 | Evan G. Greenberg | $33.2M | $58.5M | $10.3B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PGRProgressive Corp. | $87.7B | 95% | 72% | 22% |
| ALLAllstate Corp. | $67.7B | 100% | 65% | 13% |
| CBChubb Ltd. | $59.5B | 91% | 57% | 9% |
| TRVTravelers Companies | $48.8B | 99% | 67% | 12% |
| HIGThe Hartford Insurance Group Inc. | $28.4B | 107% | 68% | 13% |
| AIGAmerican International Group | $28.0B | 124% | 76% | 3% |
| ACGLArch Capital | $19.9B | 88% | 55% | 13% |
| LLoews Corp. | $18.5B | 149% | 76% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 100% | 67% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookAn insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Chubb Ltd.’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered6%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity17%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $47.2B on 388M shares, a 17% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Chubb Ltd. (CB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CB, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CAVA its page in the Manual CBAN →
Industry order: ← BRK-B the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter CINF →