Share count
118Mpeak FY2025
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CAVA, CAVA Group
A restaurant business, earning on traffic through its doors and the returns on each new unit.
The broad appeal of our brand is evidenced by substantial diversity across geographies, formats, dayparts, and channels.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+22.4% YoY · 24% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $787M
Revenue $292M +19.9% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 5.9% yr-ago 5.6%
Net income $15M yr-ago $18M
Net margin 5.0% yr-ago 7.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 0.6% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −11% to 4.7% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 13% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $500M | $564M | $729M | $964M | $1.2B | $1.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 13% | 12% | 14% | 13% | 12% | 11% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($53M) | ($60M) | $5M | $43M | $55M | $65M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −10.5% | −10.6% | 0.6% | 4.5% | 4.7% | 5.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($37M) | ($59M) | $13M | $130M | $64M | $62M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 5% | — | 10% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $3M | $6M | $97M | $161M | $185M | $210M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $45M | $43M | $47M | $60M | $74M | $78M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($9M) | $18M | $27M | ($43M) | $32M | $53M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $56M | $104M | $139M | $108M | $159M | $171M | CapexCapex |
| 11.3% | 18.5% | 19.0% | 11.2% | 13.5% | 13.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($41M) | ($37M) | $50M | $101M | $111M | $132M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −8.2% | −6.5% | 6.8% | 10.4% | 9.4% | 10.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($53M) | ($98M) | ($42M) | $53M | $26M | $39M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −10.6% | −17.4% | −5.7% | 5.5% | 2.2% | 3.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $8M | $911K | $3M | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | 2% | 13% | 10% | 10% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 2% | 19% | 8% | 8% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 2% | 19% | 8% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $140M | $39M | $332M | $366M | $283M | $296M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $3M | $4M | $5M | $6M | $11M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $5M | $6M | $8M | $9M | $9M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $14M | $17M | $26M | $37M | $33M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($6M) | ($8M) | ($13M) | ($22M) | ($13M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $58M | $355M | $394M | $431M | $445M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $84M | $109M | $133M | $163M | $168M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.7× | 3.3× | 3.0× | 2.7× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $584M | $984M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| ($140M) | ($39M) | ($332M) | ($366M) | ($283M) | ($296M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($393M) | ($449M) | $571M | $696M | $780M | $810M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.1% | 0.7% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.3% | 1.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| 1.5M | 1.3M | 63.4M | 118M | 118M | 118M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $341.58 | $424.79 | $11.48 | $8.15 | $9.97 | $10.87 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-25.54 | $-44.42 | $0.21 | $1.10 | $0.54 | $0.52 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-28.10 | $-27.63 | $0.78 | $0.85 | $0.94 | $1.12 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-36.14 | $-73.89 | $-0.66 | $0.45 | $0.22 | $0.33 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $38.46 | $78.43 | $2.19 | $0.91 | $1.34 | $1.45 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-268.46 | $-337.73 | $9.00 | $5.88 | $6.59 | $6.85 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2022 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×47.78 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.86 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −58.7%/yr | −58.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −56.8%/yr | −56.8%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
10%low FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$111Mowner earningsvs.$64Mnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2021FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $111M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $74M it takes just to hold its position. It put $85M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $26M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $64M | $130M | $13M | ($59M) | ($37M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$74M | +$60M | +$47M | +$43M | +$45M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$15M | +$14M | +$9M | +$4M | +$5M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$32M | −$43M | +$27M | +$18M | −$9M |
| Cash from operations | $185M | $161M | $97M | $6M | $3M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$74M | −$60M | −$47M | −$43M | −$45M |
| Owner earnings | $111M | $101M | $50M | ($37M) | ($41M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$85M | −$48M | −$91M | −$61M | −$12M |
| Free cash flow | $26M | $53M | ($42M) | ($98M) | ($53M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 9% | 10% | 7% | -7% | -8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $74M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $85M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer $96M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $283M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $283M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -8%–10%; latest $111M = operating cash $185M − maintenance capex $74MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 5 years. It chose to put $85M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $26M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves $96M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $185M ÷ net income $64M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $3M ÷ Owner Earnings $111M
What this means
Of $111M Owner Earnings, $3M (3%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $3M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($15M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.15×ExpandingCapex $159M ÷ depreciation $74M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.65×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.59/share (latest year $0.55), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.69/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −11% → 5% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −11% early to 5% lately, median 1% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2022 · −10.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Furthermore, if we fail to leverage artificial intelligence technologies as effectively or rapidly as our peers, our competitiveness could be materially and adversely impacted.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 19, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$445M
- Cash & short-term investments$296M
- Receivables$11M
- Inventory$9M
- Other current assets$129M
Current liabilities$168M
- Accounts payable$33M
- Other current liabilities$134M
Current ratio2.65×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.60×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.77×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$277Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+19.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$806Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($168M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$498M$498M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $466M (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$77Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$625Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$466Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$0
Lease obligations (present value)$466M
Total fixed claims on the business$466M
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $466M, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $452M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$566M · 125%
- Buybacks$12M · 3%
- Returned to owners$12M
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $12M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$125M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $125M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $12M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count7981.7%
The diluted count rose from 1M to 118M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained97%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($99M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $97M, so each retained $1 added about 0.97 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Brett Schulman | $17.1M | $46.5M | $50M |
| 2024 | Brett Schulman | $1.9M | $80.1M | $101M |
| 2025 | Brett Schulman | $3.9M | −$40.9M | $111M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$15M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 28% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why CAVA Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?7981.7%
Diluted shares grew 7981.7% over 2021–2025, even as the company spent $12M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?4 of 5 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 4 of the last 5 years, $15M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Restaurants
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| JACKJack in the Box | $1.5B | 56% | 19.1% | 19% | 8% |
| BJRIBJ's Restaurants Inc. | $1.4B | 74% | 2.2% | 6% | 3% |
| FWRGFirst Watch Restaurant Group Inc. | $1.2B | — | 2.3% | 2% | 4% |
| CAVACAVA Group | $1.2B | — | 0.6% | 10% | 7% |
| DINDine Brands Global Inc. | $879M | 63% | 17.1% | 9% | 12% |
| PTLOPortillo's Inc. | $732M | — | 8.2% | 7% | 6% |
| WINGWingstop | $697M | 80% | 25.6% | 48% | 19% |
| SGSweetgreen Inc. | $679M | — | -30.2% | -43% | -16% |
| Group median | — | — | 5.2% | 8% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CAVA Group has delivered.
CAVA Group’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, CAVA Group earns about $80M on its 6.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−51%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+50%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $39M on 116M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-12; net cash $296M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($171M) runs well above depreciation ($78M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $137M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CAVA Group (CAVA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CAVA, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CATY its page in the Manual CB →
Industry order: ← CAKE the Restaurants chapter CBRL →